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Preface
Management services are now an established and growing part of 
the practice of most firms of certified public accountants. The first 
series of management services bulletins published (1959-63) under the 
supervision of the committee on management services of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants was designed to stimulate 
the interest of all members of the profession in this relatively new area 
by describing a variety of management services engagements offered, 
and to encourage all practitioners to develop the competence necessary 
to perform in this important field.
The purpose of this new series of technical studies is to help mem­
bers of the profession build upon the progress made to date. The 
profession can continue to move ahead only as fast as it is able to 
increase the quantity and quality of well trained management services 
practitioners able to advise on increasingly complex business problems.
Cost Analysis for Product Line Decisions represents the first effort in 
this series of technical studies in management services.
It is hoped that this series will be useful to the practitioner in the 
following manner:
First, that the brief text and series of individual cases will give the 
CPA some additional perspective into an area in which he may elect to 
serve his clients.
Second, that this and additional management services technical 
studies will assist him in carrying out an engagement.
Third, that the series will be useful to many CPA firms as a staff 
training device.
In addition to benefiting the practitioner, educators will find this 
series to be a valuable source of supplemental reading to give the 
student of accounting an insight into the ever-expanding role of the 
CPA.
The contents of this technical study are divided into two sections: 
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(1) textual material concerning the type of analysis covered by the 
study, and (2) four case studies describing engagements performed by  
CPAs in that area. All of the case studies are based on actual situations, 
although the names, locations, and, in some cases, minor details have 
been changed. In a few instances the figures also have been changed. 
Where this has been done, every effort has been made to avoid dis­
torting significant relationships.
Each case study consists of two parts: (1) a description of the 
client situation as it unfolded to the practitioner, and (2) a description 
of how the practitioner dealt with the situation. The cases are pre­
sented in this format to enable readers to use them as a self-teaching 
device.
Several questions are asked at the end of part one: questions re­
quiring quantitative analysis of the data in the case; questions about 
how the job should be approached; questions about fee estimates or 
man-day requirements; and so forth. It is suggested that the reader 
should plan to read part one carefully and prepare answers to the 
questions presented before proceeding to part two. Part two then 
provides an opportunity for the reader to compare his analysis with 
that prepared by the practitioner.
Most management decisions do not have just one obviously right 
answer. Therefore, the reader’s solution to a case may frequently, and 
perhaps appropriately, differ from the approach taken by the practi­
tioner. Working through the series of cases over a period of several 
weeks the management services student should find increasing con­
fidence in his ability to size up a situation and devise an approach for 
dealing with the particular problem area discussed in this bulletin.
This technical study was prepared under the general supervision of 
Professor Richard Vancil, D.B.A., CPA, Harvard Business School. As­
sistance in the field research and case writing was provided by Dr. 
James S. Hekimian, Dr. Charles J. Christenson, Dr. David F. Hawkins, 
Dr. Robert C. Deming, L. Paul Berman, and Robert C. Hill.
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Cost Analysis for Product 
Line Decisions
The lifeblood of a business is its product line. If a business does not 
provide goods or services which customers want, of a quality they 
want, and at a price they can and will pay, the business will be found 
to have no economic purpose and will sooner or later disappear. If 
the product line is not or cannot be sold at a price which yields a 
profit, a business entity will not endure, since there will be neither the 
incentive nor the sources of capital necessary to sustain it.
Product lines are not static. They are bom, rise, fall, and ultimately 
they die. They move through their life cycle in response to many 
influences, some of which are within while others are without the 
company’s control. Products change in attractiveness; sales volumes 
change; individual companies increase or decrease their shares of the 
market; new competitive products emerge, etc. It is an entirely logical 
fact of life that throughout the life cycle of a product its price-cost- 
profitability relationship will change many times. Some of these 
changes will be long in duration and some will be short. The price- 
cost-profitability relationship will have an important bearing on the 
degree of effort which a company will make to manufacture and sell 
various items in its product line. At some time the relationship usually 
will reach a point where the decision is made to eliminate the product.
Product lines are thus not only the lifeblood of a business, but they 
also become a source of many of its major problems.
The CPA’s Role in Product Decisions
Many businessmen recognize that the development and interpreta­
tion of significant financial data are prerequisites to making an intelli­
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gent decision about the present and the future of specific products. 
For this reason, the CPA is often asked to help management in studies 
involving product line decisions. One of the areas in which he is most 
often asked to help is where cost-price-profitability analyses are in­
volved. The CPA is asked for his help in such studies because he is 
familiar with business in general and with his client’s business in 
particular. He is also asked to help because the CPA’s analytical skills 
are of great value in identifying cost and profit relationships, often 
under rather obscure conditions.
In this bulletin the reader will be able to observe a number of im­
portant points which are involved in cost analysis for product line 
decisions:
1. That the necessary data desired are often not available and that 
the effort which should be expended in developing the necessary in­
formation should be governed by its importance to the analysis and 
the cost which would be incurred to obtain the data.
2. That cost analyses which may be useful for one purpose (e.g., 
inventory evaluation for financial statements or tax purposes) often 
do not produce the information necessary for another purpose (e.g., 
product line decisions). Therefore, the cost analyses which are most 
appropriate in a given set of circumstances are determined primarily 
by the use to which the information will be put.
3. That while information about past or present costs, prices, profits, 
and values is useful and indicative, information which is concerned 
with future costs, prices, profits, and values is far more significant. 
Today’s decisions must relate to events which lie ahead.
4. That at times the absolute level of costs is not as significant as 
the degree of variability which exists in these costs; that, in other 
words, changes which can be made in costs and prices as the result 
of taking one course of action rather than another are often the key 
elements in management decisions; that decisions which are made for 
the short term should usually be based upon short-term variations in 
profits and costs but decisions which are to be taken for the longer 
term should normally give major consideration to long-term changes 
in profits and costs; that one of the worst things that the business 
can do is to make or not make a long-term decision on the basis of its 
short-term consequences in relation to profits and costs.
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5. That in the long run a company must make a profit based upon 
the full absorption of costs if it is to use its assets effectively enough 
to provide earnings and future capital resources. In the short term, 
however, it may be better for a company to suffer a loss in terms of full 
costs if in so doing a short-term contribution to the absorption of fixed 
costs is provided by this action.
6. That the fact that cost analyses contain a degree of uncertainty 
does not justify the failure to make them, and in making them the 
CPA must exercise due professional care. Uncertainties about the 
future may be recognized in the form of hedged decisions or by pro­
viding for frequent determinations of the actual results of the decision 
which has been made. The need for the analysis, however, exists in 
spite of its attendant problems because the decision maker has no 
other source of comparable information to which he can turn.
The following case is used to highlight discussion on the important 
points noted above.
The Randall Company
Mr. Randall became concerned because his 1964 income statement 
(Exhibit I ) showed a loss. The company had been fluctuating between 
a small loss and a small profit for several years without giving signs 
of making the kind of progress which would significantly change the 
situation. Mr. Randall decided to accept the suggestion of Mr. Clark, 
his CPA, that the two discuss the problem.
Mr. Clark already knew a great deal about the company. He knew 
that The Randall Company, a small manufacturer, produced three 
products: A, B, and C. Product B, a standard item, was produced for 
inventory in large quantities on special purpose equipment. Product A 
required similar manufacturing processes to B, and was made to cus­
tomer specifications on the same equipment. Although many proced­
ures were common to both A and B, a major difference was that A, 
because of customer specifications, required considerably more hand 
labor. Product C was a related but completely separate line. Two 
salesmen traveled around established territories selling all three 
products. Their orders were forwarded to the office daily. Generally,
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A and C were given manufacturing priority because B was almost 
always available in inventory. During slack times, B was produced 
until the inventory on hand reached the maximum quantity that man­
agement thought prudent.
THE RANDALL COMPANY
Statement of Income
For the Year Ended December 31, 1964
Exhibit 1
Sales revenue $164,000
Cost of goods sold
Materials and supplies $46,800
Factory payroll 57,000
Factory overhead
Depreciation $12,300
Factory expense 4,100
Heat, light, power 1,000
Insurance 600 18,000
Total cost of goods sold 121,800
Gross margin $ 42,200
Selling, general, and administrative expenses
Miscellaneous $ 200
Office expenses 1,000
Office payroll 28,000
Professional services 300
Real estate tax 500
Sales promotion 14,700
Telephone and telegraph 1,100
Total selling, general, and administrative expenses 45,800
Net loss on operations $ (3,600)
Analysis and Diagnosis
Mr. Clark decided that before he could begin to advise his client, 
he would have to analyze the 1964 results in some detail. He realized 
that the first step in his analysis should be the determination of the 
revenue, cost, and profitability of each product line. In accumulating 
the cost data he planned also to separate the various cost elements 
so that he could determine how each cost element might vary in the 
future in response to management actions in improving product or 
overall profitability.
Based upon his knowledge of the company’s accounting procedures
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he realized that all the information required could not be drawn 
directly from the records. The accounts and format he visualized for 
each product were as follows:
Sales revenue
Variable costs which could be identified with each product and 
which varied directly with production or sales, such as
Materials 
Direct labor 
Payroll taxes 
Salesmen’s commissions
Overhead costs which could not be specifically identified with 
products and which did not vary directly with production or 
sales, such as
Factory overhead
Other selling and administrative expenses.
Mr. Clark knew that he would have difficulty in making this analysis 
and he therefore set out, from the start, not to make a perfect analysis 
but rather one which, when balanced, needed accuracy coupled with 
the cost of making the study.
Sales Revenue by Products
Sales revenue presented practically no problem because Mr. Clark 
was able to find out from the production records the number of units 
of each product that had been shipped. Selling prices on products B 
and C had been stable during the year, but product A sold for a range 
of prices depending on the particular requirements of the customer. 
Using these facts Mr. Clark was able to obtain an average selling price 
for A by the following calculation:
Total sales revenue $164,000
Less:
Product Quantity Sold Unit Price Total
B 20,000 $3.50 $70,000
C 50,000 1.02 51,000 121,000
Sales of A 10,000 4.30 $ 43,000
To substantiate this approach Mr. Clark asked a clerk to analyze 
sales for one month by product lines; he found the difference to be 
extremely small.
At this point Mr. Clark began making a fist of changes that should 
be made in Randall’s chart of accounts. Three separate sales accounts
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would be simple to maintain, and would automatically provide in­
formation by product line.
Manufacturing Costs by Products
The analysis of manufacturing costs was a more formidable task. 
The discussion below describes the procedures used by Mr. Clark in 
his analysis of variable costs, factory overhead, selling, and general 
and administrative expenses. Each section below concludes with a 
brief summary of typical problems encountered in the analysis of 
each of these types of costs.
Materials. In order for Mr. Clark to identify these costs by product 
lines, he decided that materials expense would have to be separated 
from supplies expense, since the three lines used differing percentages 
of the two. This turned out to be fairly easy, because purchases of 
materials and supplies were from different vendors. Materials cost 
amounted to $46,000 and supplies to $800.
Identifying raw material by product line, however, was another 
matter. All three items used the same raw material, but there was no 
apparent way of establishing how much was used by each line from 
the accounting records. One fair method of allocation seemed to be to 
look at the finished product of each line and to determine how much 
raw material ended up in each. Mr. Clark thought that this could be 
done with reasonable accuracy simply by weighing the finished product 
and assigning the total cost on the basis of relative weights. One flaw 
with this method was that it assumed uniform spoilage in relation to 
weight. After speaking with the plant manager, Mr. Clark was con­
vinced that spoilage ran lower on line B than on the other products. 
The other two lines, requiring more manual operations, accounted for 
more spoilage. On the other hand, the plant manager said that total 
spoilage was a very small amount, and Mr. Clark decided that the 
effort of running down this figure would not be worth the increased 
accuracy. For the purposes of his analysis, Mr. Clark was convinced 
that the allocation by weight was reasonably close to the actual cost. 
This turned out to be $.50, $1.40, and $.26 per unit for A, B, and C 
respectively.
Supplies. Supplies consisted mostly of compounds used by produc­
tion workers at various stages of manufacture. Usage of the compounds 
seemed to be pretty much a function of direct labor. This was con­
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firmed by the plant manager who observed that product A, which 
employed more hand labor, used the most, and product B, the least. 
It seemed therefore that the best way to allocate this cost of $800 to 
each product was on a basis of direct labor hours, which hours had 
already been determined by Mr. Clark. The supplies were distributed
to products as follows:
Product
Direct
Labor Hours Per Cent
Share of 
Supplies
A 10,000 50 $400
B 4,000 20 160
C 6,000 30 240
20,000 100 $800
Direct labor. This item posed a problem for Mr. Clark. He began 
by looking down the payroll list and noticed that some people could 
very easily be identified with a particular line and others could not. 
He decided to divide the payroll into three separate categories: direct 
labor, indirect labor, and supervision. This way he could deal with the 
easily assignable direct labor expense first and get it out of the way.
Direct labor totaled $41,000; indirect labor, $7,000; and supervision,
$9,000.
Product
Number 
of Men
Payroll
Hours
Payroll
Cost
Units
Produced
Cost/
Unit
Cost/
Hour
C
A & B
3
7
6,000
14,000
$12,000
29,000
50,000 $ .24 $2.00
Total 10 20,000 $41,000
A & B
B (piece
rate)
14,000
4,000
$29,000
9,000 20,000 .45 2.25
A 10,000 $20,000 10,000 2.00 2.00
Of the ten production line workers, three worked exclusively on 
product C and were paid an hourly wage. Their wages, therefore, were 
charged directly to product C. Seven other men alternated between 
products A and B. Ordinarily, there was some inventory of product 
B on hand, and the men would work on product A when there was 
work to be done. When the backlog of orders for product A was low, 
a couple of men would go to work making product B for inventory. The 
men were paid on a piece rate basis for their output of product B and, 
therefore, it was important to keep track of the hours worked on each
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line. The data made it easy to assign direct labor expense between 
products A and B. The hourly rate on products A and C was $2.00; 
for product B the piece rate was 45¢ per unit. This meant that the 
direct labor cost per unit for the three products was $2.00, $.45, and 
$.24 as shown by the recapitulation above.
Indirect labor. In this category were the wages of two men who 
performed various janitorial and material handling functions. This 
mostly involved carrying materials to work areas, carrying finished 
products to the storeroom or shipping area, and sweeping up the 
work areas. After some thought, Mr. Clark decided that the wages 
of these men, $7,000, should be included in overhead and distributed 
to products on the basis of direct labor hours worked.
Product
Direct 
Labor Hours
Share of
Indirect Labor Supervision
A 10,000 $ 3,500 $ 3,570
B 4,000 1,400 1,430
C 6,000 2,100 4,000
20,000 $ 7,000 $ 9,000
Having completed his analysis of the sales revenue, materials and 
supplies, and factory payroll accounts, Mr. Clark decided to summarize 
his work at this point as follows:
Sales revenue
Total
$164,000
A
$43,000
B
$70,000
C
$51,000
Variable costs
Materials 46,000 5,000 28,000 13,000
Direct labor 41,000 20,000 9,000 12,000
Total 87,000 25,000 37,000 25,000
Difference 77,000 18,000 33,000 26,000
% 47.0 42.0 47.0 51.0
Overhead expense
Supplies 800 400 160 240
Indirect labor 7,000 3,500 1,400 2,100
Supervision 9,000 3,570 1,430 4,000
Total 16,800 7,470 2,990 6,340
Difference $ 60,200 $10,530 $30,010 $19,660
% 36.7 24.5 42.9 38.5
Supervision. In this category were the wages of the two foremen in 
the plant, one responsible for product C at a salary of $4,000 per year, 
and one for products A and B at an annual salary of $5,000. It 
seemed reasonable to assign the total wages for the former to product 
C. For products A and B, Mr. Clark decided to allocate the super­
vision cost on the basis of direct labor hours.
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Since indirect labor cost and a portion of supervision were both al­
located to products on the basis of direct labor hours they were dis­
tributed together as shown above.
Mr. Clark observed that although the margin between sales revenue 
and the expenses analyzed thus far amounted to 36.7% of total sales, 
there were significant differences (from 24.5% to 42.9%) among 
products.
Summary. Mr. Clark’s analysis of Randall’s cost illustrates several 
typical problems in the determination of costs for individual products. 
In general, all these problems are concerned with balancing the degree 
of accuracy which is desired, against the cost of obtaining more 
accurate data. For example, the cost of indirect supplies and the 
losses due to spoilage are both susceptible to much greater refinement, 
but both of these costs are relatively minor for this company. In 
another situation, these costs might be significant and, therefore, worth 
the cost of a more careful analysis.
Similarly, a more precise measurement of direct labor costs per unit 
might be obtained, but might also be quite expensive. If Mr. Clark 
had thought that a more detailed analysis of indirect labor costs was 
worthwhile, he could have broken out the time of the workers on 
products A and B and assigned this cost more accurately to the two 
product lines. Mr. Clark’s solution was probably appropriate for a 
business of this size, especially in view of the limited available data 
and the purely diagnostic purpose of his analysis.
The least expensive way for a business to obtain accurate, detailed 
prime cost data is to collect this data as it goes along. Mr. Clark will 
be able to improve and refine his cost analysis within a few months by 
expanding Randall’s chart of accounts to provide a better classification 
of prime costs. New accounts are needed both by product line and 
by type of material and labor cost.
Factory Overhead
The factory overhead accounts as shown on the company’s state­
ment, Exhibit I, were as follows:
Depreciation $12,300
Factory expense 4,100
Heat, light, and power 1,000
Insurance 600
Total $18,000
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Mr. Clark’s major problem in dealing with the factory overhead 
costs was the determination of appropriate bases for allocating these 
costs to the three product lines. In examining each item, he found 
that he had some difficult decisions to make.
Depreciation. Mr. Clark knew that the depreciation figure reported 
on the income statement included both building and equipment, 
and that the amounts for these two accounts were available. Total 
building depreciation was $4,500, and equipment depreciation was 
$7,800. Mr. Clark felt that different bases should be used to allocate 
these costs, and decided to treat them separately.
A common way of charging building depreciation to product lines 
is on the basis of space occupied. The total area of the plant was 
15,000 square feet, broken down as follows:
Product
A & B jointly 
C
Other
Total square feet
Space Occupied
1,700 sq. ft.
900 sq. ft.
6,400 sq. ft.
3,000 sq. ft.
3,000 sq. ft.
15,000
A
B
The square footage allocated to A and B jointly represents the space 
occupied by the equipment used in producing A and B. In order to 
further subdivide the space occupied by A and B jointly, Mr. Clark 
asked the plant manager for the amount of machine hours devoted 
to each product. The plant manager indicated that in the absence of 
accurate data a fair estimate between the two products would be 500 
machine hours for A and 3,500 machine hours for B. Mr. Clark used 
this relationship to reallocate the 6,400 square feet of common space, 
resulting in the following estimated space usage:
Product Square Feet Per Cent
A 2,500 17%
B 6,500 43%
C 3,000 20%
Other 3,000 20%
Total 15,000 100%
The category classified above as “other” was used for storage, re­
ceiving and shipping, rest rooms, sales, and clerical and administrative 
offices. Mr. Clark decided that the simplest way to deal with non­
productive space was to ignore it in computing percentage allocations.
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The final space allocation percentages and building depreciation costs 
by product line therefore are as follows:
Product Square Feet Per Cent Depreciation
A 2,500 21% $ 950
B 6,500 54% 2,430
C 3,000 25% 1,120
Total 12,000 100% $4,500
Mr. Clark pointed out to Mr. Randall that allocating this cost was 
quite different from assigning prime costs to products. Space alloca­
tion was for expenses that would be incurred regardless of production, 
and not necessarily for expenses directly caused by a product line. Mr. 
Clark felt that the above allocation of depreciation expense was fair 
in that depreciation is the result of having a building in which manu­
facturing may take place; also, each product’s need for manufacturing 
space within a building is roughly proportional to the space actually 
occupied. Therefore, the only reasonable basis upon which to allocate 
this expense is on the square feet occupied basis.
In Mr. Clark’s opinion, there were several other building expenses 
that could be appropriately allocated on the basis of space utilized. 
These costs were grouped into an “occupancy” category, described 
later.
Mr. Clark next analyzed the equipment depreciation cost of $7,800. 
Line C had its own particular equipment. Therefore, that portion of 
the total equipment depreciation charge was made directly to product 
C. This amounted to $2,100. Depreciation of office equipment was $100 
per year. Mr. Clark classified this item as an administrative expense. 
Finally, Mr. Clark had to decide how to allocate the $5,600 of depre­
ciation on the equipment shared by products A and B. Depreciation 
expense on equipment stems from the need to have equipment usage 
available. Thus, this expense could be allocated between products A 
and B based on machine hour usage. This resulted in the following 
allocation of machinery depreciation by product line:
Total machinery depreciation $7,800
Product C — direct $2,100
Products A & B (machine hours)
A — 500 $ 700
B — 3,500 4,900 5,600
Transferred to administrative
expenses 100
Total distributed $7,800
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Factory expense. After analyzing this account, Mr. Clark found 
that it contained three different types of expense: gas and oil 
($420), payroll taxes ($3,280), and small tools ($400). Since he 
could think of no one factor which would provide a reasonable basis 
for allocation of factory expense in total, he decided to handle each 
item separately.
Gas and oil were used in operating the machinery. After speaking 
with the foremen, Mr. Clark concluded that the use of gas and oil 
depended primarily on the number of hours that each machine was in 
use. The foreman of line C told Mr. Clark that his machinery operated 
about 2,000 hours per year. With this additional information Mr. Clark 
had all the data he needed to allocate this cost as shown below:
Product
Machine
Hours Per Cent
Gas and 
Oil Cost
A 500 8 $ 30
B 3,500 59 250
C 2,000 33 140
6,000 100 $420
Payroll taxes approximated 4 per cent of total payroll. An analysis 
revealed that $1,640 was applicable to direct labor, $560 to supervision 
and indirect labor, and $1,080 to administrative employees. Mr. Clark 
decided to allocate the payroll taxes on direct labor to products on a 
direct labor dollar basis, and the payroll taxes on supervision and in­
direct labor to each product on the basis of total payroll costs for these 
two accounts. This allocation is shown below:
Payroll taxes on direct labor — $1,640
Product
Direct Labor
Cost
Payroll Tax — 4% of 
Direct Labor Cost
A $20,000 $ 800
B 9,000 360
C 12,000 480
$41,000 $1,640
Payroll tax on supervision and indirect labor — $560
Product
Supervision and In­
direct Labor Cost
Payroll Tax — 3.5% (approx.) 
of Payroll Cost
A $ 7,070 $250
B 2,830 100
C 6,100 210
$16,000 $560
12
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The small tools expense of $400 included everything from small hand 
tools to parts such as nuts and bolts. The authorization to purchase 
these items came from the two foremen. Mr. Clark found that these 
small tools were used throughout the factory. In giving this matter 
further thought Mr. Clark found that the small tools requisitions orig­
inated with the line workers for use in their specific tasks. This indi­
cated that direct labor hours would probably be as accurate a basis as 
any. The foremen agreed that this was a reasonable basis for alloca­
tion purposes, and Mr. Clark distributed this cost as follows:
Product
Direct Labor 
Hours Per Cent
Share of 
Small Tools
A 10,000 50 $200
B 4,000 20 80
C 6,000 30 120
20,000 100 $400
Occupancy costs. Upon examining the heat, light, and power cost 
of $1,000, Mr. Clark’s first reaction was to separate power from the 
two other expenses because power varied with machine hours, while 
heat and light were related to space usage. However, the electric com­
pany billed those expenses as one item, and Mr. Randall was not dis­
posed to install separate meters for allocation purposes. The electric 
company billed according to a minimum basic charge after which addi­
tional electricity was billed at a lower rate. Mr. Clark concluded 
therefore that it would be reasonable to treat the entire amount as 
related to space occupancy. This basis would introduce a slight in­
accuracy because product B used more power than products A and C. 
However, product B occupied more space than the other two products. 
Mr. Clark was of the opinion that the effort expended in attempting to 
refine the allocation would not be worth the benefits to be realized.
Mr. Clark used the same reasoning in allocating the insurance ex­
pense of $600 on the basis of occupancy. He also decided to remove 
the real estate taxes of $300 from the administrative expense category 
and to allocate it as part of the total occupancy cost.
The allocated amounts of these three expense accounts were allo­
cated to products as follows:
Share of
Product
Floor
Space
Per
Cent
Heat, Light, 
and Power Insurance*
Real Estate 
Taxes*
A 2,500 21 $ 210 $130 $ 60
B 6,500 54 540 320 160
C 3,000 25 250 150 80
12,000 100 $1,000 $600 $300
* Rounded off to nearest tenths.
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Summary
Allocating factory overhead expenses can be a difficult task, as illus­
trated by Mr. Clark’s analysis in connection with The Randall Com­
pany. The difficulty stems from the fact that most factory overhead 
expenses are incurred in creating and maintaining the capacity to 
produce; they therefore cannot be as directly associated with indi­
vidual product costs. This distinction is significant in many manage­
ment decisions.
Mr. Clark felt it desirable to allocate both prime costs and capacity- 
related overhead costs to products. The reasons for allocating the 
former are obvious; the reasons for doing so with respect to the latter 
deserve some examination.
Capacity-related costs represent past investments in resources 
which are still available to the firm. Advocates of direct costing* 
argue that these costs should be disregarded in any current decision 
because: (1) They represent past investments, and (2) current de­
cisions mainly concern the future. Others argue that this reasoning 
ignores the fact that the resources which are still available to the 
firm often can be used for more than one purpose with more than one 
rate of profitability and that their existence should be taken into ac­
count in current decisions, particularly in evaluating the profitability 
of individual product lines.
Capacity-related costs usually are not changed immediately or 
directly by a product line decision, but the use of the resources they 
represent can more often be changed. This reasoning is consistent 
with the argument that capacity costs are relatively fixed and therefore 
should be ignored in many types of decision making; but it recognizes 
the fact that the use to which resources are put may be variable. We 
should not, however, overlook the fact that capacity-related costs can 
usually, as the result of more drastic action or over a longer period of 
time, be substantially changed.
The value of allocating overhead costs lies primarily in its use as 
a diagnostic device for management. Management must examine the 
production, distribution, and sales aspects of a product to find out 
whether a product is capable of carrying its share of the capacity 
costs. The reason for this is evident—if products do no more than carry 
costs, there can be no profit.
For each type of expense, Mr. Clark has attempted to relate the 
expense to the resource being consumed in manufacturing products
* See Item 4 in the bibliography for a discussion of this subject.
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A, B, and C. The reason for his cost allocations is that support costs 
used in the consumption of the resource become an integral part of 
the production process, even though they cannot be directly identified 
in the finished product. If, for example, product A cannot carry the 
$950 of building depreciation assigned to it, perhaps management 
should consider some alternative way of using the 2,500 square feet 
of space that product A requires.
The amount of accuracy required for allocating costs will vary 
depending on the specific problem or decision. All unit costs are 
really only estimates. Careful, overly precise cost allocations may be­
come more expensive to prepare than the value derived from them. 
Simple allocations are not only inexpensive but may also be extremely 
useful to management in evaluating product lines.
Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses
Referring to Exhibit 1, Mr. Clark noted that Randall’s general over­
head expenses amounted to nearly 30 per cent of total sales. In order 
to incorporate his reclassification of certain accounts, Clark recom­
puted the total general expenses as follows:
Total general expenses per Exhibit 1 $45,800
Plus: Payroll taxes on office salaries 1,080
Depreciation on office equipment 100
Less: Real estate taxes reclassified as occupancy cost (300)
Total general expenses $46,680
In looking over these expenses, Mr. Randall stated that it would 
be difficult to identify most of them with any particular product lin e  
because the expenses were incurred for the benefit of all lines or the 
business as a whole. To make sure that nothing was being overlooked, 
Mr. Clark checked into the kinds of expenses under each main head­
ing. He found the following:
Office expense 
Contributions 
Postage 
Supplies
Office payroll
Executive and office salaries 
Salesmen’s salaries
Sales promotion 
Advertising 
Commissions 
Travel
$ 100 
400
500 $ 1,000
$14,000
14,000 $28,000
$ 900
8,200
5,600 $14,700
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Randall employed two salesmen. Their job consisted of calling on 
accounts within a certain territory on a regular basis and taking orders 
for all three products. In addition to a salary, they were paid a com­
mission of 5 per cent of sales on all orders. Clearly, Mr. Clark thought, 
the commissions expense, being a variable expense, should be charged 
to the product lines based on the relative proportion of sales revenue 
coming from each. In fact, Mr. Clark decided that sales revenue was 
as good a basis as any for allocating the rest of the selling and admin­
istrative expenses. The total of such expenses was 23.46 per cent of 
sales (38,480 ÷  164,000).
In order to summarize his analysis, and to illustrate that his figures 
agreed with Exhibit 1, Mr. Clark then prepared the product line in­
come statement shown in Exhibit 2.
Having come this far, it was evident that the $3,600 loss which 
precipitated this investigation was caused primarily by product A. 
Neither products B nor C resulted in significant profits, and the loss 
caused by product A was making the company as a whole operate at 
a loss. Mr. Clark then discussed these product statements with Mr. 
Randall to determine what alternative courses of action were available 
to increase company profits.
Some Tentative Conclusions
At this point, it might be well to summarize what Messrs. Clark and 
Randall knew about the situation:
Total A B C
Sales $164M $43M $70M $51M
Variable expenses 97 28 41 28
Contribution $ 67 $15 $29 $23
"Fixed” manufacturing, selling, 
and administrative expenses 71 20 28 23
Net profit or (loss) ($ 4) ($ 5) $ 1 —
Some conclusions could also be drawn from the information which 
was at hand:
1. None of the products were contributing enough profit to make 
this a healthy company. The company needed to obtain better sales 
prices or sales volumes, lower its costs, or add more profitable new 
products to its product line.
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2. Something should be done about product A since it was the 
direct cause of the loss for the year. In the long run the product either 
had to be dropped or its performance substantially improved. In the 
short run a decision also had to be made as to whether to drop the 
product or to continue it, awaiting the improvement of product A 
or awaiting the improvement of products B and C to a point where 
A’s loss was small enough not to be of concern, or until better products 
could be found to which the company’s resources should be applied.
Evaluation of Alternatives
Mr. Randall felt that it would be rather difficult, in light of present 
and future competitive conditions, to increase prices on product A. 
He also believed that if product A were continued the sales volume 
would approximate that of the year 1964. Finally, he believed his 
own labor and material costs would be unchanged—or that if there 
were a change, these costs could be recovered through increased sell­
ing prices. Mr. Randall felt that the only available alternative to con­
tinuing product A was to drop product line A and try to live off 
products B and C.
Mr. Clark mentioned the fact that dropping product A would not 
automatically increase the company’s profit by $5,040. While there 
were certain costs, (material, direct labor, payroll taxes, and sales 
commissions) which would be eliminated by dropping the line, there 
were other costs, (depreciation, real estate taxes, and insurance to 
mention a few) which would continue, while certain other expenses, 
(oil, small tools, light, heat, and power) would change, although not 
proportionately with sales. Therefore, in order to determine the effect 
which dropping the line would have on overall company profits, it 
would be necessary to analyze each account in some detail.
Working together, Mr. Randall and Mr. Clark attempted to predict 
just what the results would be if product A were discontinued. Exhibit 
3 summarizes their analysis as discussed below.
Total sales revenue would clearly be reduced by $43,000 if product 
A were eliminated. It remained to be determined, however, whether 
the reduction in costs would be as great or greater than the reduction 
in revenue. In making this analysis, the classification of costs into 
variable and overhead expenses as shown on Exhibit 2 is of con­
siderable assistance.
It would be reasonable to assume that the total material cost would 
be eliminated. On direct labor costs, Mr. Randall reasoned that only
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Exhibit 2
THE RANDALL COMPANY
Statement of Income by Product Line 
For the Year Ended December 31, 1964
Total
Product
A
Product
B
Product
C
Sales revenue $164,000 $43,000 $70,000 $51,000
Variable expense:
Materials 46,000 5,000 28,000 13,000
Direct labor 41,000 20,000 9,000 12,000
Payroll taxes 1,640 800 360 480
Sales commission 8,200 2,150 3,500 2,550
Total variable cost $ 96,840 $27,950 $40,860 $28,030
Contribution to overhead and profit $ 67,160 $15,050 $29,140 $22,970
% Contribution 41.0 35.0 41.6 45.0
Manufacturing expenses:
Supplies $ 800 $ 400 $ 160 $ 240
Indirect labor 7,000 3,500 1,400 2,100
Supervision 9,000 3,570 1,430 4,000
Building depreciation 4,500 950 2,430 1,120
Machinery depreciation 7,700 700 4,900 2,100
Gas and oil 420 30 250 140
Payroll taxes 560 250 100 210
Small tools 400 200 80 120
Light, heat, and power 1,000 210 540 250
Insurance 600 130 320 150
Real estate taxes 300 60 160 80
Total manufacturing $ 32,280 $10,000 $11,770 $10,510
five men would be laid off. This would be done on the basis of 
seniority and would eliminate $18,000. In the past the company had 
worked its men on an hourly basis and it had always been these five 
men, if any, who had been temporarily laid off. All other employees 
had been with The Randall Company for some time and possessed 
valuable skills. In discussing this matter with Mr. Clark, Mr. Randall 
explained that the remaining men would be kept on full salary regard­
less of the workload. Certain skills and experience were necessary to 
the business, and he did not want to risk losing these skills and experi­
ence by laying off any more men. (A long discussion ensued between
18
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Exhibit 2
THE RANDALL COMPANY
Statement of Income by Product Line
For the Year Ended December 31, 1964 
(continued)
Total
Product
A
Product
B
Product
C
Selling and administrative:
Executive and office salaries 
Salesmen’s salaries
Payroll taxes
Travel expenses
Contributions
Postage
Supplies
Advertising
Depreciation
Miscellaneous
Professional services
Real estate taxes
Telephone and telegraph
$ 14,000 
14,000 
1,080 
5,600 
100 
400 
500 
900 
100 
200 
300 
200
1,100
Total selling and
administrative $ 38,480 10,090 16,420 11,970
Total overhead $ 70,760 $20,090 $28,190 $22,480
% Overhead 43.1 46.7 40.2 44.0
Net income or (loss) $ (3,600) $(5,040) $ 950 $ 490
% Net income or (loss) (2.1) (11.7) 1.4 .9
Mr. Clark and Mr. Randall during which Mr. Randall agreed that if 
this were a matter of life or death—or perhaps if they were talking 
of a longer period—more drastic cuts could be made. However, they 
agreed that for the purposes of this decision, they would consider the 
changes Mr. Randall might reasonably be expected to make in the 
next year.)
Thus, not all of the direct labor cost charged to product A was 
eliminated by dropping product A. Since the payroll tax is about 
4 per cent of payroll dollars, this expense account would be reduced 
by $720 not $800. The full amount of the sales commission would 
be eliminated.
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Exhibit 3
THE RANDALL COMPANY
Contribution Analysis of Product Line A
Account 1964 Elimination
Remaining
Costs
Sales revenue $43,000 $43,000
Variable costs:
Material $ 5,000 $ 5,000
Direct labor 20,000 18,000 $ 2,000
Payroll taxes 800 720 80
Sales commissions 2,150 2,150
$27,950 $25,870 $ 2,080
Manufacturing expenses:
Supplies $ 400 $ 400
Indirect labor 3,500 3,500
Supervision 3,570 4,000 $ (430)
Building depreciation 950 950
Machinery depreciation 700 700
Gas and oil 30 30
Payroll taxes 250 250
Small tools 200 150 50
Light, heat, and power 210 100 110
Insurance 130 130
Real estate taxes 60 60
$10,000 $ 8,430 $ 1,570
Selling and administrative:
Postage $ 100 $ 20 $ 80
Supplies 130 30 100
Travel expenses 1,470 300 1,170
All other 8,390 8,390
$10,090 $ 350 $ 9,740
Total cost and expenses 48,040 34,650 13,390
Net income or (loss) ($ 5,040)
Contribution to overhead
and profits (excess of
sales eliminated over
cost eliminated) $ 8,350
Balance to be absorbed by
Products B and C $13,390
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The fact that all of the variable types of costs and expenses do not 
vary directly with sales volume shows quite clearly the need for cost 
analysis depending upon the individual circumstances.
One of the two indirect laborers could be laid off, which would equal 
the cost allocation to product A. Although supplies expense was 
allocated to product A on the basis of direct labor hours, it was felt 
that the full amount would be eliminated if product A were discon­
tinued.
The foreman on product line C could be laid off and the foreman 
of product line A could be assigned the responsibility for product lines 
B and C.
In the analysis of factory overhead, neither the building nor the 
machinery depreciation amounts would be effected by the discon­
tinuance of product A. Since gas and oil varied pretty much in 
accordance with the amount allocated to product A, the full amount 
of this expense could be eliminated. The payroll tax on indirect labor 
would be eliminated following the reduction in these two accounts.
Small tools presented somewhat of a problem since these were used 
interchangeably by the men on the various jobs. The plant manager 
estimated that the real reduction in this expense would be about 
$150. There would also be some reduction in light, heat, and power, 
which Mr. Randall estimated at $100. The expenses for insurance 
and real estate taxes would remain the same.
Most overhead expenses under the selling and administrative 
classification would not be affected by the decision to drop product 
A. Of course, some of these expenses such as contributions could be 
reduced, but they could be reduced irrespective of the decision on 
product A. There could be a small saving on postage and supplies 
which the bookkeeper estimated at $20 and $30 respectively. Mr. 
Randall estimated that there would be a reduction of $300 in travel 
expenses since a few accounts purchased only product A.
Exhibit 3 shows, in the first column, that product A, under present 
operations and methods of expense identification and allocation, lost 
$5,040 in the year 1964. The second, or elimination, column shows 
that product A, after eliminating the sales revenue of $43,000 and 
directly affected expenses of $34,650, was making a contribution to 
overhead and profit of $8,350. The third column shows that products 
B and C would have to absorb an additional expense of $13,390 if 
product A were eliminated.
Stated another way, the loss for the year 1964 would have been
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increased by $8,350 if product A had not been in the line. That is, 
the loss would have been $11,950 ($3,600 plus $8,350), or the profit 
on products B and C of $1,440 would have been converted to a loss 
of $11,950 ($13,390 additional expense less $1,440 present profit).
Making a Decision
It was quite apparent to both Mr. Randall and Mr. Clark that it 
would not be advisable to eliminate product A from the line, at least 
for the present. Although the product was showing a loss of $5,040 
for the year, it was contributing $8,350 to company overhead and 
profit. It was equally clear that the decision to continue product A 
was only a stopgap one and that something had to be done about all 
product lines if the company was to survive, since the return was 
not satisfactory on any of the products. It was agreed that if there 
were no improvement, more drastic cost reductions would have to be 
considered.
Mr. Clark recommended to Mr. Randall that in the future his book­
keeper should set up the accounts as shown in Exhibit 3 so that 
similar information could be provided more readily and quickly.
Summary. It will be useful to point out one important limitation 
to the above analysis. Apparently Mr. Clark has determined, as rea­
sonably as possible, the cost of products A, B, and C. Some costs 
(material, direct labor) were directly attributable to the manu­
facture of each particular product. Other costs, on the other hand, 
were pretty much independent of which products were manufactured 
(depreciation, insurance). Still others were partially determined by 
the product mix (heat, fight, power).
Exhibit 2 indicates what the product costs were during 1964. Had 
The Randall Company simply produced more (or less), some product 
costs might have been different. Some of the costs (such as direct 
material and direct labor) would remain about the same per unit 
produced; others (such as depreciation and insurance) would change 
substantially on a per-unit basis, although the total amounts would 
remain fixed. Still others (such as heat, fight, power) would change 
somewhat but certainly not in proportion to the change in output. 
As noted, the capacity-related and selling and administrative costs 
were allocated on the basis of what seemed “fair” or “reasonable.” 
These costs were allocated because they could not be directly identi­
fied with any particular product. In a sense they benefited all units of 
output but no one in particular. The total unit cost of a product,
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therefore, necessarily becomes a function of the amount or volume of 
production. In other words, the total product costs will differ simply 
because of production volume. Even though the prime product 
costs per unit may not change, the relatively fixed costs for manu­
facturing and general overhead may be spread over more or less units 
and would, therefore, affect the total unit cost.
This discussion leads to the conclusion that there is really no one 
correct product cost. Total product cost, as such, is simply a con­
glomeration of many different kinds of costs. Some are caused directly 
as a result of production; others are allocated over what was produced; 
and others contain elements of both types. The product costs arrived 
at in the above schedules, therefore, are a direct reflection of the 
volume and product mix achieved by Randall in 1964.
For analytical purposes, a considerable improvement can be made 
over the traditional format shown in Exhibit 1 by adopting a format 
(Exhibit 2) similar to that used in a direct costing system. The distinc­
tion between fixed and variable costs is not quite as clear as Exhibit 2 
implies, but drawing the distinction can be useful, nevertheless. For 
example, the exhibit shows that all three products are covering their 
variable costs, a basic criterion that each product must meet. After 
assigning the capacity-related costs, however, product A became a 
loss item and a more careful analysis concerning the advisability of 
keeping that line was worthwhile. Working together, Mr. Clark and 
Mr. Randall attempted to predict just what the results would be if 
product A were discontinued. Exhibit 3 summarized their analysis.
The only thing these numbers “prove” is that neither fully allocated 
costs nor variable costs are an accurate measure of the effect of drop­
ping a product; an accurate estimate can only be made by a special 
analysis. In this example, where the decision is a major one involving 
dropping an entire product line, fully allocated costs provide a good 
approximation of the expected results obtained by analysis. For other 
types of product lin e  decisions, however, variable costs may be a better 
approximation. The safest generalization is that there is no substitute 
for a specific analysis of the costs and revenues associated with the 
particular action under consideration.
There is no such thing as the cost of anything, as illustrated in the 
preceding section. The relevant cost in a particular situation is insep­
arably intertwined with the particular problem at hand. Relevant 
costs for decision making can be identified only after becoming 
thoroughly familiar with the alternatives available.
In decision making, the important difference from costing proce­
dures (which are appropriate for financial accounting and control) is
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the concern with differential future costs. Once the alternatives have 
been formulated, the chief task is to concentrate on those costs that 
would be different in the future under the alternatives (keep or drop 
product A). Past costs were used, and played an important role. 
However, the costs used in making the decision are those costs that 
would be different in the future.
A little later in the year, a would-be supplier presented The Randall 
Company with an opportunity which called the Randall-Clark com­
bination back into action to consider another kind of cost analysis 
problem. This time a make/buy decision was involved.
Making or Buying a Product
A manufacturer offered to supply The Randall Company with 
product C at $.60 each. The prior analysis indicated that The Randall 
Company produced 50,000 units at a cost per unit of $.72 (variable 
cost of $.51 plus overhead expense of $.21). Should Randall continue 
to make this product or buy it from outside? Again, proper cost 
analysis must concentrate on those costs which will be relevant to this 
decision.
Notice that revenues to the company will be the same under either 
alternative; revenue, therefore, is not a relevant factor. The decision 
will turn on the changes in production cost that will result.
In order to manufacture this product The Randall Company has 
incurred certain expenses. The problem is to determine which ex­
penses can be eliminated if the manufacture of this product were 
discontinued. The more obvious costs and expenses which would be 
eliminated are material and direct labor. In 1964 The Randall 
Company material cost per unit was $.26 ($13,000 ÷  50,000 units). It 
is expected that this unit cost would increase to $.28 in the future. 
The direct labor cost per unit was $.24 ($12,000 ÷  50,000 units) and 
the applicable payroll tax $.01 per unit.
Since one man supervises this line, his salary of $4,000 would be 
eliminated, as well as the applicable payroll tax of about $160. Al­
though much of the indirect labor effort would be eliminated, Mr. 
Randall felt that it would not be possible to let one man go. None of 
the selling and administrative expenses would change appreciably—
24
COST ANALYSIS FOR PRODUCT LINE DECISIONS
Mr. Randall estimated a small reduction of $200 on supplies, power, 
and small tools.
This cost analysis resulted in the following:
Cost of purchase
Variable costs 
Material 
Direct labor 
Payroll tax
Total
Additional cost to purchase
Other manufacturing costs which will be 
eliminated
Supervision $4,000
Payroll benefits 160
Other 200
Total
Per Unit 
$.60
.28
.24
___ .01
$.53
$.07
$4,360
Mr. Randall can save about $4,360 if he is willing to incur an 
incremental cost per unit of $.07. By stating the facts in this way, 
it is clear that the decision hinges on a projection of sales volume. 
Suppose that The Randall Company has projected next year’s sales 
to be 75,000 units. The total additional cost of purchase as opposed to 
manufacturing will be $5,250. Since the cost savings above would 
amount to only $4,360, it appears that The Randall Company can 
save approximately $900 by manufacturing its own product. Another 
way of approaching this decision is to calculate a breakeven point by 
dividing $4,360 in cost reduction by the additional increment of $.07 
per unit. This indicates a breakeven volume of 62,300 units. Below 
this volume, Randall should consider purchasing C from the outside 
manufacturer; above this point, it is cheaper for Randall to manu­
facture product C.
In this analysis of Randall’s make or buy problem, all the capacity 
costs allocated to product C in Exhibit 3 have been ignored because 
they would not change with the decision. Likewise, alternative 
uses of the resources represented by these costs were also ignored— 
resources that would be available to Randall if it did purchase product 
C.
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The crucial question at this point hinges on whether these resources 
have any other use to Randall. If the only alternative available to 
Randall is to manufacture or purchase product C, the value of those 
resources would be zero. On the other hand, if the resources could be 
utilized in the production of products A and B, or a new product, a 
value would be assigned to the resource. The amount of the value 
would be determined by the additional profit earned on products A 
and B and therefore become relevant in Randall’s decision to make or 
buy product C.
What resources (represented by capacity costs) has Randall assigned 
to the manufacture of product C? Most obviously, certain manufac­
turing equipment is required to manufacture the product. However, 
other resources represented by building depreciation, insurance, and 
real estate taxes have also been made available. Indirect labor has 
been assigned to keep work flowing to and from the production line. 
Heat, light, and power were necessary for the operation of the produc­
tion line. These expenses have been incurred to make available certain 
resources which are necessary to the manufacture of product C. The 
company cannot eliminate these costs by eliminating product line C, 
but it is also true that product line C could not function without the 
existence of the resources represented by these costs.
In addition to manufacturing support, there are certain other capac­
ity costs which represent other resources available to line C. The 
company has employed an office staff, for example, which makes it 
possible to handle all the administrative detail associated with the 
manufacturing process. Again, this expenditure cannot be reduced 
solely by discontinuing the manufacture of product C, but most surely 
the manufacture of product C could not be accomplished without this 
support.
Returning to the earlier question of whether these resources have 
any other use to Randall, assume that Randall is operating at full 
capacity on product line A. Assume also that Randall could sell about 
25 per cent more units of product A, and the equipment now being 
utilized for product C could be converted to this purpose. Suppose 
further that the office and sales support already available to the firm 
is sufficient to handle an increase in volume for product A with no 
increase in cost. (This is important because The Randall Company 
will still be selling product C.) Product A, per Exhibit 2, earns a 
contribution of $1.51 per unit ($15,050 ÷  10,000 units). On an 
additional volume of 2,500 units, Randall would realize an increased 
profit of approximately $3,750.
To summarize, Randall has available certain capacity resources con­
26
COST ANALYSIS FOR PRODUCT LINE DECISIONS
sisting of equipment, space, labor, office staff, and so forth, all of which 
are available for manufacturing and/or manufacturing support. These 
resources, now committed to the manufacture of product C, are really 
“earning” only $900, the additional amount that would have to be 
spent if product C were purchased outside. By converting the utiliza­
tion of this capacity to the production of additional units of product A 
the value of the same resource would be $3,750. The net result of 
reallocating the resources would be an increase in the net profit of 
$2,850.
The allocation process may also provide a crude standard to measure 
the efficiency with which capacity resources are being utilized. The 
total manufacturing cost of product C is $.72 per unit, or 20 per cent 
more than the outside purchase price. The fact that Randall’s total 
manufacturing cost exceeds the purchase price does not automatically 
mean that Randall would be better off to purchase product C outside, 
however, because analysis indicated that the company would lose 
$900 on that single action. But reallocating the utilization of product 
C’s capacity could increase Randall’s profits by $2,850. Therefore, in 
helping management pinpoint areas in which capacity resources are 
being utilized ineffectively, full cost data are useful.
Summary
In each of these analyses, attention was centered on those costs 
that would be different between the alternative under consideration. 
Future costs become the concern. In some cases, past costs served as 
an appropriate approximation; in other cases, past costs were used 
with appropriate adjustments; and in some cases it was necessary to 
use new data ( the increase in raw material cost) and ignore past costs 
altogether. We found also that in talking about differences in cost, 
the differences that were relevant depended wholly upon the alterna­
tives under consideration. In one case, for example, supervision cost 
was different between two alternatives; in another, supervision cost 
was not relevant because it remained the same under both alternatives.
As stated earlier, therefore, the process of cost analysis for decision 
making follows the need for such analysis. Depending upon the need 
for cost information, upon the decision that must be made, we can 
proceed to develop the appropriate cost figures. As we saw, different 
costs were appropriate in different situations. There was no such 
thing as the product cost; there was only a relevant product cost for 
each particular decision.
Most cost information, as in the case of The Randall Company, comes
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to the businessman from the accounting records. Since these records, 
however, deal with past costs and total costs, a prime task of cost 
analysis is to translate this accounting data into the best possible 
estimates (consistent with the cost of doing so) of the appropriate, 
relevant future costs. After this, other important, nonqualified factors 
which bear on the decision must be taken into account. There is no 
magic formula for weighing together all this information to get the 
“right” answer. In fact, the last step, molding together all the informa­
tion available in order to reach a decision, is the essence of decision 
making.
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Aluminum Products, Inc.
Franklin & Sweet, a small regional firm of certified public ac­
countants, were the auditors for Aluminum Products, Inc., a Youngs­
town, Ohio, manufacturer of aluminum awnings and accessories, doors, 
and combination screen and storm windows. In February 1965, Samuel 
Cohen, the president and principal stockholder of Aluminum Products, 
telephoned Thomas Player, senior partner of Franklin & Sweet, to ask 
Mr. Player to visit him and discuss the possibility of Franklin & Sweet 
performing management advisory services for Aluminum Products. 
Mr. Cohen wanted Franklin & Sweet to examine a decision Mr. Cohen 
had made to substitute a new line of aluminum playroom furniture for 
an existing line of aluminum awnings.
Franklin & Sweet
Franklin & Sweet had been established in 1930. In 1965, it consisted 
of a head office, in Youngstown, Ohio, and three branch offices, in 
nearby towns. The firm employed 20 full-time staff men actively en­
gaged in audit and tax work for local manufacturing, retail, and service 
organizations. The firm’s management services department consisted of 
two full-time employees, Philip Anderson, head of the department, 
and Harry Egan. However, several members of the audit staff had 
displayed an interest in and an aptitude for management services, 
and were earmarked for eventual transfer to that department. Ander­
son would borrow these men from the audit staff from time to time 
as needed for specific management services engagements.
Philip Anderson was 34 years old and had been in the employ of 
Franklin & Sweet for 12 years. He had obtained his CPA certificate 
eight years ago and had taken courses in management and in industrial 
engineering. He had also acquired some background in punched
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card accounting and EDP through independent study and courses 
offered by the several equipment manufacturers. During the past six 
years, he had been responsible for all management services engage­
ments undertaken by Franklin & Sweet, and four years ago had trans­
ferred to management services as his full-time activity. He held the 
staff rank of manager in the Franklin & Sweet firm.
Harry Egan was 30 years old and had been employed two years ago 
by Franklin & Sweet when the volume of management services work 
became sufficient to justify adding a second employee to the staff 
and also when the need for a man with his particular background 
became apparent. Egan had graduated in industrial engineering but 
had taken considerable graduate work at the school of business admin­
istration with heavy emphasis on accounting. After leaving school, 
he had worked for the controller of a medium-sized diversified manu­
facturing company where he had acquired considerable experience 
in time and motion study, cost accounting, and variable budgeting. 
Because of his outgoing personality and lively imagination, consulting 
work appealed to him. Consequently, he was pleased to join the 
management services staff of Franklin & Sweet when the opportunity 
presented itself. He held the position of associate consultant in the 
Franklin & Sweet organization.
Client Relationship
Franklin & Sweet’s relationship with Aluminum Products unfor­
tunately had not been close. Beginning in 1958, Mr. Cohen had 
engaged the firm each year to undertake an audit of Aluminum Prod­
ucts’ accounts and records. It was understood by Mr. Player that 
Cohen had hired Franklin & Sweet at the request of a local bank which 
had entered into a revolving credit arrangement with Aluminum Prod­
ucts; it was the bank’s policy to encourage its customers with sub­
stantial lines of credit to employ independent auditors.
From the beginning, Mr. Player had taken a personal interest in 
the Aluminum Products engagement. For the past four years, the 
supervisor on the engagement had been James Peters. Peters was 31 
years old and had devoted all of his professional and college years to 
the practice and study of accounting, particularly auditing. He had 
been in the employ of Franklin & Sweet for eight years. Each year 
since he had first been assigned to the engagement, Peters had devel­
oped pertinent procedural and organizational recommendations con­
cerning Aluminum Products as a result of his work on the audit. Each 
year, following the release of the audit report, these recommendations
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had been summarized in a separate letter addressed to Mr. Cohen 
which had been delivered personally by Mr. Player for purposes of 
elaborating on the recommendations and offering the assistance of 
Franklin & Sweet in implementing them. However, Mr. Cohen had 
shown little interest in adopting the recommendations and, conse­
quently, the services of Franklin & Sweet to Aluminum Products had 
been limited to the annual audit. It was for this reason that Mr. Player 
was particularly pleased to receive Mr. Cohen’s telephone call and to 
learn of his interest in utilizing the services of Franklin & Sweet in 
another area.
Aluminum Products’ Assignment
When Samuel Cohen, the president of Aluminum Products, tele­
phoned on February 20, 1965, he advised Thomas Player essentially 
as follows:
“As you know, Aluminum Products’ profits during the last few years 
have declined, while sales have risen steadily. In fact, despite a record 
sales volume of nearly $3.8 million during 1964, we lost some $15,000. 
In the light of these disappointing and apparently contradictory oper­
ating results, I think perhaps the time has come when I should seek 
outside consulting help for the first time. Especially since I am about 
to drop my awning line for a new line of playroom furniture.
“I prefer outside help from somebody who is acquainted with my 
business activities. The only group I know of which meets this criterion 
is Franklin & Sweet. Would you like to discuss the matter with me?”
Mr. Player proposed to Mr. Cohen that he and Philip Anderson, 
Franklin & Sweet’s consultant in management services, meet with 
Cohen the following day to discuss two topics: the scope and character 
of Franklin & Sweet’s management services activities, and Aluminum 
Products’ particular consulting needs.
Following Cohen’s telephone call, Player apprised Anderson of the 
meeting to be held the next day. Anderson immediately set out to 
learn all he could concerning Aluminum Products. Because of the 
limited time available before the meeting, Anderson limited his re­
search to sources of information within Franklin & Sweet. First he 
studied the Aluminum Products’ audit working papers on file at 
Franklin & Sweet. Then he spoke with Jim Peters who knew more 
about Aluminum Products, Inc., than anyone else in the Franklin & 
Sweet organization.
Audit file. From his study of audit working papers, Anderson learned
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that Aluminum Products’ annual sales volume had risen steadily from 
$3.5 million in 1962 to $3.8 million in 1964. The company’s profits after 
taxes had reached a high of $49,000 in 1962, and then had commenced 
to decline to the point where a loss of $15,000 was sustained in 1964. 
Anderson summarized the income statements for the years 1962, 1963, 
and 1964 as they appeared in the audit reports of Franklin & Sweet. 
These financial data are reproduced in Exhibit 1. The condensed 
balance sheet of Aluminum Products as of December 3 1 , 1964, appears 
in Exhibit 2.
Exhibit 1
ALUMINUM PRODUCTS, INC.
Condensed Statement of Income
For The Years Ended December 31, 1962 Through 1964, (000 omitted)
1964 1963 1962
Gross Sales $3,963 $3,716
Less sales commissions 198 186
Net sales
Awnings $1,300 $1,215
Doors 1,265 1,205
Windows 1,200 3,765 1,110 3,530
Less cost of goods sold:
$3,684
184
Direct labor 
Materials used 
Mfg. overhead
$ 440 
2,190 
762 3,392
$ 405 
2,025 
716 3,146
Gross margin $ 373 $ 384
Less:
Selling and administrative
$1,205
1,195
1,100 3,500
$ 350 
2,000
695 3,045
$ 455
expenses $ 378
Other expenses 20
$ 360
398 20 380
Net income (loss) 
before taxes $ (25) $ 4
Federal income taxes 10* 1
$ 361
15 376
Net income (loss)
$ 79
30
$ (15) $___ 3 $ 49
*Tax credit
Source: Franklin & Sweet audit file.
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Exhibit 2
ALUMINUM PRODUCTS, INC.
Condensed Balance Sheet December 31, 1964 
(000 omitted)
Assets
Cash
Accounts receivable
Inventories
Total current assets 
Plant and equipment
Less allowance for depreciation
$ 70
130
100
Land
Total fixed assets 
Loans to employees 
Other assets
Total assets
560
280
$280
52
$300
332
30 
__ 25
$687
Liabilities and Stockholders Equity
Accounts payable
Accrued wages
Other accrued expenses
Total current liabilities
Capital stock
Retained earnings
Total stockholders equity
Total liabilities and stockholders equity
Source: Franklin & Sweet audit file.
$120
40
30
200
297
$190
497
$687
Next Anderson reviewed the permanent file of Franklin & Sweet 
pertaining to the Aluminum Products’ engagement which contained 
detailed information concerning the company’s organization, book­
keeping system, and accounting policies. He also reviewed the internal 
control questionnaires used by Franklin & Sweet which were filled out 
each year at the time of the audit. From these sources, Anderson 
learned the following facts:
1. Aluminum Products did not use organization charts, procedural 
manuals, or job descriptions.
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2. The company did not employ formal budgeting procedures.
3. The company did not have an integrated, or even a statistical, 
cost accounting system.
4. The company’s chart of accounts apparently was designed to 
provide the minimum information required for income tax purposes. 
The accounts provided for no analysis of operations by product line or 
by departments.
5. The company’s monthly internal reports, which were few in 
number, related solely to sales, production, and employee statistics. 
In the absence of a cost accounting system, there were no operating 
statements. The only standards against which current performance 
was evaluated were the previous month’s figures.
6. In the absence of a cost accounting system, the costs associated 
with several of the company’s products were estimated from time to 
time by the company’s cost clerk. Occasionally, these estimated costs 
had been used as a guide to pricing.
The management letters written to Aluminum Products by Frank­
lin & Sweet following each annual audit had commented in general 
on the absence of management controls, organization charts, manuals, 
budgets, standards, cost data, and informative interim reports. Notes 
in the permanent files indicated that, for the most part, management 
of Aluminum Products had not corrected the deficiencies indicated in 
these letters.
The management letters released following the audits of more recent 
years’ operations had become more urgent in tone. They pointed out 
that the limited cost data available were not up-to-date, were based on 
a rough observation of manufacturing operations, and did not cover all 
of the product lines simultaneously, which created a real jeopardy in 
the possibility of failing to include certain costs which might be 
pertinent to a particular product line.
Interview with James Peters. After reviewing the audit working 
papers, Anderson spoke with James Peters, the supervisor in charge of 
the Aluminum Products audit. From Peters, Anderson learned the 
following general information pertaining to Aluminum Products, Inc.:
Aluminum Products was a closely held company. The president of 
the company, Samuel Cohen, was the principal stockholder. He ran
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Exhibit 3
PRESIDENT
Controller
Treasurer
Secretary
Sales Manager
(COHEN)
AWNING SALES OTHER SALES FACTORY
(Herbert Wolfe) (Harold Atkins) Superintendent
DOOR SALES COMBINATION 
WINDOW SALES
BOOKKEEPERS
CASHIERS
ENGINEERING COST DOOR AWNING SCREEN
CLERK PRODUCTION PRODUCTION and STORM
WINDOW
PRODUCTION
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the company, Peters said, as a “one-man show,” and, as a practical 
matter, was not only the company’s president, but also its controller, 
treasurer, secretary, and sales manager, despite the fact that these 
positions were nominally held by other men, including several of 
Cohen’s relatives. One of Cohen’s relatives, his brother-in-law, Herbert 
Wolfe, was the sales manager for the firm’s awning line. He reported 
directly to Cohen, not to the firm’s overall sales director, Harold Atkins.
Although the company employed no formal organization chart, 
during the preceding audits Peters had sketched a chart reflecting 
what he believed to be the practical lines of responsibility. He showed 
this chart to Anderson, and it is reproduced herein as Exhibit 3.
The principal products of the company, Peters told Anderson, 
were: (1) aluminum awnings and accessories, (2) aluminum doors, 
and (3) aluminum combination screen and storm windows. Each 
of these product lines accounted for approximately one-third of the 
company’s $3.8 million sales volume. With respect to the awning line, 
Peters explained that the aluminum awnings were sold principally to 
three types of customers: schools, hospitals, and office buildings. No 
residential sales were made. These awnings, he went on to say, could 
be purchased in four standard sizes.
Furthermore, during the last three years, Peters estimated that the 
company had spent some $30,000 in an attempt to design a new line of 
aluminum-frame furniture for family rooms. To date, several proto­
types had been constructed. This project was under the direction 
of Herbert Wolfe.
Peters then informed Anderson that in his opinion Aluminum 
Products, Inc., enjoyed a reputation for fine quality products in its 
regional market. While it issued no formal guarantee, its products 
were recognized locally as being equal, or superior, to competitive 
local products, and it was quite generally understood that the com­
pany would replace without question any defective item where 
material or workmanship appeared to be faulty.
The company’s products, Peters said, were sold through independent 
sales agents (manufacturers’ representatives) for a flat commission of 
5 per cent of the sales price. All prices were quoted F.O.B. Aluminum 
Products’ plant.
The demand for each of the company’s major product lines followed 
essentially the same seasonal pattern, Peters stated. Consequently, 
during August, September, October, and November, the plant operated 
at only 50 per cent of its one-shift production capacity. During the 
rest of the year, the plant operated at between 85 per cent and 95 per
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cent of its capacity. Production, Peters believed, was keyed to orders. 
Few finished goods were produced for inventory during the slack 
months. The workers appeared to be busy all the time, except that 
they worked at a slower pace during the slack season.
Since 1960, Aluminum Products’ employees, most of whom were 
skilled or semiskilled machine operators, had averaged about 90 in 
number. Furthermore, Peters claimed, these operators seemed to be 
shifted from product to product and from department to department 
within the plant. All employees, office and factory, received an hourly 
wage. No employees were laid off during the slack months, Peters 
added.
In summary, Peters declared, Cohen ran the company “by the seat 
of his pants.” He seldom turned down an order, and quoted whatever 
price he believed would get his company the business. Furthermore, 
Peters said, Cohen despised paper work and figures, avoided formal 
planning, and compulsively interferred with the tasks of his subordin­
ates. In the past, he had had a free hand in running the company’s 
affairs inasmuch as he was the only major stockholder who was active 
in management. However, he displayed certain native abilities which 
commanded the respect of his executives and employees.
Visit to Aluminum Products’ Office and Plant
The next day, February 21, Player and Anderson met with Cohen at 
the offices of Aluminum Products, Inc.
Mr. Cohen began the interview by saying that he proposed to drop 
his aluminum awning line immediately and replace it with a newly 
developed line of playroom furniture incorporating aluminum frames. 
Such action, Cohen believed, would eventually lead to an improvement 
in Aluminum Products’ profit picture. Furthermore, Cohen said, in 
making this product switch, he did not significantly anticipate chang­
ing the size or composition of his total work force. The workers pre­
viously employed in the awning department would be reclassified 
as furniture department employees, and five additional employees 
would be transferred from other departments to the new furniture 
department.
The reason for dropping the awning line, Cohen declared, stemmed 
from his belief that the competition in the awning market would 
increase greatly in the near future. For this reason, Cohen said, he 
believed that the profit margins of the awning line would decrease 
relative to the company’s other lines of products. Also, Cohen added,
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the awning business involved too many different installation problems: 
It was a nuisance because every installation was virtually a custom 
job. In contrast, Cohen stated, the playroom furniture line could be 
standardized, and, in addition, he expected it to be less competitive. 
The only disadvantage which he could recognize, Cohen said, was 
that the demand for aluminum playroom furniture probably would 
follow the same seasonal pattern as the rest of the company’s products 
did.
What he now felt that he needed, Cohen told the Franklin & Sweet 
representatives, was some competent outsider to confirm his decision 
to drop the awning line and to add the furniture line. “I decided to 
call you in,” he said, “because some of the other stockholders have 
been disappointed with the company’s poor profits and are growing 
critical of my management. My guess is that they will question the 
wisdom of dropping the established awning line. Frankly, I need an 
independent authority to support my decision.”
Mr. Player said that Franklin & Sweet would be willing to assist 
Cohen in this matter, but he warned that Franklin & Sweet could 
not guarantee to come to the same conclusion which Mr. Cohen had 
as to the advisability of dropping the awning line. In Mr. Player’s 
opinion, the appropriate role for Franklin & Sweet would be to make 
a recommendation based upon an objective analysis of the situation. 
If Mr. Cohen would accept their help on that basis, Player stated that 
Franklin & Sweet would be willing to undertake a study of the pro­
posed product line substitution.
Mr. Cohen stated that he did not require an elaborate study, and 
would expect to receive the Franklin & Sweet report in time for the 
next directors’ meeting which was to be held on March 16. Mr. Player 
said that his staff would make every effort to complete its study be­
fore that date, but so much depended upon the data available in the 
records of the company and the assistance which could be expected 
from the company’s officers and employees, that it was impossible to 
guarantee the project would be completed by that date. If this was 
not acceptable to Mr. Cohen, Mr. Player said, Franklin & Sweet was 
not prepared to undertake the engagement.
After some thought, Mr. Cohen agreed to this condition, expressing 
the opinion that, in an emergency, the directors’ meeting might be 
postponed and, furthermore, that he would feel more confident in his 
position if it had been challenged and supported by a truly competent 
and independent authority.
Mr. Player then advised Mr. Cohen of his general plan for analysis 
of the problem, of the members of his staff whom he expected to
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assign to the engagement, and of the billing rates for each of these 
members of his staff. At Mr. Cohen’s request, Mr. Player then esti­
mated the total fee which might be involved in completing this en­
gagement. He told Mr. Cohen that this estimate was based upon 
certain assumptions as to the availability of data, and the assistance 
which he could expect from members of the company’s organization. 
In any case, he was prepared to assure Mr. Cohen that he would keep 
him currently apprised as to the progress of the study and, should 
these assumptions prove to be incorrect, Mr. Cohen would be in a 
position to terminate the engagement or expect that the fee would 
exceed the original estimate.
Mr. Cohen invited Mr. Player to undertake the study.
At the termination of this discussion, Anderson mentioned that 
while he was at the company’s plant he would like to make a tour of 
its facilities. In addition, if convenient, he would like to speak briefly 
with the company’s sales director, awning sales manager, and cost 
clerk. This would enable him, Anderson explained, to familiarize 
himself with the company’s operations and to learn what data were 
already available concerning the proposed product line change.
The sales director. After his interview with Mr. Cohen, Anderson 
met briefly with Harold Atkins, Aluminum Products’ sales director. 
Anderson wanted to discuss with Atkins the company’s anticipated 
sales volumes for the new and old lines.
Atkins explained to Anderson that he knew little of the plans for 
the new furniture line because Mr. Cohen’s brother-in-law, Herbert 
Wolfe, the present sales manager of the awning department, had been 
in charge of the development for the proposed line. Also, Atkins 
claimed that he knew little more about the awning line because Mr. 
Wolfe reported directly to Mr. Cohen. However, with respect to the 
door and the combination screen and storm window lines, Atkins 
stated that he did not expect their sales volume nor sales mix to 
change significantly over, say, the next five years. In addition, he 
anticipated that the price structure of these two lines would remain 
reasonably constant during the foreseeable future.
Mr. Wolfe. Next, Anderson spoke with Herbert Wolfe, the sales 
manager of the awning department and the person responsible for 
the development of the proposed aluminum furniture line. Excerpts 
from that conversation are presented.
Anderson: What is your estimate of the prospects for the proposed 
furniture line, Mr. Wolfe?
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Wolfe: I have made some sales estimates based upon discussions
with our sales representatives who have talked with several 
department store furniture buyers, as well as upon an 
examination of several industry surveys prepared by the 
Aluminum Products Council (a regional trade association 
of aluminum product fabricators). Using this information, 
I believe we should have an average annual sales volume 
of approximately $1,200,000 over the first five years our 
furniture is on the market. This estimate is based on our 
current plans to offer only one style of aluminum furniture 
at a price of $125 per set. That price would be our net, 
after all trade discounts and sales commissions, and it is 
well in line with the prices of the competitive furniture 
that is now on the market. Incidentally, I don’t think the 
quality of the other sets is anywhere near ours.
Here are my estimates of net sales by years:
Table I
Furniture Sales Estimates—1966-1970
1966 $ 900,000
1967 1,100,000
1968 1,200,000
1969 1,400,000
1970 1,400,000
We plan to sell the furniture sets through our regular sales 
representatives. These agents will handle the furniture 
sets for exactly the same terms as we give them on the 
awning lines.
Anderson: Where did the idea to substitute the furniture line for the 
awning line come from?
Wolfe: My brother-in-law, Mr. Cohen, first started thinking about
it a couple of years ago. As far as I can gather, he finally 
just decided to go ahead and do it. He simply told me to 
work with Robert Allen, our cost clerk and designer, and 
to develop an aluminum furniture set which would be 
competitive with those retailing for about $200 per set. 
This line would replace the awning line, he said.
As it now stands, I will become the sales manager of the
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Anderson:
Wolfe:
Anderson:
Wolfe:
Anderson:
Wolfe:
Anderson:
Wolfe:
Anderson:
Wolfe:
furniture department when it is started, and presumably 
the awning line will be dropped at that time.
Are you developing any other products besides the fur­
niture sets?
Not as far as I know. Mr. Cohen would like to come up 
with something to fill in our slack months, but so far he 
hasn’t hit on anything.
What, in your opinion, would be the prospects for the 
awning line if you did not drop it?
Well, first of all let me say that if we didn’t drop the awn­
ing line, we could not get into the furniture line without 
investing some $200,000 in new equipment and hiring an 
additional 15 plant employees at about $7,000 a year each, 
including fringe benefits.
Would these be the only incremental investments and 
costs?
I suppose we would have to have additional working 
capital, too.
What about other operating costs?
That’s a bit out of my line—but I would say that there 
would be no other major increases.
How much factory space will the furniture department 
take up?
We plan to use the space presently occupied by the awning 
department. In fact, we will use the same equipment. The 
fabricating machines we are using to make aluminum awn­
ings can also be used to make aluminum furniture frames. 
For this reason, we won’t have to make any significant in­
vestment in new equipment to fabricate the furniture 
frames. However, we can’t run frames and awnings through 
this department at the same time; it would involve too 
many setup changes. Moreover, the peak volume season 
for both of these lines is substantially identical. But to get 
back to your question related to the prospects for the awn­
ing line if we didn’t drop it, here are my estimates of net 
sales for the next six years. The estimates show a decline
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primarily because of anticipated price declines, not be­
cause of a reduction in the number of awnings sold.
Table II
Awning Sales Estimates—1965-1970
1965 $1,300,000
1966 1,200,000
1967 1,100,000
1968 1,000,000
1969 900,000
1970 900,000
These sales estimates, like the ones I made for the fur­
niture line, are only my best guesses. However, I have 
been in this business for a long time, and I feel fairly con­
fident that they will not be far off the mark.
Factory tour. Following his discussion with Mr. Wolfe, Anderson 
made a quick tour of the Aluminum Products’ plant.
The plant, Anderson learned, occupied an area of approximately 
200,000 square feet. Of this total, about 50,000 square feet were 
devoted to the awning department, 40,000 square feet to the door 
department, and 40,000 square feet to the combination screen and 
storm window department. Inasmuch as the executive and adminis­
trative offices of the company were located in a separate adjacent 
building, the remaining 70,000 square feet of the plant floor space 
was largely unused; a small portion of it was occupied by rest rooms, 
foremen’s offices, the maintenance department, and the offices of the 
plant superintendent and his staff. Anderson noted that the unused 
portion was lighted and heated while the plant was in operation.
Anderson was told that the factory’s total work force of 90 was 
divided as follows: awning department, 15 men; door department, 23 
men; combination window department, 22 men. The rest of the com­
pany’s 30 employees were either executives or members of the sales, 
factory, or accounting staff.
During his brief plant tour, Anderson observed a number of things. 
He noticed, for instance, that the items processed by Aluminum Prod­
ucts seemed to be a mixture of long and short production runs. The 
direct labor employees on different jobs appeared to be working at 
varying speeds. Several half-finished jobs were standing idle. (They 
were waiting for a delivery of raw materials, the foreman said.) Near 
each work center there were usually several discarded half-finished
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items. (These were imperfect items rejected because of production 
errors, the foreman stated.) Above all, Anderson noted that the plant 
had a general atmosphere of confusion.
The cost clerk. After his plant tour, Anderson had a discussion with 
the company’s cost clerk, Robert Allen. Previously, Mr. Cohen had 
informed Anderson that Allen’s principal function was product design, 
but that he also served as a production cost analyst. As a matter of 
fact, Cohen had said, Allen had spent most of his time during the 
past 18 months working on the design of the proposed new playroom 
furniture line and, consequently, during this period Allen had not 
brought any of his studies of unit product costs up-to-date.
In particular, Anderson wanted to discuss with Allen the cost of the 
awning line and its proposed replacement, the aluminum furniture line. 
In the absence of up-to-date unit cost data, Allen gave Anderson the 
following breakdown of total production costs for the awning line 
(to the nearest $1,000) based on 1964 profit and loss figures and a sales 
volume of $1,300,000:
Table III
Awning Department Costs—1964
Direct labor and related costs $ 105,000
Materials 900,000
Manufacturing overhead1 293,000
Selling, administrative, and other expenses2 95,000
Total $1,393,000
1 Total factory burden =  $762,000 (Exhibit 1)
Awning department floor space =  50,000 square feet 
Total manufacturing area in use:
Awning department 50,000 sq. ft.
Door department 40,000 sq. ft.
Screen and storm window department 40,000 sq. ft.
$762,000 x 50,000 
130,000
130,000 sq. ft.
=  $293,077 ($293,000)
2 Total selling and administrative expenses 
plus other expenses  
Total direct labor—awning department 
( estimated) =
Total direct labor, plant =
$398,000 X $105,000
--------- ------------------  =  $ 94,977 ($ 95,000)
$398,000 (Exhibit 1) 
$105,000
$440,000 (Exhibit 1)
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Allen then went on to explain these figures. The number of direct 
labor employees assigned more or loss permanently to each department 
was well known. But, because of temporary transfers back and forth 
among the three departments, total direct labor costs for each de­
partment could not be conveniently ascertained from the accounting 
records. Consequently, Allen had arrived at the cost of $105,000 for 
direct labor and related payroll expense for the awning department 
not directly from the accounting records, but instead through rather 
informal time studies of direct labor operations pertaining to each item 
in each department. Observing the time taken by the direct labor 
employees to fabricate the various items, Allen had arrived at an 
approximate unit time for each item. These unit times were con­
verted to dollars by multiplying them respectively by the number of 
units produced, and dividing the total production time thus ascer­
tained into the total direct productive labor cost obtained from the 
accounting records. The resulting direct labor cost per hour, multiplied 
by the time to produce each individual unit, represented the approx­
imate direct labor cost per unit. The approximate labor cost for each 
unit produced in the awning department multiplied by the number 
of each such units produced, was how Allen arrived at the total direct 
labor cost of production in the awning department.
Allen had established unit material costs by taking the average unit 
invoice cost of each type of material used in the products of the awn­
ing department and applying these costs to the materials specified 
in each product’s bill of materials. Added to these costs was an al­
lowance of 5 per cent for spoilage and waste. These unit material 
costs were then multiplied by the quantities produced to obtain the 
total materials costs for the department.
Factory overhead costs, Allen said, were allocated to each of the 
several departments on the basis of actual factory space occupied by 
each manufacturing department. Total selling and administrative ex­
penses, plus other expenses, were allocated to the respective depart­
ments on the basis of direct labor costs.
When asked about the total costs of the proposed furniture depart­
ment, Allen gave Anderson the figures shown in Table IV. Allen 
pointed out that these figures assumed a sales volume of $1,400,000.
The total direct labor figure for the furniture department was cal­
culated by Allen on the basis of a 20-man department in which each 
man received approximately $7,000 annually in wages and fringe 
benefits. Anderson noted that Allen was contemplating five more 
people in the department than was Wolfe.
The materials figure was derived by costing out the bill of materials
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for the prototype furniture sets on hand, adding 5 per cent for wastage 
and spoilage, and multiplying by the projected quantities to be pro­
duced.
The manufacturing overhead was calculated in the same fashion 
as the manufacturing overhead for the awning department. Since the 
floor space of the two departments was the same, Mr. Allen said that 
this figure should remain unchanged. Anderson wondered whether 
five additional direct labor employees could work in the same floor 
space.
The allocation of selling, administrative, and other expenses was 
figured in the same manner as for the awning department (see 
Table III).
Robert Allen stated that he believed the total factory burden and 
the total selling, administrative, and other expenses would remain at 
about the 1964 level over the foreseeable future, irrespective of 
whether or not the awning line was replaced by the furniture line.
Table IV
Projected Furniture Department Costs
Direct labor and related costs $ 140,000 
Materials 938,000
Manufacturing overhead 293,000
Selling, administrative, and
other expenses1 127,000
Total $1,498,000
Questions
1. How would you go about evaluating the wisdom of Mr. Cohen’s 
decision to substitute the furniture line for the awning line?
2. Based only on the available data in this case, could you prepare 
an estimate of the relative profitability of the awning and furniture 
lines?
1 Total selling and administrative expenses
plus other expenses =  $398,000 (Exhibit I )
Total direct labor, furniture department =  $140,000 
Total direct labor, plant =  $440,000 ( Exhibit I )
$398,000 X $140,000
-------- -------------------  =  $126,564 ($127,000)
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3. On the basis of the available data, would you be prepared to 
submit a report and recommendations? If not, what additional data 
would you attempt to obtain before reaching a decision? How would 
you get this information?
4. What recommendations would you expect to make to manage­
ment as a result of your study?
Anderson’s Initial Analysis
On the following day, Philip Anderson proceeded to evaluate the 
data he had accumulated and to reach, if possible, a conclusion con­
cerning the problem which Mr. Cohen had posed. After reviewing 
his notes, he met with Mr. Player to discuss the situation.
First, they agreed that considerably more information would be 
required before they could reach an intelligent conclusion.
Next, Player suggested that, because of Peters’ familiarity with 
Aluminum Products and his established rapport with its management, 
it would be logical for Anderson to use him to the fullest extent pos­
sible as his assistant on this engagement. Furthermore, Player sug­
gested, since Peters was one of the members of the audit staff who 
had consistently expressed an interest in management services, this 
engagement would give him an additional opportunity to acquire 
experience in the consulting area.
With these matters decided, it was agreed that Anderson would 
proceed to obtain the required additional data and would keep Player 
informed concerning the progress of the engagement. Player cautioned 
Anderson against reaching a premature conclusion. He advised him 
that, although he should make every reasonable effort to conclude the 
engagement in advance of the established date for the meeting of the 
board of directors, he had several logical alternatives which he should 
weigh carefully. First of all, if he, Anderson, were in a position to 
render an informed opinion in advance of the specified date, that 
would be the most fortunate conclusion to the engagement. Second, 
if he felt that he had made considerable progress as the established 
date of the board of directors’ meeting approached, but that he could 
not render a substantiated opinion without obtaining considerable ad­
ditional data which would involve substantially more time, he would 
have to recommend postponement of the date of the meeting of the 
directors. Third, if he should have to conclude that the obtainable 
data were insufficient to form the basis for a logical conclusion, he
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Problem Area
Absence of production planning 
and inventory control
Erratic pricing
Out-of-date and possibly inac­
curate cost data
Inadequate chart of accounts
Absence of useful periodic re­
ports to top management
Absence of formalized cost ac­
counting system
Lack of communication between 
executives
Poorly defined lines of respon­
sibility
President interferes in areas of 
responsibility of subordin­
ates
Overly centralized control 
Absence of standards 
Lack of budgeting procedures
Evidence
Half-finished jobs awaiting raw 
material, observed by An­
derson during plant tour. 
Also Peters’ comments con­
cerning the varying work­
load during the year
Peters’ statement concerning 
Cohen’s pricing policy
Allen had done very little cost 
work during the past 18 
months. Also some question 
concerning the soundness of 
the costing calculations, par­
ticularly the bases for allo­
cation of indirect costs
Audit questionnaires and man­
agement letters
Audit questionnaires and man­
agement letters
Audit questionnaire
Anderson’s observations during 
plant visit, particularly with 
respect to Atkin’s and 
Wolfe’s activities
Absence of organization chart, 
as noted in audit question­
naire and management letter
Peters’ remarks
Peters’ remarks 
Audit questionnaire 
Audit questionnaire
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would have to recommend that Cohen be advised that Franklin & 
Sweet was not in a position to render an opinion concerning the ad­
visability of substituting an aluminum furniture line for the aluminum 
awning operations.
Before getting into the specifics of the problem, Player and Ander­
son decided to list those of Aluminum Products’ major problems which 
had come to their attention, while these matters were still fresh in 
their minds. These observations would be useful at a later date in 
making recommendations to Mr. Cohen for follow-up management 
services work. They would also provide an essential environmental 
context within which the specific problem should be considered. The 
notes which they prepared are transcribed above.
After reviewing this list of problems, which both men regarded as 
being far from exhaustive, Anderson and Player decided that the most 
important service a consultant could render to Aluminum Products 
would be to improve its organizational structure to define lines of 
responsibility and to establish systems for controlling production costs 
and indirect expenses. Even though the most urgent problem con­
cerned the substitution of the furniture line for the awning line be­
cause of Mr. Cohen’s conviction in this matter, Anderson and Player 
concluded that more fundamental problems were besetting the com­
pany. In fact, the existence of these problems was probably the reason 
why Aluminum Products’ profits had declined so rapidly. However, 
the scope of the initial engagement was well defined, and Anderson’s 
work was cut out for him.
Finally, Anderson told Player that he and Peters would arrange 
to get together the following Monday to discuss the facts which 
Anderson now possessed, and to decide what steps should be taken 
next.
Discussion with Peters. On February 25, 1965, Philip Anderson and 
Jim Peters met. They reviewed the information that had been gath­
ered, and proceeded to decide what additional data would be required 
before an intelligent conclusion could be reached concerning the sub­
stitution of the furniture line for the present awning line. Here is 
the informal program which they prepared to indicate the areas which 
they would have to explore in considerably greater depth, and the 
data already available which they believed should be challenged:
1. Obtain unit direct labor and material costs for all products and 
sizes in the awning line and in the proposed furniture line.
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2. Review all indirect expenses (both factory and selling and ad­
ministrative ) to identify differential costs relevant to the contemplated 
change in operations.
3. Adjust relevant differential costs for projected future changes; 
add any new costs which might be expected as a result of the con­
templated change in operations.
4. Challenge sales projections in awning and in proposed furniture 
line.
5. Prepare computations of relevant differential contribution to 
profits of the awning line and of the proposed furniture line for the 
period 1966-1970.
6. Draw conclusions; formulate recommendations; prepare report.
Development of Unit Costs
Anderson expressed the opinion that, unless he could acquire con­
fidence in the unit cost figures computed by Allen for the awnings 
and for the furniture sets, or, alternatively, develop reliable unit cost 
estimates of his own, there would be no point in proceeding further 
with the study. Without reliable unit cost data, no intelligent con­
clusion could possibly be reached, and the engagement should be 
terminated without further delay. Consequently, he made arrange­
ments to meet again with Robert Allen the following day, February 26.
Looking first into the unit awning costs, Anderson asked Allen 
whether or not it was feasible to calculate unit costs on an overall 
average basis, inasmuch as Mr. Cohen had said that the awning busi­
ness . . was a nuisance because every installation was virtually a 
custom job.”
Allen said that production of the awnings was very standardized in 
the factory, being fabricated in only four standard sizes. The real 
problem, Allen stated, was in fitting the awnings to the specific re­
quirements at each individual location. The closest large standard 
size was selected for each unit sale, but then it had to be fitted into 
the field.
Anderson asked Allen if the installation adjustments were made by 
the sales representatives. “Oh, no,” said Allen, “some degree of skill 
is required to do this, and certain hand tools are required as well.
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Typically, the representatives want to devote their time to closing 
sales, and not be bothered with installation, service calls, or com­
plaints.” This made sense to Anderson. “The installation,” continued 
Allen, “is made by a number of very competent men on our factory 
maintenance staff. Of course, when they have to go out of town, we 
pay mileage for the use of their automobiles. Within town and in 
nearby areas, we pay local transportation costs.” Anderson made a 
mental note of the fact that traveling time was probably a more 
important consideration than traveling expense.
Then Anderson inquired into the competitive situation in the alu­
minum awning line. Allen told him that the most serious competition 
in their regional market was from small local sheet metal fabricators 
who manufactured aluminum awnings on a custom basis. These fab­
ricators were not equipped to produce the awnings in production 
line volume, and consequently undoubtedly incurred substantially 
higher manufacturing costs than Aluminum Products. However, these 
higher costs were largely offset by the advantage the local fabricators 
enjoyed in their proximity to their market, resulting in lower installa­
tion costs. Anderson made notations of these pertinent marketing 
facts, and then went on to review Allen’s unit cost computations for 
the awning line.
Satisfied that manufacturing specifications for the four standard 
sizes of awnings were uniform in the factory, with the possible excep­
tion of the complication of meeting color requirements, Anderson 
reviewed the bills of materials for the several sizes. He found that 
these were simple, so that their accuracy could be verified readily. 
Pulling recent invoices out of the files from the distributors of alu­
minum strips and extrusions and from the suppliers of fittings, Ander­
son found that the pricing for unit cost purposes had been done 
accurately by Allen.
Proceeding next to unit labor costs, Anderson reviewed the informal 
time studies of direct labor operations made by Allen and pertaining 
to each item in the awning department. Quizzing Allen in this regard, 
he learned that they had been made with a stop watch, but that 
Allen had had no formal training in time study methods. Moreover, 
Allen readily admitted that there had been numerous interruptions 
during the time he was attempting to establish unit direct labor op­
erational increments.
On the basis of this information, Anderson was not very satisfied 
with the accuracy of the direct labor unit costs which Allen had 
computed. However, before attempting to establish his own direct
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labor unit costs, Anderson decided to test the accuracy of Allen’s 
computations.
To do this, Anderson asked Allen if he had computed unit costs for 
the various items in the two other established lines: namely, the alu­
minum door line, and the combination screen and storm window line. 
Allen said he had, and, although they also were not very current, he 
produced calculations which appeared to be conscientiously worked 
out.
Allen took the unit labor costs of each of the different components 
of the several products in each of the other two lines, and applied 
them to their respective products multiplied by the unit sales in these 
lines to arrive at a total which he could compare with the total direct 
labor cost of sales appearing on the profit and loss statement for the 
same period.
Comparing these two figures, Anderson found a large discrepancy 
amounting to 20 per cent. He felt that this discrepancy was too large 
on which to base a judgmental decision. Consequently, he decided 
to have Harry Egan, his assistant on the management services staff, 
make a few tests of Allen’s unit direct labor cost studies.
Consulting with Egan, Anderson discussed whether formalized time 
studies or MTM (Methods-Time Measurement) analyses ought to be 
run. Egan suggested that, because there were only four standard 
sizes in the awning line, MTM studies of direct labor operations would 
be quite feasible. Had there been considerably more, Egan might 
have chosen some variation of time study for the purpose of arriving 
quickly at approximate direct labor unit costs.
Anderson agreed that this was a logical approach, and budgeted 
Egan a half a day to make some tests of selected unit direct operational 
costs as presented by Allen.
Egan came up with substantially different unit direct labor costs 
from those Allen had computed. Admittedly, Egan’s unit costs were 
based upon a reasonably efficient level of operations. On the other 
hand, some of Allen’s studies might have been made during the peak 
production season when the pace of the direct labor effort was at its 
maximum, and some at another time of the year when the effort was 
considerably more casual. In any case, inasmuch as Anderson had 
confidence in Egan’s ability in the MTM area, he felt that Egan’s 
unit labor costs were more accurate than Allen’s, which he could not 
reconcile to the accounting records. He requested Egan to give him 
an estimate of the time which would be involved in correcting all 
of Allen’s unit direct labor costs for the awning line to a degree of
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accuracy sufficient to serve the purpose of this study, and in compiling 
reasonable operational cost estimates for the proposed furniture line. 
MTM methods would be the only practicable approach to the de­
velopment of unit labor estimates for the furniture items inasmuch 
as they were not in production. The fact that Egan would also be 
applying these methods in the awning line involving similar opera­
tions would be an advantage.
Anderson next directed his attention to indirect costs. He was not 
much concerned with the distinction between manufacturing burden 
and selling and administrative expenses; consequently, he examined 
these two classifications of expenses at the same time. Turning to the 
1964 audit working papers, he and Peters noted that manufacturing 
overhead had been $762,000, selling and administrative expenses 
$378,000, and other expenses $20,000. Then they started to review 
together the individual account analyses contained in the working 
papers. Anderson explained that his purpose was to identify all dif­
ferential indirect costs relevant to the particular problem at hand. 
There were many indirect expenses relevant to the awning depart­
ment, of course, and most of these also would be relevant to the 
aluminum furniture operations if they were substituted for the awn­
ing operations. However, Anderson was interested only in those rel­
evant expenses which would change by reason of the substitution 
of the furniture line for the awning line. These he referred to as 
relevant differential expenses. This greatly limited the number of 
items he would have to deal with, but it was still necessary to review 
all indirect expenses in order to be certain that none pertinent to the 
problem would be overlooked.
Having explained the purpose of this step to Peters, he discussed 
several specific items of expense with him before permitting him to 
proceed with the review by himself. For instance, the approximately 
$30,000 which had been spent in designing the new line of furniture 
certainly was relevant to the furniture operations. It was a differential 
experience in that it might be discontinued completely, or continued at 
a different rate. Investigation disclosed that there were no plans for 
future design work on the furniture sets, so that no expense of this 
nature was projected to be charged against future operations of the 
furniture department.
They also discussed the cost of rearranging the physical location 
of certain of the production machines which had been done to permit 
a better work flow through the awning department. Inasmuch as 
these costs were not expected to recur, they were not included among
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the relevant differential costs to be charged against future operations 
in the study.
A major item of expense which Anderson brought out for special 
consideration was the cost of awning installations by indirect factory 
employees, including wages, payroll expenses, and traveling expenses 
related to these activities. Anderson assigned Peters to compile an 
estimate of these costs and their relationship to awning sales by review 
of awning sales records, examination of payroll records and travel 
expense vouchers, and discussions with Wolfe and with the main­
tenance employees involved.
Leaving his consideration of indirect expenses for the moment, 
Anderson again conferred with Egan, and was pleased to learn that 
Egan anticipated no difficulty in establishing required unit direct 
labor cost estimates by MTM methods, accurate enough for purposes 
of this study, within three days—or four days at the most. Anderson 
directed Egan to proceed with his direct labor cost studies. He also 
advised him not to set his unit cost estimates too “tight” because he 
did not want to base his figures upon an anticipation of substantially 
improved efficiency; on the other hand, however, Anderson told Egan 
not to take into consideration the subnormally slow pace which Peters 
had reported the employees worked during the off season.
Anderson further requested Egan to review in detail the engineering 
bills for material used by the awning and furniture lines after he had 
completed his studies of direct labor costs.
Now convinced that reliable unit cost estimates could be computed, 
Anderson turned for the moment to other matters.
Challenge of Sales Projections
Seeking out Mr. Wolfe, Anderson discussed with him his five-year 
projection of awning sales (Table II). Remembering that Wolfe had 
said that the anticipated decline in sales was attributable principally 
to price declines rather than to a decline in the number of awnings 
sold, Anderson asked Wolfe whether he expected numerous additional 
small local competitors to enter the market during the five-year period 
of the projection.
“No,” said Wolfe, “because they are not solely in the business of 
making and selling aluminum awnings. In fact, this is only a marginal 
part of their businesses inasmuch as they cannot produce them as 
cheaply as we can and, consequently, do not make much profit on 
them. Most of them are custom sheet metal fabricators catering to 
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the small, individual job requirements in their communities. Each 
of them has his own local market, and the potential is not attractive 
enough to expect that very many more of these local operations will 
spring up.”
“Why then,” Anderson inquired, “do you anticipate further dete­
rioration in prices, especially if the aluminum awning business is only 
marginally profitable to local sheet metal fabricators?”
“Well,” responded Wolfe, “you may have a point there. Local price 
competition has become increasingly keen over the past three years, 
but I suppose it has to stop somewhere. I guess that I fell into the 
fallacy of projecting a trend which could not continue forever. Frankly, 
Anderson, I think I might have been influenced by the fact that I 
have been so discouraged by local price competition in the awning 
line over the past few years that I welcomed an opportunity to get 
out of it and into an entirely new line.”
Anderson inquired, “Do you think that your markets for aluminum 
awnings are becoming saturated?”
After some thought, Wolfe replied, “No, on the contrary; I really 
believe that the penetration is still in its infancy. Our logical regional 
market is quite a populated area, you know, and aluminum awning 
suppliers have barely commenced to scratch the surface of the poten­
tial. The considerably higher cost of aluminum awnings over fabric 
awnings was a deterrent to sales in the beginning, but as people have 
come to realize the advantages of aluminum awnings from the stand­
point of continued attractive appearance and permanency, they be­
come increasingly willing to make a higher initial investment. When 
I think of the still untapped markets for industrial, commercial, and 
institutional aluminum awning sales in our marketing region, I think 
I might have been somewhat impulsive in projecting the decline in 
sales for aluminum awnings over the five-year period ahead.”
“Would you be so kind,” Anderson asked, “as to prepare me a 
revised projection of awning sales for the 1966 through 1970 period 
as soon as you conveniently can. I will need it in order to complete 
my cost study for Mr. Cohen. However, before I leave, I would like 
to take a few more minutes of your time to discuss your projections 
of furniture set sales.” (Table I).
Wolfe appeared a bit disconcerted. “Look here,” he said, “I told 
you these estimates were only my best guesses. I really had not given 
them a lot of consideration. I am more interested in increasing sales 
than I am in developing theoretical figures for my brother-in-law, 
Mr. Cohen.”
“That is as it should be,” said Anderson, “but you must not under­
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estimate the importance of planning for the future. Proceeding with­
out a plan is like traveling without a road map—you may get there 
eventually, but probably not by the most direct or rapid route.
“You told me that you plan to sell the aluminum furniture sets 
through your regular sales agents, most of whom already sell alu­
minum awnings. Let me ask you this: Are these commissioned agents 
also selling aluminum doors and aluminum combination screen and 
storm windows for Mr. Atkins?”
“Yes, they are,” said Mr. Wolfe, “their customers are substantially 
the same. If a prospect is not interested in aluminum awnings, he 
might well be interested in aluminum doors or in aluminum screen 
and storm windows.”
Anderson made another note of the possible confusion which could 
be generated by direction of the same group of manufacturers’ rep­
resentatives by more than one sales executive in the same company. 
Then he proceeded to further examine the marketing pattern for the 
three existing lines.
“Do your manufacturers’ representatives sell to distributors, to re­
tailers, or directly to consumers?”
Wolfe replied, “They do not sell to distributors at all. There is 
essentially no competition from national manufacturers in these lines. 
Because of the freight factor, markets are regional. For this reason, 
we are, in effect, our own distributor. Our manufacturers’ represen­
tatives do sell to a few retail outlets. However, these businesses are 
the same type of small sheet metal fabricators which represent our 
serious local competition.
“For the most part, sales are made directly to the consumer. The 
commission percentage standard in this business is high enough, and 
the typical unit sale is large enough, to make direct consumer selling 
attractive to our sales representatives.”
Anderson then recalled that Wolfe had based his projections of 
furniture set sales over the next five years upon reports of discussions 
which the sales representatives had had with several department store 
buyers, and upon industry surveys prepared by the Aluminum Products 
Council. Initially, Anderson had presumed that the field sales rep­
resentatives were well acquainted with department store furniture 
buyers, but now he was inclined to question this fact. After some 
probing, Wolfe admitted that Aluminum Products manufacturers’ 
representatives did not regularly contact department store furniture 
buyers, neither for Aluminum Products nor for any of the other lines 
that they typically carried. He further admitted that the discus­
sions which had been reported to him were not motivated by any
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request on his part for a survey of the potential for aluminum furniture 
sets, but rather as a result of a rumor which had circulated throughout 
the organization that Mr. Cohen was contemplating going into this 
line. Reflecting for a moment on the ramifications of these circum­
stances, Wolfe himself offered the comment that salesmen are op­
timistic by nature, and that, inasmuch as all of Aluminum Products’ 
salesmen were compensated solely on commission, they had nothing 
to lose and possibly something to gain by having new lines with 
which to experiment.
Anderson and Wolfe proceeded to examine the industry surveys 
circulated by the Aluminum Products Council. They found, upon 
closer scrutiny, that although the Council was a regional trade as­
sociation, the figures had been obtained from an affiliated national 
association and were not particularly pertinent to the problem at hand 
except as an indication of national trends.
At this point, Wolfe volunteered the opinion that he could come 
up with five-year sales projections for aluminum furniture sets in 
which he had much more confidence, merely by devoting a few days 
to a field trip to key cities within his natural marketing area for 
purposes of surveying the potential. Wolfe still held to the belief that 
the logical outlet for aluminum furniture sets was through department 
stores, although he felt that there was some potential to be realized 
in sales to small furniture stores in the more rural areas. Wolfe of­
fered to make a swing around the territory within the next few days 
if it would assist Anderson in completing his study before the date 
of the meeting of the board of directors.
Four days later, meeting again with Harry Egan, Anderson reviewed 
first his direct labor cost estimates to produce the various items com­
prising the awning line and the proposed standardized lin e  of alu­
minum playroom furniture. Egan stressed that, while he considered 
his figures to be reliable enough for estimating purposes, they should 
not be looked upon as acceptable production standards. Comparing 
these unit direct labor cost estimates with those he had obtained 
earlier from Allen, Anderson noted important differences.
Next Anderson discussed with Egan his review of the engineering 
bills of material for both the awning and the furniture lines, as well 
as the application to these bills of material at current material costs. 
He was very glad to learn that Egan was quite satisfied with the 
quality of Allen’s work in this area.
The next day, in the offices of Franklin & Sweet, Anderson received 
a telephone call from Mr. Wolfe. Wolfe said that he had revised his
56
CASE STUDY 1: ALUMINUM PRODUCTS, INC.
five-year sales projections for both the awning line and the proposed 
aluminum furniture set line, and that he would like to have Anderson 
come out to the Aluminum Products’ plant and review them with him. 
Several hours later Anderson met with Wolfe and discussed the proce­
dures which Wolfe had followed in developing each of the two new 
sales projections. Anderson was quite satisfied with the methods which 
had been applied, and he was impressed by the ability which Wolfe 
demonstrated when faced with this specific challenge.
Wolfe’s five-year projection of furniture set sales appears below 
in Table V:
Table V
Revised Furniture Sales Estimates—1966-1970
1966 $1,000,000
1967 1,200,000
1968 1,250,000
1969 1,300,000
1970 1,350,000
His revised projection of awning sales for the same period remained 
substantially as originally forecasted and appears in Table VI, below:
Table VI
Revised Awning Sales Estimates—1965-1970
1965 $1,368,000
1966 1,300,000
1967 1,250,000
1968 1,250,000
1969 1,250,000
1970 900,000
Wolfe was obviously pleased with the results of his recent activities. 
“There is no good substitute for getting out into the field occasionally,” 
he said. “You may be interested to know that if we do introduce 
this new line of aluminum furniture, I do not intend to market it 
through our present group of sales representatives. Inasmuch as the 
retail sales outlets for this lin e  within our natural marketing region 
are relatively few in number, I think they can be serviced better and
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more cheaply by one full-time salaried salesman who can develop 
specialized experience in working with department store buyers than 
by our commissioned agents, any one of whom normally would not 
have more than two or three sales outlets for this line within the 
territory he covers.”
Anderson made a note of this information for use in developing 
his cost projections.
Completion of Cost Study
The following day, Anderson and Peters both appeared at the offices 
of Aluminum Products where they sat down together to review the 
data which they had accumulated and to attempt to reach some con­
clusions. They preferred to work in the client’s office for ease in 
obtaining any additional facts which they might require and for con­
venient access to any of Aluminum Products’ officers and employees 
whom they might wish to consult.
The figures which they developed appear in Schedules 1 through 4.
Comparing Schedule 2 with Schedule 4, Anderson and Peters noted 
that during its first year of operations (1966), the proposed furniture 
line might be expected to make a differential contribution to profits 
for the company of $137,000—just about the same differential con­
tribution as was made by the awning line in 1965. However, compar­
ing this projection of the differential contribution of the proposed 
furniture line for 1966 with the projection for the awning line for the 
same year, it could be seen that the substitution of the former line 
for the latter would result in an increase in profits (or decrease in 
losses) of approximately $16,000. During the subsequent four years 
covered by the projection, the improvement in profitability would 
become increasingly greater.
Preparation of Report
Anderson was now prepared to write a brief report in which he 
would summarize the results of his study, the assumptions upon which 
it was based, and the conclusions which he drew therefrom. His re­
port would cover the following points:
1. If the assumptions upon which the projections were based proved 
to be correct, substitution of the furniture line for the awning lin e  
under Mr. Cohen’s present plan would, indeed, result in a financial 
improvement of the company’s operations.
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Schedule 1
ALUMINUM PRODUCTS, INC.
Computation of Relevant Differential Contribution
to Profits of Awning Line—1965 
(000 omitted)
Gross sales $1,368
Less differential costs directly identifiable to the awning 
line:
Commissions (5% of gross sales) $68
Direct labor (including indirect payroll expense and
fringe benefits) (Note 1) 145
Materials (Note 2) 938
Indirect labor costs (including payroll expense and
fringe benefits) (Note 3) 78 1,229
$ 139
Notes:
1. Direct labor costs (plus indirect payroll expense, including fringe 
benefit costs) charged to the awning line were computed from Egan’s 
unit cost studies applied to unit sales.
2. Inasmuch as Egan had been reasonably satisfied with the accuracy 
of the engineering bills of material and Allen’s computations of unit 
materials costs, Allen’s figures were used. From Egan’s limited 
observations, he also concluded that a 5 per cent allowance for 
spoilage and waste was probably as good an estimate as could be 
made in the absence of an established reporting procedure.
3. Peters’ investigation had disclosed that there were 19 indirect labor 
employees in the factory whose average individual annual compensa­
tion (including payroll expenses and fringe benefits) amounted to 
$6,500. Of these 19, the equivalent of 12 full-time employees were 
required to make the custom installations of awnings in the field.
2. However, before a final decision is made, consideration should 
be given to the practicality and advisability of continuing all three 
of the present lines along with the introduction of the furniture line 
by producing for stock at a consistently maintained efficient produc­
tion level during the slack season.
3. If it proved to be advisable to continue the awning line, a study 
should be made of possible alternative methods of field installation 
of the awnings to replace the practice of using factory employees for 
this purpose, which added so substantially to the cost of operations.
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Schedule 2
Projection of Relevant Differential Contribution
to Profits of Awning Line—1965-70
ALUMINUM PRODUCTS, INC.
(000 omitted)
1966
1967 and 
Subsequent 
Years
1965 
( Sch. 1)
Gross sales $1,368 $1,300 $1,250
Less differential costs:
Commissions $ 68 $ 65 $ 63
Direct labor 145 145 145
Materials 938  891 856
Indirect labor 78 78 72
Total $1,229 $1,179 $1,136
Differential contribution $ 139 $ 121 $ 114
(Anderson had some thoughts concerning this problem which he was 
anxious to discuss with Mr. Cohen and Mr. Wolfe.)
Having prepared a draft of his report, Anderson made an appoint­
ment to meet again with Mr. Cohen to discuss his findings before 
finalizing the report. He considered it good practice to give Mr. Cohen 
an opportunity to challenge his assumptions and conclusions. He also 
wanted to find out if the report, in the form he proposed to render it, 
would adequately serve Mr. Cohen’s purposes.
After Mr. Cohen had read the draft of Anderson’s report, he ques­
tioned at great length many of the steps taken by Anderson in carrying 
out his study. He was interested in learning from Anderson what 
would be involved in undertaking an additional study to determine 
the feasibility of producing all four lines of products. Anderson 
promised to submit a proposal for this work along with an estimate 
of the fee involved, but he outlined in general terms his thoughts on 
the best approaches to the problem.
Cohen then studied Anderson’s calculations of the cost of installing 
awnings in the field. During the course of the discussion, Anderson 
found an appropriate opportunity to present his ideas, qualifying them 
as being just “off the top of his head.” He felt that the installation work 
could be done at substantially less cost, even though at considerably
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Schedule 3
ALUMINUM PRODUCTS, INC.
Computation of Relevant Differential Contribution
to Profits of Proposed Furniture Line—1966
(000 omitted)
Gross sales $1,000
Less differential costs directly identifiable to the furniture
line:
Direct labor (including indirect payroll expense and 
fringe benefits) (Note 1) $145
Materials 670
Salesman’s salary and traveling and entertainment
expenses (Note 2) 28
Advertising allowance (Note 3) 20 863
Differential contribution $ 137
Notes:
1. From his review and revision of Allen’s unit direct labor cost esti­
mates, Egan concluded that the equivalent of only approximately 15 
full-time employees would be required to produce the furniture 
line at an annual sales volume of $1,000,000. However, since the 
equivalent of approximately 18 full-time employees had been re­
quired to produce the 1962 sales volume in the awning line, and since 
all executives consulted seemed to agree that it was important to 
retain a stabilized force of experienced workers because of conditions 
in the local labor market, no reduction in the number of direct labor 
employees was projected. The economic effect of this assumption 
was emphasized in the report.
2. Estimated by Wolfe.
3. Wolfe advised that a 2 per cent advertising allowance would have to 
be refunded to the retailers in most instances.
higher hourly labor rates, if the traveling time and expenses could 
be eliminated. This suggested the possibility of contracting in each 
community with some qualified local person to make the installations. 
Consideration might even be given, Anderson suggested, to exploring 
the possibility of making such arrangements with the local sheet metal 
fabricators who represented Aluminum Products’ principal competi­
tion in this line. Through its greater purchasing power, Aluminum 
Products undoubtedly enjoyed better prices for materials and com­
ponents for its awning line than did the small fabricators, and this, 
plus greater efficiency through volume production, was where Alumi-
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Schedule 4
Projection of Relevant Differential Contribution 
to Profits of Proposed Furniture Line—1966-70 
(000 omitted)
1966
ALUMINUM PRODUCTS, INC.
(Sch. 3) 1967 1968 1969 1970
Gross sales $1,000 $1,200 $1,250 $1,300 $1,350
Less differential costs:
Direct labor $ 145 $ 145 $ 145 $ 150 $ 156
Materials 670 804 838 871 904
Salesman’s salary
and expenses 28 30 30 31 31
Advertising allowance 20 24 25 26 27
Total $ 863 $1,003 $1,038 $1,078 $1,118
Differential contribution $ 137 $ 197 $ 212 $ 222 $ 232
num Products made its money rather than on field installation. On the 
other hand, the small local fabricators probably made their money 
on installation. Consequently, if they could be assured of continuing 
installation business, they might be agreeable to discontinuing to offer 
aluminum awnings as retailers. Alternatively, if, in individual sales 
territories, the small fabricators appeared to cover the market as well 
as, or better than Aluminum Products’ present commissioned agents, 
some thought might be given to transferring the line and passing 
along to them as a discount, part or all of the commission currently 
being paid to the agents. These alternatives might also permit the ex­
tension of Aluminum Products’ marketing region.
Cohen seemed quite interested, and said that he would like to think 
about this for a while. However, he asked Anderson to delete this 
third point from his formal report and to submit the report to him as 
soon as possible. He told Anderson that he intended to discuss the 
findings and recommendations of Franklin & Sweet with the other 
members of the board at the meeting on March 16. It was not his 
intention, however, to request action by the board at that time. 
Instead, he would recommend that further appropriate studies be 
undertaken by Franklin & Sweet without delay so that a well planned 
program of action could be adopted at the earliest date possible.
Anderson returned to the offices of Franklin & Sweet to finalize his 
report and to prepare a proposal for Phase 2 of the Aluminum Products 
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management services engagement. Later, when he prepared to bill 
Aluminum Products for Phase 1, he was gratified to find that accumu­
lated charges were about in line with the estimate originally given 
Mr. Cohen.
Follow-up Projects
Anderson intended that Phase 2 of the engagement be limited to 
work required to reach conclusions concerning points 2 and 3 in the 
initial draft of his report. This would logically include individual 
studies of the door and window lines similar to the one he had made 
of the awning line.
Anderson did expect to include in his report on Phase 2 a strong 
recommendation that, if all four product lines were to be produced, 
immediate steps be taken to design and install at least rudimentary 
systems for inventory and production p lanning  and control.
From time to time in the future, Anderson planned to discuss with 
Mr. Cohen other areas in which Franklin & Sweet could be of assist­
ance. These would include, but not necessarily in the sequence men­
tioned, the following matters: (1) improvement of the organization 
structure and definition of lines of responsibility, including recom­
mendation that a qualified controller be employed; (2) design and 
installation of an appropriate cost accounting and cost estimating 
system; (3) recommendations concerning pricing policies; (4) rede­
sign of chart of accounts; (5) installation of a reporting system for 
accounting for the transfer of direct labor employees among the 
several departments; (6) institution of scrap and spoilage reports, 
both for control purposes and for purposes of establishing accurate 
spoilage allowances; (7) development of improved bases for alloca­
tion of indirect costs among departments, and classification of these 
costs appropriately in preparation for profit planning; (8) develop­
ment of monthly financial reports designed to provide useful informa­
tion for management purposes, including operations by product lines; 
(9) development of logical forecasting and variable budgeting pro­
cedures; and (10) training of a qualified employee on the staff of 
Aluminum Products in time study and MTM methods to produce 
accurate unit direct labor standards for use in estimating, cost account­
ing, production control, performance measurement, and, possibly, in­
centive program purposes.
The excess lighted and heated factory space also continued to bother 
Anderson. If no substantial expansion of volume or introduction of 
new product lines were contemplated over the medium-term future,
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it was possible that the executive, sales, and accounting offices could 
be moved into the unoccupied space, and the separate building cur­
rently occupied by these offices be sold or leased. However, before 
such a move were made, Anderson would urge exhaustive study of 
the possibilities of adding one or more new product lines which might 
involve use of this space for the purposes of continuing growth, bal­
ancing of the seasonal sales pattern, and diversification.
He made a notation of these thoughts and filed it for future refer­
ence.
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James Leather Products
In January 1964, Henry James, the sole owner of James Leather 
Products, Apple Creek, Pennsylvania, visited Peter Lowe, the prin­
cipal partner of Peter D. Lowe Associates, a local certified public 
accounting firm, to see if Mr. Lowe could help him improve the 
fortunes of his company. At the time, many businessmen in the 
Apple Creek area believed James Leather Products was in serious 
financial trouble.
Apple Creek was a town of some 400 persons. The nearest large 
town was Newton, Pennsylvania, where Mr. Lowe’s offices were 
located. Newton had a population of some 10,000 persons and was 
situated 10 miles from Apple Creek. The Newton-Apple Creek area 
was noted for its corn, clay pits, potteries, and coal mines.
James Leather Products
In 1964, Henry James was 41 years old, was married, and had two 
children. He had lived in Apple Creek all his life. His company, 
James Leather Products, manufactured and sold leather goods; namely, 
safety gloves, harnesses for sulky racing, optical cases, and “wrist 
positioners.” During the year 1963, the company’s sales amounted to 
about $182,000.
Early Career
Mr. James’s business career started in 1951, when he purchased a 
shoe repair shop in Apple Creek for $3,500. After operating the shop
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for a year, he quit the shoe repair business, primarily because it 
failed to provide enough income to support his young family.
Then, using his shoe repair equipment, Mr. James began to manu­
facture safety gloves and within a short time he received his first order 
from a local brickyard. Over the years he continued to sell these gloves 
to local companies and by 1964 his annual sales for safety gloves 
amounted to about $14,000.
Next, in February 1952, James added leather racing harnesses to 
his product line. During the next four years, his harness business grew 
rapidly. Then, in 1956, to meet the growing demand for his harnesses, 
James put a completely equipped trailer on the road, which carried 
a full line of harnesses together with a repair man and all of the equip­
ment necessary to repair harnesses. This truck visited various race 
tracks selling harnesses directly to the sulky racers and repairing their 
old harnesses. Later, between 1957 and 1960, a truck and a second 
trailer were acquired and placed on the road to sell and repair har­
nesses.
In Mr James’ opinion, there was one major weakness in his sales 
strategy of selling directly to sulky racers. While his trucks were away 
from the plant he had little control over the revenues from repair 
work and the credit terms extended by his salesmen to harness buyers. 
Consequently, to police his sales force, he traveled frequently through­
out the country to the race tracks where his salesmen operated.
In 1960, Mr. James suffered a ruptured disk which required a 
serious operation. From May until September he was immobilized, 
and during this period he completely lost control over his business. 
As a result, in early 1961, he discontinued the trailers and sold his 
harnesses only to wholesale accounts. This change in policy in turn 
caused a decline in annual harness sales from $250,000 to $150,000.
During late 1961, in order to make up for the loss in sales volume, 
Henry James started to manufacture leather optical cases and “wrist 
positioners,” a leather device worn on the hand of a bowler to help 
him control the path of his bowling ball.
The Situation in January 1964
In January 1964, James Leather Products had a net worth of some 
$10,000, and the company’s 1963 income statement showed a profit of 
about $4,000, which was inadequate to meet James’ income require­
ments. Exhibit 1 presents the 1962 and 1963 balance sheets for the 
company; Exhibits 2 and 3 contain the company’s 1962 and 1963 
statements of earnings and expenses.
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Exhibit 1
JAMES LEATHER PRODUCTS
Comparative Balance Sheet 
December 31, 1963 and 1962
December 31 
1963 1962
Assets
Cash $ 114 $ 3,006
Accounts receivable 26,865 25,474
Inventories
Raw materials 34,660 33,483
Work in process and finished
goods 14,520 15,505
Prepaid expenses 1,317 1,380
Fixed assets, less allowance for
depreciation 8,436 10,112
Cash value of life insurance 8,000 6,781
Total assets $93,912 $95,741
Liabilities and Proprietor’s Capital
Notes payable, plus accrued
interest $51,156 $52,931
Accounts payable 31,326 30,443
Withholding taxes 1,030 689
Other 554 656
Total liabilities $84,066 $84,719
Proprietor’s capital 9,846 11,022
Total liabilities and proprietor’s capital $93,912 $95,741
The company employed seven men in its plant. Since Mr. James 
was the firm’s only salesman, he made field trips frequently. Conse­
quently, his shop was unsupervised for long periods of time and he 
suspected that his plant employees were working far below their 
capacity. Several local businessmen told Peter Lowe that they be­
lieved, given better supervision, the productive output of James 
Leather Products could be increased greatly without additional in­
vestment in equipment.
Mr. James ran the company’s office with the part-time help of his 
wife. While Mrs. James was a competent bookkeeper, there was more 
work than she could handle. Mr. James hired Mr. Brooks, a local
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Exhibit 2
JAMES LEATHER PRODUCTS
Statement of Earnings and Proprietor’s Capital
For the Years Ended December 31, 1963 and 1962
December 31
1963 1962
Net sales
Harnesses $143,379 $148,062
Optical cases 13,372 15,956
Safety gloves 13,748 11,409
Wrist positioners 11,890 9,097
Total sales $182,389 $184,524
Cost of goods sold
Inventories—beginning $ 48,988 $ 45,441
Purchases 74,286 75,293
Direct labor 75,110 76,319
Manufacturing expenses 17,662 17,549
Ending—less inventories
$216,046
49,180
$214,602
48,988
Cost of goods sold $166,866 $165,614
Gross profit $ 15,523 $ 18,910
Selling and administrative expenses
Selling expenses $ 3,709 $ 4,505
Administrative expenses 8,300 8,513
Operating profit
$ 12,009 
$ 3,514
$ 13,018 
$ 5,892
Other income 502 779
Net earnings $ 4,016 $ 6,671
Proprietor’s drawings 5,192 7,207
Excess of drawings over net earnings $ 1,176 $ 536
Proprietor’s capital—beginning of year 11,022 11,558
Proprietor’s capital—end of year $ 9,846 $ 11,022
bookkeeper, on a part-time basis to assist with the bookkeeping and to 
prepare the company’s tax returns.
The company’s manufacturing operations were carried on in a small 
building located on the main street of Apple Creek. The building’s 
lighting and layout were poor. For instance, there was inadequate 
space (1) for the storage of raw materials and finished products, (2) 
for the free movement of employees between the various pieces of 
machinery, and (3) for the addition of new machinery.
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Exhibit 3
JAMES LEATHER PRODUCTS 
Statement of Expenses
For the Years Ended December 31, 1963 and 1962
December 31 
1963 1962
Manufacturing expenses:
Indirect labor $ 3,690 $ 3,427
Supplies 3,908 3,975
Payroll taxes 3,478 3,774
Utilities 2,140 1,853
Depreciation 944 662
Repairs 1,030 1,094
Rent 1,373 1,498
Insurance 1,099 1,266
Total $17,662 $17,549
Selling expenses:
Commissions $ 1,026 $ 779
Telephone 163 90
Travel and entertainment 1,500 1,751
Advertising and promotion 201 1,178
Depreciation — auto 514 514
Repairs and maintenance — auto 30 93
Miscellaneous 275 100
Total $ 3,709 $ 4,505
Administrative expenses:
Office salaries $ 1,958 $ 1,842
Office supplies 136 373
Telephone 1,347 1,203
Postage 156 45
Contributions 421 441
Dues and subscriptions 51 75
Legal and accounting 862 842
Travel 81 645
Depreciation — office equipment 39 35
Interest 2,590 2,196
Miscellaneous 659 816
Total $ 8,300 $ 8,513
Local businessmen regarded Henry James as a hard worker, honest, 
and an excellent salesman. In addition, among sulky racers, he en­
joyed a reputation for manufacturing high quality leather products.
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Product Line
In January 1964, James Leather Products manufactured four leather 
products: racing harnesses, optical cases, safety gloves, and wrist 
positioners. The racing harnesses were sold through several Mid­
western wholesalers to sulky racers. The company’s other three prod­
ucts were sold directly by the company to local manufacturing 
companies and retail outlets.
The range of leather racing equipment marketed by the company 
included complete harnesses and harness accessories. The harnesses 
were sold FOB Apple Creek and the average selling price per harness 
during 1963 was $140.
The company sold its optical cases to a number of opticians through­
out Pennsylvania and Ohio. These high-grade leather cases sold FOB 
Apple Creek for $1.50. This price was determined by the competitive 
prices of similar cases made of either plastic or leather, marketed 
locally by several large optical suppliers.
Henry James’ safety gloves were used in a number of local brick­
yards, manufacturing plants, and potteries. The gloves consisted of 
two pieces of flexible leather punched in the shape of a hand and 
joined together by studs to form a glove. Safety gloves were offered 
by the company in nine different sizes for 75¢ a pair, FOB Apple 
Creek. It was Henry James’ understanding, however, that national 
and regional mill supply houses bought similar gloves from a variety 
of sources at about 55¢ a pair and then sold them in the Apple Creek 
area for approximately 70¢ a pair. Henry James believed he was able to 
command a higher retail price for his gloves because they were a 
better quality than those offered by the mill supply houses.
Two varieties of wrist positioners—ladies’ and men’s—were sold to 
a number of sports stores and bowling alleys throughout the Penn­
sylvania-Ohio area by James Leather Products. A wrist positioner is 
similar to a golf glove in appearance, except that it has a band of 
special leather attached at the top. The bowler places the glove on his 
hand and wraps the leather band around his wrist, fastening the 
band by means of a metal snap. Wrist positioners were sold in six 
basic sizes FOB Apple Creek for $1.08 a pair. Similar products were 
offered in the Apple Creek area by several national and regional sport­
ing goods jobbers for around 900 a pair. Mr. James believed these 
jobbers paid manufacturers about 75¢ a pair for their wrist positioners.
Only one of the company’s product lines, the harness line, carried 
a brand name, the rest simply bore a stamp, “James Leather Products,” 
and the company’s address. The harness line was known as “Hercules”
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racing equipment. According to Henry James, this brand name was 
well known among sulky racers.
The company guaranteed all of its products against defects and, in 
the case of the harness line, offered repair service as well. In practice, 
Henry James gave credit for all returns, even if they were not defective. 
Also, he often repaired, free of charge, harnesses he had sold, irrespec­
tive of who was to blame for the damaged harness.
All of the company’s products were shipped in plain cardboard boxes 
bearing the company’s name and address and the destination of the 
box. Harnesses were packed individually in clear, unprinted plastic 
bags, which were then shipped in the cardboard boxes. The safety 
gloves, optical cases, and wrist positioners were not individually 
packaged.
To market the above products, Henry James traveled extensively in 
his company’s station wagon. Typically every two weeks he would 
load the wagon with samples of each of his products and then spend 
four to five days on the road visiting potential buyers in different cities. 
The terms of trade he offered to these customers were 30 days net.
Peter D. Lowe Associates
Peter D. Lowe Associates consisted of three partners, seven staff 
men, and eight female clerk-secretaries. The firm’s clients were mainly 
small manufacturing companies spread throughout western Penn­
sylvania and Ohio. Almost without exception, Peter D. Lowe Associ­
ates’ management services engagements involved existing audit clients 
and were handled exclusively by Mr. Lowe.
Management Service Practice
Management services were billed by Peter D. Lowe Associates on 
the same basis as audit services. In general, Mr. Lowe preferred to 
bill for time actually spent on the job rather than committing himself 
for a definite amount of money in advance. In most cases, management 
services work was so intermingled with the rest of the firm’s account­
ing work that it had never been considered practical to break down 
the management services work for billing purposes. Mr. Lowe 
estimated that audit opinions accounted for about 30 per cent of the 
firm’s billings, tax work about 15 per cent, with the remainder of the 
firm’s billings representing “writeup” and management services en­
gagements.
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Lowe’s Early Impressions of James Leather Products
Henry James was referred to Peter Lowe by one of Mr. Lowe’s 
clients, from whom James had unsuccessfully attempted to borrow 
money to shore up his sagging business. This client believed Lowe 
might be able to help James liquidate his business in an orderly fashion.
After listening to Henry James’ business history, Mr. Lowe sug­
gested he visit James’ plant to see at first hand the factory layout and 
the company’s books and products. Mr. Lowe explained to Henry 
James that he would not be billed for this visit since Lowe was not 
sure he could do anything to assist him.
Subsequently, during February 1964, Lowe visited the company’s 
plant and obtained some preliminary facts about the business. Later, 
based on this information, Peter Lowe told one of his partners the 
following: “In my opinion, Henry James is a good salesman. Also, 
he is a shrewd businessman when it comes to picking products. How­
ever, he is a poor financial manager, an inept controller of operations, 
and a dismal marketing manager. By borrowing money from a num­
ber of sources he has been able to put off facing up to these weak­
nesses. However, he can borrow no more; he must now tighten up 
his business or liquidate it.
“His current situation is unbelievable. He has violated all the prin­
ciples of administration. He has no organization, no lines of authority, 
no wage policy, no credit policy, and no cost data. I just don’t know 
how he has lasted this long.
“So far, he and I have managed to pull together some raw material 
usage figures broken down by each product line. Fortunately, the kind 
of leather incorporated in each product line is of a different type so 
it was fairly easy to put the figures together. Here are the 1963 figures:
Harnesses
Optical
Cases
Safety
Gloves
Wrist
Positioners Total
“Inventory — 1-1-63 $24,883 $2,512 $3,018 $3,070 $33,483
Purchases 57,107 7,471 6,566 3,142 74,286
81,990 9,983 9,584 6,212 107,769
Inventory — 12-31-63 26,180 1,612 4,116 2,752 34,660
Raw materials used $55,810 $8,371 $5,468 $3,460 $73,109
“Incidentally, Henry James expects the cost of the particular grade 
and type of leather he uses in his optical cases to increase somewhat 
in the near future. Apparently, the cost has gone up 10 per cent during
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the last year and his suppliers have warned him to look out for a 
similar increase this year.
“Henry doesn’t keep records of the time spent by his plant employees 
on various jobs. However, I did ask him to estimate the time his 
labor force devoted to each of the major product lines. After he ex­
plained this was a difficult thing to do because plant employees 
switched from product line to product line, he gave me the following 
rough estimates:
Percentage of Labor Dollar Equivalent 
Force’s Time ( approximately)1
“Harnesses 80% $60,088
Optical cases 10 7,512
Safety gloves 5 3,755
Wrist positioners 5 3,755
100% $75,110
“According to James, the factory employees all work for the same 
hourly wage.
“Now I am in a quandry. Should I take Henry James as a manage­
ment services client? He is eager to have me help him. What do 
you think I ought to do?”
Questions
1. Would you take Henry James as a management services client?
2. Define the objectives of the engagement which you would estab­
lish in your understanding with Henry James.
3. What kind of billing arrangement would you adopt?
4. From the description given in the case, what steps would you 
take to attain your defined objectives?
5. What analyses would you prepare in considering product line 
policy questions?
Commentary on James Leather Products
Peter Lowe decided he would accept Henry James as a management 
services client for three reasons. First, James’ predicament represented
1 Based on 1963 manufacturing labor costs.
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a challenge to Lowe’s management services skill. Second, Lowe felt 
a strong obligation to do all that he could to improve the economy 
of the Newton-Apple Creek district. Third, he suspected that with 
proper direction, James Leather Products could develop into a profit­
able operation with sales well beyond its current level. If this improved 
situation came to pass, Lowe believed the company could be a con­
tinuing client for his firm.
Consequently, in March 1964, Mr. Lowe proposed that Peter D. 
Lowe Associates perform the following work:
1. Develop recommendations designed to improve the company’s 
cash position and to help James gain better management control over 
the business.
2. Analyze the profit contribution of each of the company’s four 
product lines to assist James in his decisions on product line policy 
and marketing strategy.
Billings for this work would be based on the actual time spent. 
Lowe’s time would be billed at $25 an hour and the time of his staff 
at between $7 and $15 an hour, depending on the staff members in­
volved.
Based on a preliminary time budget, Lowe estimated that charges of 
approximately $1,800 would be accumulated to accomplish the work 
which he intended to perform. In view of the company’s cash problem, 
he suggested that payments of $150 a month be made to apply toward 
the billings of Peter D. Lowe Associates until they were paid in full.
Henry James agreed to the terms proposed by Peter Lowe.
Peter Lowe’s Initial Analysis and Recommendations
Based on the information gathered during his first visit, Mr. Lowe 
concluded that the company’s most urgent problems were its cash 
position and its serious decline in profits. Since there was an im­
mediate need for cash and because James could not replenish his 
cash account through outside borrowing, Lowe devoted his efforts 
first to this problem.
Average daily sales in 1963
Total sales $182,389
365 days 365
Average collection period
Accounts receivable 
Average daily sales
$26,865
500
$500 per day
54 days
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Lowe examined his client’s accounts receivable and concluded that 
the company’s average collection period was about 54 days, as shown 
above.
In Lowe’s opinion, a 54-day average collection period for a com­
pany selling net 30 days indicated a weak credit policy. Furthermore, 
he determined from a review of the accounts that the average collection 
period for the three lines sold directly by the company was longer 
than 54 days, since the wholesalers who bought the harness products 
generally paid within the stated terms of trade. Therefore, the first 
recommendation he made to Henry James was to begin immediately 
to hold his customers to the terms of trade. This could be accomplished 
by a frequent review of the accounts and by insisting on payment of 
past due amounts when additional goods were ordered by a delinquent 
customer.
Peter Lowe decided that the next most likely means of improving the 
company’s cash position was to reduce the level of the inventories. 
He noted that on December 31, 1963 the value of the inventories was 
about 29 per cent of the company’s 1963 cost of goods sold. A review 
of the details of the inventory listing at December 31, 1963 revealed 
that the amount of work in process was negligible and James con­
firmed that the finished goods quantities were not excessive. The total 
raw materials inventory, however, was 47 per cent of the total materials 
used during the year and obviously warranted further study.
Lowe reviewed the detailed listing of raw materials with Henry 
James to establish estimated maximum and minimum inventory quanti­
ties of the various types of leather and other principal raw material 
items needed to meet production and shipping requirements. These 
estimates were based on James’ extensive knowledge of lead times 
required for delivery from suppliers, production time cycles, and cus­
tomer service demands. Lowe then prepared a set of perpetual inven­
tory cards for these items and recorded the maximum and minimum 
quantities. He also entered the current quantities on hand which 
were obtained by a physical count taken by James. After this was 
completed, he instructed Mr. and Mrs. James on how to maintain and 
use the cards to control inventories at the desired levels.
It was apparent from Peter Lowe’s analysis that substantial reduc­
tions in the raw material inventories could be made without affecting 
the company’s ability to make prompt shipments. As a result of this 
work, Henry James was able to reduce his inventories by approximately 
$5,000 over a three-month period.
Lowe realized that another possibility for improving the company’s 
cash balance would be to slow down payments to suppliers. After a
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brief review of the status of the balances due, however, he concluded 
that the company had already taken full advantage of its credit with 
suppliers.
At this point, Mr. Lowe decided to direct his efforts toward deter­
mining what might be done to improve the profits of James Leather 
Products. In planning his work on this problem, he made a brief 
summary of some of the possible actions which might be taken:
1. Reduce operating expenses through analysis and control
2. Drop product lines if unprofitable
3. Adjust product prices
4. Revise marketing strategy relating to:
a) Packaging
b) Use of brand names
c) Selling through jobbers or retailers
d ) Guarantee and service policy
e) Product quality
5. Improve manufacturing efficiency by:
a) Better supervision
b) Improved plant layout and facilities
Lowe decided to concentrate his work on analyzing the company’s 
costs to provide a basis for product line and pricing decisions and for 
control of manufacturing costs and operating expenses.
His first step was to assign a member of his staff to analyze the 
content and cost behavior of the individual manufacturing, selling, and 
administrative expense accounts for the year 1963. Exhibit 4 presents 
a schedule of the resulting segregation between fixed and variable 
expenses. Lowe concluded from a review of the account analyses that 
significant reductions in these expenses were unlikely.
While his assistant was analyzing expenses, Peter Lowe worked with 
James to develop the data necessary to prepare a summary of unit costs 
for each of the four product lines. Although he already had an esti­
mated allocation of direct labor by product lines, he was not satisfied 
that it was sufficiently accurate for decision making purposes. Accord­
ingly, he reviewed the direct labor operations required to make each
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Exhibit 4
JAMES LEATHER PRODUCTS 
Behavior Analysis of Operating Expenses
Year Ended December 31, 1963
Fixed Variable
Manufacturing expenses:
Indirect labor $2,400 $ 1,290
Supplies 3,908
Payroll taxes 3,478
Utilities 900 1,240
Depreciation 944
Repairs 600 430
Rent 1,373
Insurance 600 499
Total $6,817 $10,845
Selling expenses:
Commissions $ $ 1,026
Telephone 163
Travel and entertainment 1,000 500
Advertising and promotion 201
Depreciation — auto 514
Repairs and maintenance — auto 30
Miscellaneous 275
Total $1,982 $ 1,727
Administrative expenses:
Office salaries $1,958 $
Office supplies 136
Telephone 1,347
Postage 156
Contributions 421
Dues and subscriptions 51
Legal and accounting 862
Travel 81
Depreciation — office equipment 39
Interest 2,590
Miscellaneous 659
Total $8,300 $ -
product and, with the assistance of James and a plant employee, 
developed estimates of the time involved for each operation. He 
assumed that production of the various harness models required the
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same amount of direct labor on James’ assurance that there were only 
minor variations between models. The resulting direct labor hours to 
produce each of the four basic products is shown in Exhibit 5.
Exhibit 5
JAMES LEATHER PRODUCTS
Estimated Products Costs per Unit 
by Product Line
Harnesses
Optical
Cases
Safety
Gloves
Wrist
Positioners
Selling price $140.00 $1.50 $ .75 $1.08
Variable cost of goods sold
Raw materials used $ 54.20 $ .945 $ .303 $ .324
Direct labor 59.66 .760 .190 .380
Variable manufacturing 
expenses 8.61 .110 .027 .055
$122.47 $1.815 $ .520 $ .759
Manufacturing profit 
contribution $ 17.53 $(.315) $ .230 $ .321
Variable selling expenses 1.62 .006 .003 .004
Profit contribution $ 15.91 $(.321) $ .227 $ .317
Units sold — 1963 950 8,915 18,330 11,009
Unit Each Each Pair Pair
Direct labor hours required 
to produce one unit 31.4 .4 .1 .2
Average labor rate — $1.90
Direct labor cost per unit $ 59.66 $ .76 $ .19 $ .38
Lowe’s next step was to examine the wage rates of direct labor 
employees on 1963 payrolls. He verified James’ earlier statement that 
all employees were paid the same rate, which was $1.90 an hour.
Peter Lowe then had his assistant prepare a summary of the quanti­
ties of each of the four major products sold during 1963. This was 
accomplished by totaling the quantities shown on sales invoices. The 
accuracy of the resulting quantities of units sold shown on Exhibit 
5 was verified by dividing the unit sales prices into the total dollars 
of sales by products. A special analysis was made to obtain a segrega­
tion of sales between harnesses and harness accessories.
Lowe then computed the unit raw material costs by developing 
a bill of materials for each of the four products. The bill of materials 
for a harness was based on the average requirements rather than on
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the specific models. The lists of materials were then priced, extended, 
and totaled to obtain a raw material cost for each unit.
At this point, Peter Lowe had all of the data necessary to prepare 
a schedule of estimated unit product costs and a statement of operating 
profit by product lines based on these unit costs. Exhibits 5 and 6 
present this information.
The variable and fixed manufacturing expenses were allocated to 
each product line on the basis of direct labor dollars. In Lowe’s 
opinion, this basis was the most practical way to distribute the factory 
burden among the various product lines. The result, he believed, repre­
sented each product line’s “fair share” of the burden costs.
Administrative expenses were allocated on the basis of total manu­
facturing costs. Lowe considered this to be a reasonable allocation 
procedure because he believed, as a general rule, that the more direct 
labor, materials, and manufacturing burden associated with a particu­
lar product, the more dollars it took to administer the manufacture, 
storage, and distribution of the product.
Sales expenses were allocated on the basis of sales dollars. In 
Lowe’s estimation, this was a fair way to allocate sales expenses since 
he believed sales expenses typically bore a direct relationship to 
sales volume.
After evaluating the cost information he had assembled, Peter 
Lowe reviewed it with Henry James. He pointed out that consideration 
should be given to dropping the optical cases from the product line 
because they apparently caused a loss in profits of $2,857 in 1963. 
However, he cautioned James to take other factors into consideration 
before reaching a final decision. These factors might be the effect of in­
creasing the selling price, effects on sales of other product lines, and 
the possibility that expenses classified as variable might not be fully 
eliminated by dropping the line.
Lowe then stated that the profit on harnesses appeared unsatis­
factory. Since this line produced a major part of the sales volume 
and contributed only $15,112 to the absorption of fixed overhead ex­
penses, it certainly warranted a great deal of attention. He suggested 
to James that a price increase be considered since the product had an 
excellent reputation for quality and was well accepted in the racing 
trade. This, of course, would be advisable only if it would not reduce 
the volume of units sold beyond the point of the benefits received from 
increased prices.
Peter Lowe also called James’ attention to the excellent rate of 
profit being earned on safety gloves and wrist positioners. This indi-
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CASE STUDY 2: JAMES LEATHER PRODUCTS
cated that these lines should be promoted as extensively as possible. 
In addition, he observed that the harness accessories should probably 
be continued since they were a necessary part of the harness line and 
were apparently contributing toward the absorption of fixed overhead 
expenses.
In view of the loss on optical cases and after considering other 
factors, James decided to discontinue the manufacture and sale of 
this product. He had several reasons for reaching this conclusion:
1. Strong competition eliminated any possibility of an increase in 
selling price.
2. The rumored increase in optical case leather prices had just 
become a reality.
3. He would be able to devote more time to developing the profit­
able product lines.
4. He believed that the variable expenses applicable to optical cases 
could all be eliminated, thereby increasing his profits by approximately 
$2,800.
5. His investment in optical case inventories could be eliminated 
which would help alleviate his cash problem.
Henry James also explored the probable effects of increasing the 
selling prices of harnesses by an average of $10 a harness. Knowing 
that there was little competition and that his customers would continue 
to buy the harnesses because of their high quality, he concluded that 
the proposed price increase would have little or no effect on the volume 
of units sold. Accordingly, he put the increase into effect on May 1, 
1964.
Peter Lowe decided that one additional task remained to be ac­
complished if his initial objectives were to be attained. To provide 
James with a means of control over the business, it would be necessary 
to arrange for the preparation of monthly financial statements and some 
form of scrap and labor efficiency reporting. Although he realized 
that an operating budget and cash forecast would also be helpful, he 
felt that under the circumstances the elementary requirements had to 
be satisfied first.
Lowe discussed this matter with James, and it was agreed that 
procedures should be developed and installed to obtain the recom­
mended reports. James also requested that Peter D. Lowe Associates
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instruct Mr. Brooks, the part-time bookkeeper, on how to prepare 
these statements and reports on a monthly basis.
During the next month, Lowe and his assistant designed and in­
stalled the following:
1. A method of obtaining monthly inventories and cost of goods 
sold through the use of perpetual inventory  records
2. The reporting of employee time by products and indirect labor
3. Daily reports prepared by Mrs. James showing materials spoiled 
and comparing total actual labor hours with estimated standard hours 
for each product produced
4. Monthly financial statements showing profit contributions by 
product lines
Having completed the work program covered in his initial under­
standing with the client, Lowe held a conference with James to review 
what had been accomplished. During the course of the conversation, 
he had an opportunity to discuss many other matters relating to the 
management of the business. He pointed out that the plant layout and 
housekeeping seemed to be poor and were apparently contributing to 
production inefficiencies. He also suggested that some thought be 
given to appointing a plant foreman to provide continuous supervision 
of the workers and the manufacturing operations. This would give 
James more time to concentrate on marketing and the overall manage­
ment of the business.
In discussing ways in which the sales volume could be expanded, 
Lowe suggested that the effects of selling all products through jobbers 
be carefully studied. This might result in wider distribution and sales 
increases which could compensate for selling at jobber’s prices. He 
suggested further that consideration be given to using brand names for 
some or all products and to developing packaging which might be 
more attractive and result in increased sales.
Mr. Lowe also questioned the advisability of his client’s guarantee 
and service policy. He suspected that the acceptance of returned mer­
chandise without penalty to the customer was too liberal and that 
at least a partial restriction of this practice might be beneficial.
In discussing these matters, Peter Lowe was careful to point out 
that he was not an expert in these areas and that his comments were 
reactions to what he had seen in the course of his work. He cautioned 
James that a more extensive investigation should be made before 
taking any action on the items which he had questioned.
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James expressed his appreciation for the excellent assistance he had 
received and promised to look into the various alternatives covered 
by Lowe’s observations. He also requested that Lowe make periodic 
follow-up visits to review the progress being made toward improve­
ment of the business.
Profits and Progress— 1964
Shortly after the December 31, 1964 financial statements of James 
Leather Products had been prepared, Peter Lowe and Henry James 
reviewed the results of operations. They were delighted with the 
progress which had been made as reflected in the statement of earn­
ings shown in Exhibit 7.
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Aden Vending Company
During late 1965, Aden Vending Company, a small vending com­
pany located in Newark, New Jersey, was preparing to seek some 
additional equity capital to meet the needs of its growing business. 
Joseph McGee, after discussions with his banker, decided that he 
should engage a CPA firm to audit his financial statements so that 
certified statements could be submitted to potential sources of addi­
tional capital. He therefore engaged London, Roach & Jones, a me­
dium-sized local certified public accounting firm, to audit his year-end 
financial statements.
During London, Roach & Jones’ audit, they noted that the systems 
and procedures of Aden were not particularly efficient, nor did they 
provide good internal controls. Also, management obtained very little 
information concerning operations from existing month-end reports. 
Accordingly, the partner in charge arranged a meeting with Mr. McGee 
to discuss how London, Roach & Jones might be of help to Aden in 
improving the usefulness and effectiveness of their accounting activi­
ties. Mr. Cole, the partner in charge of London, Roach & Jones’ 
management services department was also present. The following case 
is based on a management services engagement which resulted from 
this meeting.
London, Roach & Jones
London, Roach & Jones consisted of six partners and a staff of 45 
persons. In addition to its main office in Newark, the firm had a branch 
office located in another city in New Jersey. The firm’s management
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services department consisted of one partner and five staff men and 
was situated in the Newark office.
London, Roach & Jones set up a separate management services de­
partment in 1960. Prior to that time, according to Mr. London, the 
firm’s senior partner, London, Roach & Jones had done management 
services type work, but by 1960, Mr. London had decided a separate 
management services department was desirable so that the firm could 
better meet its clients’ developing needs for consulting services which 
went beyond the normal attest function.
In general, the firm obtained management services work (1) from 
their own audit clients, often as the result of needs noted by the audit 
staff during their examinations, and (2) through referrals from several 
small local accounting firms. In the latter case, it was the policy of 
London, Roach & Jones to preserve the smaller firm’s audit relationship 
with its client.
The management services work performed by London, Roach & 
Jones fell into three basic categories:
1. Office automation and data processing
2. Cost systems, budgeting, and management reporting systems
3. Clerical work simplification and measurement
It was customary for the firm to write a proposal letter to prospective 
management services clients, giving an outline of the work to be done 
and an estimate of the total cost of the job. In other cases where no 
proposal letter was issued, a letter of confirmation for the engagement 
was written to ensure that no misunderstanding existed as to the 
objectives or scope of the undertaking. Actual billing was on a per 
diem basis.
In general, London, Roach & Jones’ billing rates for management 
services were two and one-half times a man’s salary. The management 
services rates for staff men ranged from $14 to $20 an hour; the firm’s 
audit rates were approximately $10 an hour. This differential in hourly 
rates resulted primarily from two factors. First, it reflected the higher 
level of experienced personnel working on management services en­
gagements. Second, it recognized the fact that management services 
staff men typically billed fewer chargeable man-hours per year than 
auditors.
It was London, Roach & Jones’ normal practice on management 
services projects to assign one or two staff men to each enagagement, 
depending on the size of the engagement, under the supervision of 
Mr. Cole, the partner in charge of the management services depart­
ment. The report was drafted by the consultant and reviewed by
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Mr. Cole and, where applicable, by the partner in charge of the audit 
account.
Aden Vending Company
Aden Vending Company was organized in 1961 to acquire: (1) the 
assets of a partnership founded in 1951 by Joseph McGee, Peter 
McGee, and Andrew Albert, and (2) the assets of Lodding Vending 
Corporation, a corporation organized by Frank Lodding in 1960. Sub­
sequently, in August 1964, the company acquired all of the stock of 
Lodding Vending and reactivated the company as a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Aden Vending Company. Later, during early 1965, Aden 
Vending Company took over the assets of four small vending com­
panies.
In 1965, the Aden Vending Company operated vending machines for 
the retail sales of cigarettes and cigars, confectioneries, and a variety 
of food and drink products. In addition, the company was a wholesale 
distributor of cigarettes. These products accounted for the bulk of 
Aden Vending’s 1965 sales of about $1.8 million.
The vending machine business was highly competitive. Customer 
locations in the area in which Aden Vending operated were actively 
sought by a number of national, regional, and local concerns. Many 
of these competitors were substantially larger than Aden Vending.
Business and Products
Aden Vending Company was engaged in a full line of vending 
machine operations, including cigarette and cigar vending and indus­
trial vending (various food and drink items). During the 1963 to 1965 
period, the company operated the following number of vending ma­
chines at customers’ locations:
Table 1
Aden Vending C ompany  
Number of Vending Machines, 1963-1965
1963 1964 1965
Cigar and cigarette machines 260 291 337
Industrial vending machines 50 148 181
Total 310 439 518
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Aden Vending Company’s coin-operated machines were located in 
department stores, schools, hospitals, restaurants, taverns, bowling 
alleys, and industrial establishments within the Newark metropolitan 
area. The company’s machines were placed in different premises 
under agreements ranging from one to six years in duration. These 
contracts bound Aden Vending to pay the owner of the location a 
commission based on a percentage of sales, in return for the exclu­
sive right to operate the machines on his premises. Commissions 
varied from 5 per cent to 15 per cent depending on the location and 
type of machine.
Cigarette and cigar vending sales represented about two-thirds of 
the company’s vending business in 1965. Aden Vending sold all major 
brands of cigarettes through its vending machines. In addition, the 
company operated machines for the vending of cigars, both individ­
ually and in packages of five. All machines were maintained and 
serviced directly by Aden Vending.
During 1965, industrial vending sales accounted for the remainder 
of the company’s total vending revenues. Aden Vending sold candy, 
crackers, chewing gum, pastries, sandwiches, hot soups, coffee, milk, 
soft drinks, and ice cream. These items were primarily nationally 
advertised products which the company purchased directly from 
manufacturers. Aden Vending did not have its own commissary. 
Sandwiches were supplied by a caterer, the company paying for 
the sandwiches and the servicing of the machines. Milk was de­
livered to and installed in the company’s vending machines directly 
by the supplying dairy. Bottled soft drinks were delivered and in­
stalled in the machines by the various bottling companies. Ice cream 
was purchased by Aden Vending from a local dairy. Some of the 
ice cream vending machines were serviced by the company and others 
by the dairy on a subcontract basis. Aden Vending maintained an 
inventory of all other industrial vending items, and the company 
serviced its machines with such items.
Aside from its vending business, Aden Vending sold cigarettes 
wholesale to other vending companies in the area and a number of 
the stores and taverns where its machines were located. Aden 
Vending was a licensed cigarette stamping agent for the State of 
New Jersey, which paid the company a commission for affixing tax 
stamps to the cigarettes it distributed.* Profits on cigarettes sold at
* The State of New Jersey does not pay commissions for affixing tax 
stamps to cigarettes. The State of New Jersey is used to disguise the actual 
location of Aden Vending.
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wholesale were nominal; the principal source of income from these 
sales was derived from the cigarette tax stamp commissions. The sales 
were 2.8 per cent of the value of the tax stamps affixed.
Table 2 gives a breakdown of the sources of the company’s total 
sales during the 1963 to 1965 period:
Table 2
Aden Vending C ompany
Schedule of Total Sales for the Years Ended July 31, 1963-1965
Year Ended July 31
1963 1964 1965
Wholesale cigarette 
sales (1) $ 619,369 $ 656,388 $1,021,530
Cigarette and cigar 
vending (1) 388,353 440,952 550,612
Industrial vending 151,272 192,593 254,543
Cigarette tax stamp 
commissions 9,876 11,436 18,882
Miscellaneous 30,436 35,269 36,528
Total sales $1,199,306 $1,336,638 $1,882,095
1. State cigarette taxes have been excluded from the sales figures.
Financial Results
During the fiscal year 1965, Aden Vending’s net income after taxes 
was about $26,500. Income statements for 1964 and 1965 are presented 
in Exhibit 1. A balance sheet as of July 3 1 , 1965, is shown in Exhibit 2. 
The item, “Loans receivable, trade” on the July 31, 1965 balance sheet 
consisted of loans to location owners in return for which the company 
was given the right to install its machines. These loans were repaid by 
the location owners out of the commissions they earned. This practice 
was common within the industry. Deferred charges consisted of the 
initial costs of setting up a machine location, such as plumbing and 
electrical connections. These were being written off over the lives 
of the individual agreements involved.
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Exhibit 1
ADEN VENDING COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES 
Consolidated Statement of Income
For The Years Ended July 31, 1964 and 1965
Year Ended July 31 
1964 1965
Sales and other operating revenue $1,336,638 $1,882,095
Costs and expenses:
Costs of goods sold (1) $ 970,966 $1,422,973
Sales expense 31,002 40,101
Collection expense 60,611 82,100
Administrative expense 75,211 96,211
Commissions (5-15%) 44,994 54,564
Maintenance and repairs 7,984 9,576
Warehouse expense 14,007 18,000
Other 1,000 1,200
Amortization of deferred charges 10,960 12,843
Depreciation 85,045 95,187
Interest expense 8,459 10,503
Total $1,310,239 $1,843,258
Net income before Federal income taxes $ 26,399 $ 38,837
Taxes on income 8,255 12,320
Net income $ 18,144 $ 26,517
Earnings per share (2) $.07 $.10
Dividends per share (2) .03 .03
Notes:
(1) State cigarette taxes have been excluded from both sales and cost 
of goods sold.
(2) Based on 255,000 shares of common stock.
Management and Employees
The four officers and directors of the company were its sole owners. 
These men were: Joseph McGee, President and Director; Frank 
Lodding, Vice President and Director; Andrew Albert, Secretary and 
Director; and Peter McGee, Treasurer and Director.
In addition, the company employed 24 full-time employees, of
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Exhibit 2
ADEN VENDING COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES 
Consolidated Balance Sheet July 31, 1965
Assets
Current assets:
Cash $ 49,732
Loans receivable, trade 25,075
Accounts receivable, trade, less $2,000
estimated to be uncollectible 53,740
Merchandise inventory at cost (FIFO) 84,655
Prepaid expenses 13,944
Total current assets 227,146
Investments, at cost 1,250
Allowance for Net
Cost Depreciation Book Value
Equipment:
Vending machines $373,126 121,752 251,374
Other 48,586 7,833 40,753
$421,712 129,585 292,127 292,127
Deferred charges, at cost less amortization 40,190
$560,713
Liabilities
Current liabilities:
Notes payable, banks $ 87,757
Notes payable, others 9,533
Accounts payable, trade 65,797
Accrued liabilities 25,944
Total current liabilities 189,031
Long-term debt, notes payable, banks 52,511
Stockholders’ equity:
Common stock, par value $1 (1,000,000
shares authorized; 255,000 shares issued) $255,000
Capital in excess of par value of stock 990
Retained earnings 63,181
319,171
$560,713
whom: 2 were engaged in sales; 7 were collectors employed in col­
lection and servicing work; 4 were mechanics and repair men engaged 
in installing, repairing, and maintaining vending equipment; 2 were 
employed in the warehouse making up merchandise orders; and 9 
performed clerical and administrative duties.
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According to Joseph McGee the officers and employees were organ­
ized as follows:
Table 3
Aden Vending Company 
Organization Chart
Directors
Joseph McGee 
President
Frank Lodding 
Vice President
Peter McGee 
Treasurer
Andrew Albert 
Secretary
Sales
 
Salesmen
(2)
Service Equipment
 
Purchasing
Warehouse Office Collections Maintenance
(2) (9) (7) (4)
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Plant and Equipment
The company’s executive offices, warehouse facilities, and repair and 
service department were located in a one-story building in downtown 
Newark. The building was occupied under a 10-year lease commencing 
June 1964 at a rental of $600 per month.
It was Aden Vending’s policy to purchase vending machines from 
nationally known manufacturers and maintain an inventory of one 
or two duplicates of each machine used by the company. These ma­
chines ranged in price from $200 to $3,000. Vending machines were 
depreciated on a straight-line basis over their estimated useful lives of 
two to five years, depending on the type of machine.
Accounting Practices and Procedures
All of Aden Vending’s posting and processing of accounting data 
was done manually by eight individuals who received between $217 
and $540 a month plus fringe benefits amounting to approximately 10 
per cent of their monthly salary. A breakdown of the monthly office 
payroll costs, exclusive of officers’ salaries, is shown below.
Table 4
Aden Vending Company 
Office Payroll Analysis
Office Help Monthly Cost
A. Smith — Accountant $ 540
L. Peabody — Collection supervisor 463
M. Brown — Secretary 360
K. Kay — Purchasing steno-clerk 360
P. Franks — Warehouse clerk 267
J. Kramer — Service dept. clerk 267
P. Appleton — Clerk 251
A. Allen — Clerk 242
F. Cohen — Clerk 217
Total $2,967
Although the office help were basically reliable employees, they 
were not highly trained and there was little understanding by clerical 
personnel of how to accomplish their functions. It appeared that much 
of the inefficiency resulted from too rapid an expansion of sales and 
locations within the past few years without adequate attention to
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office and accounting procedures. As a result, at least three weeks 
elapsed following the monthly closing of the books before management 
received any information concerning the overall results for the month 
and year to date.
Detailed records were kept of sales and depreciation for each vend­
ing machine. In contrast, maintenance records were not kept by 
vending machines.
In general, Aden Vending’s control over inventories was effective. 
Detailed inventory records were kept for each brand and type of item 
sold. These records were used to compute the cost of goods sold 
figure which was shown on the monthly financial statements received 
by management. However, no effort was made to break the cost of 
goods sold figure down by vending machine location or product type.
There were no written instructions or manuals which set forth the 
procedures to be followed by those connected with the installation, 
service, maintenance, or removal of machines.
The company’s collectors were responsible for (1) keeping the vend­
ing machines stocked, and (2) collecting the sales proceeds. In addi­
tion, collectors paid the commissions due to location owners out of the 
sales proceeds they collected. Each day before starting their rounds, 
collectors received sets of collection slips from the collection supervisor, 
a supply of goods from the warehouse, and some cash to refill the 
change makers included in each machine. A sample of the collection 
slip filled out by the collector after he serviced each machine is shown 
in Exhibit 3.
In addition, collectors often made wholesale cigarette sales to loca­
tion owners and collected amounts due on loans made by the company 
to location owners. These sales and special collections were recorded 
in the form of a notation at the bottom of the collection slip.
After the collector returned from his daily rounds, he turned in his 
bags of money and completed collection slips to the money room and 
returned his merchandise to the warehouse. The warehouse clerk 
reconciled the collector’s ending inventory and beginning inventory 
with the record of merchandise deposited in machines as shown on the 
collection slips. Subsequently, all of this information was fed to the 
accounting department where it was entered into the appropriate 
accounts.
The repair and maintenance procedure was as follows. After the 
maintenance dispatcher received a call for a mechanic, he entered 
the request in his log and assigned a mechanic to handle the problem. 
When the mechanic completed the job, he prepared a brief memoran-
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dum reporting the time elapsed on the job, the customer’s name, the 
type of repair or installation done, and a list of parts used. When the 
mechanic returned to the plant, the service department clerk took 
the memo written by the mechanic and extended the cost of labor 
at actual hourly rates and added the costs of parts used at the man­
ufacturer’s list price. This information was then transmitted to the 
accounting department where the repair and maintenance costs were 
entered.
Management Reports
Top management received three reports monthly—an income state­
ment, a balance sheet, and a record of sales by machine location. The 
income statement and sales report showed results for the current 
month and the year-to-date. While on his first visit to Aden Vending, 
Cole discussed these reports with Joseph McGee. Excerpts from their 
discussion are presented below:
Cole: How do you feel about the reports you are getting monthly?
McGee: Well, the accounting department tries very hard, but the re­
ports don’t get to me until at least three weeks after the end 
of the month. Fortunately, our sales have been growing and 
every report I get indicates we are doing well.
Cole: How do you use the monthly reports?
McGee: I look at the financial statements to see if we are continuing 
our sales growth without hurting profits. For instance, during 
1964, sales went up, but profits went down. However, by 
having the income statements before me each month I was 
able to put pressure on the organization to cut costs. Now 
we have profits on the way up again. I look at the balance 
sheet to see that we are not building up inventories to ex­
cessive levels. Also I like to see that our current ratio remains 
about 1 to 1. We are in a competitive business and the turn­
over among companies is high. If suppliers get the impres­
sion you are running into trouble, they will cut your credit 
off. We need good trade credit to exist.
Cole: How do you use the figures for sales by machine?
McGee: Well, I make a number of decisions based on these figures.
For instance, if I see the sales for a particular machine going
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down I want to know why. I’ll ask the collector responsible 
what he thinks the problem is. If he doesn’t have a good 
answer, I will go out and look for myself. And, if I don’t like 
what I see, I will pull the machine out of the location. After 
all, we have to keep our sales up if we want to make money.
Cole: Does this kind of follow-up involve a lot of your time?
McGee: Yes, as much as two days a week on the average.
Cole: What are some of the common reasons for a decline in sales
at a particular location?
McGee: Well, there are many possible reasons. The machine may 
be old and break down often, lack of variety in flavors or 
brands, or the location may become less popular or be open 
fewer hours.
Cole: Looking at the other side of the coin, why might the sales
of a particular machine increase?
McGee: The most obvious reason would be that the location becomes 
more popular. Others would be changes to more popular 
brands, or a decrease in the amount of time the machine is 
out of order. Also, the addition of a new change maker with 
larger capacity might have resulted in fewer sales being lost 
because the potential customer didn’t have the right change.
Cole: Do you have any notion of what a particular machine’s sales
ought to be?
McGee: If you mean do we make formal estimates of sales by ma­
chine location the answer is no. However, based on my long 
experience in this business, I can get a feel for a location’s 
sales potential and intuitively I know if a machine is making 
the grade or not.
Cole: Then, I gather you drop a location when the sales from the
machines located there drop off.
McGee: Essentially, that’s true.
Cole: Do you know what your operating costs are on the different
product lines and vending servicing arrangements you have?
McGee: No. I doubt if the accounting department could give me 
reports on costs or profitability by machines or product line.
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It takes them long enough just to get the sales by machines 
to me. If I asked for costs or profits also, these reports would 
be twelve weeks behind instead of three. Of course, I could 
cut down the time factor by increasing the size of the office 
staff. However, I don’t think I can afford that kind of addi­
tional overhead.
Then, there is the problem that this would also require 
changing the accounting system. I am not certain that any 
of our clerks’ skills are transferable to a new system. They 
know the present procedures and can work with them.
Also, what basis would you use to allocate the various over­
head costs to machines or product lines? This is a tough 
question to solve and I’d be the first to admit that I don’t 
know the answer.
Anyway, why did you ask me the question? Have you got 
something in mind?
Cole: Well, as I look at your business and the way you run it, my
impression is that you actually have several different product 
line operations, each one of which has different cost factors. 
In addition, operating costs may vary considerably between 
locations.
Now, you are making a number of important decisions, such 
as dropping a location, based on sales trends alone. I think 
it would be helpful if you also knew the costs for operating 
the different types of vending operations and the costs for 
servicing different locations. With this kind of information I 
am sure you could make better decisions. On the basis of 
your company’s experience, you could develop sales standards 
and breakeven points for particular types of machines by 
classes of location. Then these standards could be used to 
judge current performance and to make projections as to the 
profitability of potential locations, given the installation of 
different types of machines.
McGee: I couldn’t agree with you more, but how do I get that kind 
of report to make product line decisions given my problems 
of timeliness, clerical skill, and cost?
Questions
1. Do you agree or disagree with Mr. Cole that it will be possible 
to establish general sales standards and breakeven points for particu­
lar types of machines by classes of location?
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2. Which of the specific cost items listed in Exhibits 1 and 2 are 
relevant to the decision to drop a particular machine from a location?
3. Using the material presented in the case, do you believe you 
could give Mr. McGee a rough proposal of how a timely, inexpensive 
report related to the cost of the operation of machines could be devel­
oped for him? What kind of information would you include in your 
proposed report? How might Aden Vending collect and process the 
information to be included in the report? How often should Mr. McGee 
receive your proposed report?
4. If Mr. McGee asked you for an estimate of the number of man- 
days involved in installing the procedures you recommend, how would 
you respond?
Commentary on Aden Vending Company
In the course of the audit of Aden Vending Company by London, 
Roach & Jones, the partner in charge of the audit asked Arthur Cole, 
the head of London, Roach & Jones’ management services department, 
to participate in a discussion of Aden Vending’s office procedures and 
management reports with Joseph McGee, the President. Mr. McGee 
expressed interest in receiving more useful and timely accounting 
reports showing the cost and profitability of the different product 
vending operations. These reports, he believed, would be useful for 
a variety of management decisions, particularly those involving 
product line policy.
In response to Mr. McGee’s question “. . . how do I get that kind 
of report to make product line decisions, given my problems of time­
liness, clerical skill, and cost?” [see last paragraph of case], Mr. Cole 
replied: “To achieve this it will be necessary to revise your accounting 
procedures and the various forms used so as to simplify and minimize 
the clerical and accounting efforts involved. Your accounting records 
should be set up so as to develop the information you find useful 
without the time consuming supplemental analysis now required.”
Next, Mr. McGee wanted to know how much it would cost to have 
London, Roach & Jones undertake an engagement designed to imple­
ment the type of changes in the company’s accounting systems pre­
viously outlined by Cole. Mr. Cole said he thought about 15 man-days 
would be needed to (1) survey the company’s present system for col­
lecting and reporting operating results and statistics, and (2) prepare 
a report stating the consultant’s recommendations. If these recom­
mendations met with management’s approval, Cole believed it would
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probably take an additional 20 man-days to implement the recommen­
dations. Cole added that they would bill, based on actual time spent,  
at their standard hourly rates. Mr. Cole further indicated that they 
would submit a formal proposal letter on all management services 
engagements clearly setting forth the objectives, responsibilities, and 
costs of the engagement. Mr. McGee indicated he would like to 
receive such a proposal letter.
Three days following the submission of the proposal, Mr. McGee 
phoned Mr. Cole to say he had considered Cole’s proposal concerning 
an improved accounting system and had decided to go ahead as soon 
as possible. Mr. Cole indicated that he would be able to assign a 
properly qualified staff man in about two weeks.
Planning the Engagement
The Friday following McGee’s phone call, Arthur Cole met with 
Bob White, the staff member he intended to assign to the engagement, 
to discuss Aden Vending’s management services needs and to pro­
gram the work to be undertaken. Excerpts from the discussion relat­
ing to the revised reporting and accounting system are quoted below.
Cole: I have outlined a general approach for you to follow in under­
taking this engagement. First you will want to document 
the existing procedures and controls. This should include your 
spending some time with one or two collectors to observe the 
filling of machines at several locations. Also you should obtain 
all of the necessary quantitative information regarding number 
of machines, locations, line items, etc.
White: Did you get any information as to the expected increase in the 
number of machines over the next few years?
Cole: No, but we will have to get this from Mr. McGee and Mr. 
Lodding, Vice President of Sales. In documenting the pro­
cedures you should obtain copies of all the forms and reports 
in use. If possible, get copies of forms which have been filled 
out because these will give us a better idea of how the forms 
are actually being used. Finally, we should discuss in more 
detail with the officers of the company what information they 
believe will be of most value to them, and how often they 
would like to receive it. By adding our thoughts to theirs,  
I am confident we can come up with a simple but effective 
set of management reports.
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White: What about mechanization? Does it seem likely that this may 
require a punched card installation to handle all of the infor­
mation on a timely basis?
Cole: The bulk of the accounting clerical work would appear to be 
in reconciling cash and inventory on the collectors’ reports. 
As far as inventory control is concerned, I think a manual 
system may actually be more effective at less cost because of 
the rapid turnover and relatively few line items. However, in 
making your review you should definitely keep in mind the 
possibility of using a punched card service bureau.
A week later Mr. Cole, accompanied by Bob White, his staff con­
sultant, visited Aden’s offices to begin their engagement. After meeting 
all of the key personnel and explaining the program to them, Mr. Cole 
left Mr. White to begin the details of his assignment. By the following 
week, Bob White had completed his review of existing procedures and 
had gathered sufficient data concerning operations to begin forming 
conclusions. Mr. Cole met Mr. White at Aden’s office and reviewed 
the information that had been compiled. The following are excerpts 
from their conversation:
Cole: Bob, have you reached any conclusions as to what our recom­
mendations should be?
White: Well, there is a definite need to redesign the forms used by 
the collectors and to devise some new ones in other areas. 
The present forms do not provide good controls. For example, 
wholesale cigarette sales and note payments are merely noted 
on the bottom of the regular collection ticket and consequently 
there is no signed receipt for delivery of cigarettes or for 
payment of cash. Also, the system of charging out mer­
chandise from the warehouse could be improved.
Cole: Does there appear to be any possible savings in clerical effort 
which could be achieved by better forms design?
White: Oh yes, for example, no maintenance or repair order form 
exists. Consequently, the memorandum written by the service 
man covering the work accomplished is frequently such that 
it cannot be used for pricing out the service costs, and a sup­
plemental worksheet must be prepared.
Cole: What about the possible use of a punched card service bureau 
to reduce clerical costs and increase timeliness of reports?
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White: I believe that with the redesign of the basic forms, clerical 
effort can be reduced significantly. My analysis of time spent 
by function indicates that once the collectors’ reports are com­
pletely reconciled, there is little problem in completing the 
accounting cycle. Punched cards could not be justified eco­
nomically at this time. However, if the company continues to 
grow, they may prove practical.
Cole: Have you considered the possible impact which the additional 
information required to give the officers more meaningful re­
ports would have?
White: Yes. I do not feel this would change the economics sufficiently 
to reach a different conclusion. However, it is in this area of 
management reports that I still have some questions as to 
content and format. I have several statements in mind. Here 
is a list of them:
Weekly:
Collector’s report 
Serviceman’s report 
Salesman’s report
Every 4 weeks:
Route sales report
Product line gross profit report
Maintenance report
Income statement
Balance sheet
Inventory turnover report
Cole: Before we go into the specific statements, I note that you have 
indicated 4 week statements rather than monthly.
White: Yes, because of the weekly route schedules it would actually 
be more difficult to prepare statments on a monthly basis than 
on a four-week cycle. In addition, monthly statements would 
never be fully comparable because of the different number of 
working days in each month.
Cole: I agree. Now what about the content of the statements.
White: The weekly statements are basically activity reports. The 
monthly statements contain more accounting data; but before 
I actually discuss the statements let me give you a summary 
of the business operations.
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First, wholesale sales constitute over 50 per cent of sales 
revenues though they do not by any means contribute that 
percentage to the company’s profits. Generally the sales are 
handled by the collectors on their regular routes, except for 
a few major customers for whom a special delivery is made 
once a week. I have considered these customers the equiva­
lent of a separate route for report purposes.
I have also prepared an analysis of vending operations:
Number of 
Machines Sales
Average Per 
Machine
Cigarette machines 310 $540,107 $1,742
Cigar machines 27 10,507 389
Candy machines 80 111,682 1,396
*Pastry and sandwich machines 39 45,145 1,158
Hot drink and soup machines 26 30,216 1,162
*Soft drink machines 21 40,409 1,924
*Milk machines 5 8,405 1,681
**Ice cream machines 10 18,684 1,868
518 $805,155
* Serviced by others under contract.
**Five units serviced by others under contract.
Also, in analyzing the operating expenses of the company, 
the following items appeared to be direct expenses which 
could be assigned or easily allocated to specific machine loca­
tions:
Cost of goods sold $1,422,973
Commissions 54,564
Maintenance and repairs (machines) 7,546
Amortization of deferred charges 12,843
Depreciation (machines) 90,007
In addition, the collection expense of $82,100 could be allo­
cated to locations by analysis of drivers’ route reports.
Cole: Well, that accounts for about 90 per cent of the costs. That 
would seem to permit a fairly exact separate income computa­
tion for each vending machine or vending location. Is that 
what you have in mind?
White: No, not exactly. Let’s start with the cost of goods sold. It 
would, of course, be possible to keep track of the actual cost
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of goods sold by machine, but this would involve a lot of detail 
that I believe can be avoided. In each of the different lines 
of vending operations, the margin of profit is quite uniform. 
All 5¢ or 10¢ candy bars cost the company about the same 
percentage of retail price. The same is true of cigarettes. 
Consequently, I believe a standard gross profit factor can be 
used very satisfactorily.
Cole: Are these assumptions or have you established this actually to 
be the case?
White: I made a tabulation of cost and retail prices on all candy 
and cigarette lines. You can see there is almost no variation, 
except for a few items which have a very low volume.
Cole: What about the other types of vending operations?
White: Soft drinks, ice cream, hot drinks, and milk all have the same 
pattern. Only in pastry and sandwich machines is there any 
degree of variation, and even this is small, because the com­
pany has the machines serviced by a caterer, whose prices 
seem to be set with the retail mark-up in mind.
Cole: Well, I can see where using a standard percentage rather than 
the actual cost on a machine basis could save a lot of clerical 
work, but you haven’t told me what you have in mind regarding 
statement format; what information would the weekly col­
lector’s report contain?
White: This would be a simple tabulation of wholesale and vending 
sales by product line for each route for the week with a com­
parison to the preceding week. Also, it would show various 
statistics such as machines serviced, miles traveled, and hours 
spent.
Cole: Doesn’t a weekly report seem almost too short a period to form 
any definite conclusions regarding sales trends?
White: Perhaps, but on the other hand, a monthly report might not 
point up possible trouble spots soon enough. In addition, this 
report, as well as the other weekly reports, will provide controls 
over the activities of the various collectors, salesmen, and serv­
icemen. However, the monthly route sales report and product 
line gross profit statement will be the prime source of analytical 
information on which basic management decisions will be 
based.
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Cole: What information will these reports contain?
White: Let’s take the route sales report first. The purpose of this 
report is to show how each vending machine location is doing. 
I did a rough sketch of what this report might look like:
Location
Machine
Type
Comm.
%
Last Period 
Sales
This Period
Sales Margin
Acme Manufacturing Cigarette 5 $100 $105 $15
Acme Manufacturing Candy 10 50 47 5
Acme Manufacturing Ice Cream 10 20 22 4
Jones Tavern Cigarette 5 85 80 11
All of the information in this report will come directly from 
a ledger record card maintained for each vending machine and 
posted from the collectors’ and servicemen’s reports.
Cole: How is the margin computed?
White: I felt that in addition to sales, the report should contain some 
information as to profitability. Therefore, I developed a mar­
gin figure which is simple to compute, reasonably accurate, and 
significant as a measure of machine profitability. It represents 
sales, reduced by commissions, standard cost of sales, depre­
ciation, and standard collection expense. Sales, of course, are 
posted on the machine ledger record. Commissions are a 
known percentage established by contract for each machine. 
For cost of sales, I used the standard percentage for each type 
of machine. Consequently, each machine has a standard vari­
able margin percentage which is applied against sales. From 
this is subtracted a fixed monthly amount comprised of the 
periodic depreciation, a standard maintenance allowance, and 
standard collection expense, to arrive at the margin shown on 
the report. In terms of clerical computation, this involves one 
multiplication and one subtraction from the result, in order 
to obtain the margin amount. Consequently, little clerical 
effort is involved.
Cole: Let me ask a few more questions about the standard cost of 
goods sold—did you indicate this would remain constant for 
each machine?
White: Well, as we discussed before, there is very little variation 
within any given product line. However, when the product 
line statement shows a trend change in gross profit percentage,
105
the percentage for all machines in the product line can be 
easily adjusted.
Cole: What about the costs you have treated as nonvariable. How 
did you arrive at a standard collection cost?
White: Collection costs are primarily a function of the number of 
stops per week at a location, and the number of machines to 
be serviced. While travel mileage has some variable effect, 
this is relatively nominal because of the way the routes are 
laid out.
Cole: You are saying that a standard collection cost can be computed 
for each location and each machine within that location on 
some simple basis, and used for this report.
White: Yes, once computed it would be posted to the ledger card 
and not changed until either the labor rates, the number of 
machines, or the number of stops per week change. Inci­
dentally, the aggregate standard hours for each route would 
also be used in connection with  evaluating the collectors’ 
activity reports each week.
Cole: What about depreciation? This is a fixed cost. Why have you 
included it?
White: Actually, in this case, I don’t feel depreciation is a fixed cost. 
A machine’s life is almost entirely dependent on its use, rather 
than on its obsolescence. Because of their relatively short lives, 
the company is buying machines regularly and, therefore, finds 
the number of machines it owns and the resultant depreciation 
expense to be quite variable rather than fixed.
Cole: A very good point. Why did you use a standard maintenance 
allowance when an actual one would be available on the 
machine ledger record card?
White: I feel the actual monthly maintenance for any machine would 
not be too significant on this report. Vandalism is a factor 
of location, but this is set out on each maintenance report. 
Other maintenance is more a function of machine age than of 
location. For that reason I have a separate monthly main­
tenance report analyzing maintenance expense by machine.
Cole: In looking at the route sales report on an overall basis, do 
you feel it contains enough information about each location to 
permit a sound analysis?
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White: The report will disclose abnormal sales volumes or variations 
from the preceding month. In addition, the margin amount 
gives an indication of profitability. For any location in which 
an unfavorable situation exists, the machine ledger record cards 
would be reviewed for more detailed information. These cards 
would be used in discussions with the collector or in talking to 
the location owner.
Cole: Tell me what the monthly product line gross profit report 
contains.
White: This is a simple report but quite helpful in setting general 
policy. It shows, in comparative form, both wholesale sales 
and vending operations, gross sales, commissions, cost of sales, 
depreciation, maintenance, and other direct charges. Since the 
accounting journals will be set up along these lines, the infor­
mation for the reports can be taken directly from the general 
ledger accounts. For purposes of reconciliation, the other ex­
penses are shown in total without allocation to product line 
so that the net profit ties out with the general income statement.
Cole: I think we are in basic agreement on these reports.
Bob White and Mr. Cole then discussed the other control reports 
and procedure revisions. Cole suggested that White prepare a draft 
of the various reports for discussion with Mr. McGee and the other 
officers on the coming Friday.
On Friday the reports and suggested changes were reviewed with 
the officers of Aden Vending. Everyone agreed that the basic report 
formats would present very helpful information, and that with the 
introduction of the new forms, the clerical effort would actually be 
reduced. Some of the discussion follows:
McGee: I agree that the reports will be of considerable help, and 
I can certainly see how the new forms will give us better 
internal control, but I wonder whether your margin amounts 
on the four-week route sales report will be sufficiently ac­
curate so that I can rely on them.
Cole: In designing these reports we made a compromise between
accuracy and clerical cost. It would be possible to be more 
precise, though it would never be possible to be exact. The 
report gives a comparison of sales for two periods as well 
as giving a general indication of profitability for each location.
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I am sure that if a particular location showed up unfavor­
ably, you would want to get additional information before 
taking specific action. The report would have served its prin­
cipal purpose when it called your attention to an unfavorable 
trend in sales or profits so that you could investigate the 
causes. For this purpose the use of standards as we have 
suggested will do the job as well, and at a much lower cost, 
than trying to keep more precise costs by individual ma­
chines.
McGee: I had always associated standards with manufacturing opera­
tions, but you have convinced me that they can be helpful in 
the vending business as well.
After some further discussion, Mr. McGee and the other officers 
agreed that the company should adopt the new system, and they dis­
cussed with Mr. Cole the timing of the installation program as well as 
the consulting costs which would be involved. After the meeting, Lon­
don, Roach & Jones submitted a letter report summarizing their recom­
mendations and confirming their engagement to install the new system.
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Larkin Electric Service, Inc.
“Frank, I think Larkin Electric Service should get out of the con­
struction business. In my opinion the construction industry is too 
competitive and the margins are too low. I believe we might be better 
off concentrating on the home and office service markets. What do 
you think?”
The above statement by James Larkin, President of Larkin Electric 
Service, Inc., was made to Frank Simmons, CPA, soon after Larkin 
received his firm’s 1964 income statement, which showed a loss of 
around $6,000 during the fiscal year ending March 31 (see Exhibit 1). 
Larkin Electric Service, Inc., was a small, closely held electrical con­
tracting firm located in Dallas, Texas. The company’s revenues came 
from three sources: electrical installations on large construction jobs, 
maintenance and repair of home and office electrical systems, and 
house wiring. Frank Simmons was a partner of Simmons & Fowler, a 
local five-man firm of certified public accountants who acted as Larkin 
Electric’s independent auditors.
Simmons & Fowler
In April 1964, Simmons & Fowler consisted of two partners and three 
professional staff members. The firm had some 100 clients located in 
the Dallas area and its annual billings amounted to about $85,000.
Simmons & Fowler did opinion audits for 90 per cent of its clients; 
the remaining 10 per cent of its clients were mostly tax accounts. 
In addition, about 75 per cent of its opinion audit clients also had 
retained the firm at one time or another to do management services 
work.
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Exhibit 1
LARKIN ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC. 
Condensed Statement of Income 
For the Years Ending March 31, 1960-1964
Sales
1964
$616,500.95
% of 
Sales
100.0
1963
$826,258.33
% of 
Sales
100.0
Cost of sales:
Materials 265,798.66 43.1 456,277.12 55.2
Labor 210,535.42 34.2 244,770.10 29.6
Total direct cost $476,334.08 77.3 $701,047.22 84.8
Contribution $140,166.87 22.7 $125,211.11 15.2
Administrative and 
general overhead 
expense $146,973.22 23.9 $129,608.75 15.7
Net income (loss) 
on operations $ (6,806.35) (1.2) $ (4,397.64) (0.5)
Other income, less 
other deductions 925.64 0.2 2,271.72 0.2
Net income (loss) 
before taxes $ (5,880.71) (1.0) $ (2,125.92) (0.3)
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Exhibit 1
LARKIN ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC. 
Condensed Statement of Income
For the Years Ending March 31, 1960-1964
(continued)
% of %  of % of
1962
$694,388.22
Sales
100.0
1961
$662,323.59
Sales
100.0
1960
$400,647.95
Sales
100.0
348,197.13 50.1 344,281.28 52.0 190,396.05 47.5
219,978.91 31.7 206,735.45 31.2 146,538.77 36.6
$568,176.04 81.8 $551,016.73 83.2 $336,934.82 84.1
$126,212.18 18.2 $111,306.86 16.8 $ 63,713.13 15.9
$117,184.55 16.9 $ 99,351.94 15.0 $ 74,707.97 18.6
$ 9,027.63 1.3 $ 11,954.92 1.8 $(10,994.84) (2.7)
4,236.71 0.6 2,865.00 0.4 747.06 0.1
$ 13,264.34 1.9 $ 14,819.92 2.2 $(10,247.78) (2.6)
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Exhibit 2
LARKIN ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC. 
Summary of Balance Sheet Information
For the Years Ended March 31, 1960-1964
Current assets
Current liabilities 
Working Capital
Fixed assets, less depreciation 
Other assets
1964
$133,165.15
80,656.19
$ 52,508.96 
$ 13,592.06
2,672.14
Totals
Less: other liabilities 
Capital
$ 68,773.16 
13,500.00
$ 55,273.16
1963
$164,796.92
104,131.68
$ 60,665.24 
$ 12,022.33
1,466.30
$ 74,153.87 
13,000.00
$ 61,153.87
Statistical data:
Book value per share of
common stock $11.80
Ratio of current assets to
current liabilities 1.65:1.00
Stockholders’ equity in assets 36.99%
Analysis of Changes in Capital
1964
Balance, January 1 $ 61,153.87
Net income (loss)* (5,880.71)
Other adjustments _________
$13.06
1.58:1.00
34.30%
1963
$ 63,279.79 
(2,125.92)
Balance, December 31 $ 55,273.16 $ 61,153.87
* Assuming tax rate of 50%, with no consideration given to tax carryback or 
carryforward.
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Exhibit 2
LARKIN ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC.
Summary of Balance Sheet Information
For the Years Ended March 31, 1960-1964
(continued)
1962 1961 1960
$174,368.01 $153,257.97 $ 79,947.54
105,729.20 92,777.28 27,752.58
$ 68,638.81 $ 60,480.69 $ 52,194.96
$ 10,180.74 $ 8,808.34 $ 4,547.99
1,460.24 889.07 691.75
$ 80,279.79 $ 70,178.10 $ 57,434.70
17,000.00 21,000.00 25,000.00
$ 63,279.79 $ 49,178.10 $ 32,434.70
$13.51 $10.82 $7.55
1.65:1.00 1.65:1.00 2.88:1.00
34.02% 30.18% 38.07%
1962 1961
$ 49,178.10 $ 32,434.70
6,632.17 7,409.95
7,469.52** 9,333.45**
$ 63,279.79 $ 49,178.10
** Nonrecurring capital gains.
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Simmons & Fowler billed most of its clients monthly. Mr. Simmons’ 
billing rate was $12.50 an hour for audit work, between $15 and $20 
an hour for tax work, and from $15 to $25 per hour for management 
services engagements. Although separate time records for audit and 
management services work were kept by the firm, clients’ bills did 
not distinguish between audit and management services charges, pri­
marily because most of the firm’s clients regarded the work performed 
for them by Simmons & Fowler as an integrated accounting service.
The bulk of Simmons & Fowler’s management services work was 
handled by its partners. In order to offer up-to-date and effective 
management services to their clients, the partners and their staff mem­
bers read extensively in the area of business administration, enrolled 
in management and systems courses at a local university, attended 
local and national certified public accounting meetings, and visited as 
many data processing machine shows as possible. In addition, the 
partners and their staff frequently discussed among themselves current 
management services engagements.
During 1963, Simmons & Fowler billed Larkin Electric Service, Inc., 
$2,800 for professional services performed. This billing included $125 
a month for the preparation of monthly financial statements.
Larkin Electric Service, Inc.
In 1923, Mr. Alvin Sykes opened a small electrical shop in Dallas, 
Texas. The business prospered, and in 1931 was incorporated as 
Sykes Electric Service, Inc. In 1950, Mr. Sykes allowed three of his 
key employees, including James Larkin, to acquire stock in his com­
pany. In 1951, Mr. Sykes died and his remaining stock was dis­
tributed according to his will to several of his relatives. Mr. Larkin, 
who became president of the company when Mr. Sykes died, followed 
an aggressive policy of expansion and, in 1957, in recognition of his 
efforts and leadership, the name of the company was changed to 
Larkin Electric Service, Inc. By 1964, James Larkin and the com­
pany’s treasurer, Lewis Adams, (another of the key employees who 
purchased stock in 1950) were the only principal stockholders em­
ployed by the company. These two men owned 30 per cent and 10 per 
cent of the outstanding stock, respectively. The remainder of the out­
standing stock was split among nineteen relatives of the late Mr. Sykes 
and the third key employee who had bought stock in 1950.
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During the fiscal year ending March 31, 1964, Larkin Electric Serv­
ice, Inc., lost about $6,000 on sales of approximately $616,000. As a 
result, the stockholders’ equity declined from about $61,000 to approxi­
mately $55,000. Exhibit 1 presents condensed income statements for 
the company between 1960 and 1964. Exhibit 2 shows summary data 
related to the company’s assets and liabilities during the same period. 
Exhibit 3 contains certain revenue and operating statistics for the ten 
years between 1955 to 1964.
Exhibit 3
LARKIN ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC.
Summary of Operating Statistics 
Years Ending March 31, 1955-1964
Sales
Direct Labor 
Cost
% of 
Sales
Administrative
and
General
Overhead
% of 
Sales
Net Income 
( Loss)
Before Taxes
% of 
Sales
1964 $616,500.95 $210,535.42 34.2 $146,973.22 23.9 $( 5,880.71) ( 1.0)
1963 826,258.33 244,770.10 29.6 129,608.75 15.7 ( 2,125.92) (0.3)
1962 694,388.22 219,978.91 31.7 117,184.55 16.9 13,264.34 1.9
1961 662,323.57 206,735.45 31.2 99,351.94 15.0 14,819.92 2.2
1960 400,647.95 146,538.77 36.6 74,707.97 18.6 (10,247.78) (2.6)
1959 507,567.33 137,966.35 27.2 90,076.66 17.7 ( 7,435.51) (1.5)
1958 411,540.95 136,612.33 33.2 79,016.21 19.2 (17,318.39) (4.2)
1957 618,346.03 176,689.34 28.6 103,978.18 16.8 13,320.27 2.2
1956 579,638.14 165,668.23 28.6 95,669.75 16.5 5,536.43 1.0
1955 520,278.61 121,108.73 23.3 80,193.56 15.4 12,937.90 2.5
Organization and Business
In April, 1964, the operations of Larkin Electric Service, Inc. were 
divided into five operating departments known as the construction 
department, the housewiring department, the Beech Division, the 
maintenance and repair department, and the retail department. In 
addition to the operating departments, Mr. Larkin’s staff included the 
following functions: accounting, marketing, maintenance, warehouse, 
estimating, and transportation. Exhibit 4 shows the sales, direct costs, 
and contributions of each of the five operating departments for the 
years 1960 through 1964. Exhibit 5 gives a breakdown of the overhead 
costs incurred by Mr. Larkin’s staff during the fiscal year 1964.
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Exhibit 4
LARKIN ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC. 
Departmental Operations 
Years Ending March 31, 1960-1964
Department
Construction
Sales
Direct Labor and 
Materials Costs
% of
Amount Sales
Mark-up
Amount
% of 
Sales
March 31, 1964 $405,736.40 $328,277.10 80.9% $77,459.30 19.1%
March 31, 1963 679,999.18 601,697.56 88.4 78,301.62 11.6
March 31, 1962 564,216.09 477,550.09 84.6 86,666.00 15.4
March 31, 1961 534,618.91 458,161.79 85.7 76,457.12 14.3
March 31, 1960 318,371.30 280,447.26 88.0 37,924.04 12.0
Housewiring
March 31, 1964 $ 56,091.83 $ 40,379.19 72.0% $15,712.64 28.0%
March 31, 1963 23,687.41 17,305.60 73.1 6,381.81 26.9
March 31, 1962 21,827.52 16,495.46 75.6 5,332.06 24.4
March 31, 1961 32,687.12 27,492.18 84.1 5,194.94 15.9
March 31, 1960
(3 mos.) 1,755.20 1,107.97 63.1 647.23 36.9
Beech Division 
March 31, 1964
(3 ½ mos.) $ 21,185.18 $ 14,190.75 67.0% $ 6,994.43 33.0%
Maintenance and Repair
March 31, 1964 $127,644.72 $ 88,949.71 69.7% $38,695.01 30.3%
March 31, 1963 116,206.52 76,636.86 65.9 39,569.66 34.1
March 31, 1962 103,491.86 70,082.02 67.7 33,409.84 32.3
March 31, 1961 88,506.94 59,800.55 67.6 28,706.39 32.4
March 31, 1960 73,887.53 50,088.16 67.8 23,799.37 32.2
Retail
March 31, 1964 $ 5,842.82 $ 4,537.33 77.7% $ 1,305.49 22.3%
March 31, 1963 6,365.22 5,407.20 84.9 958.02 15.1
March 31, 1962 4,852.75 4,048.47 83.4 804.28 16.6
March 31, 1961 6,510.62 5,562.21 85.4 948.41 14.6
March 31, 1960 6,633.92 5,291.43 79.8 1,342.49 20.2
The Construction Department accounted for about two-thirds of 
the company’s sales volume. This department performed electrical 
work on a subcontract basis for prime contractors in the construction 
industry. These jobs were obtained through open bidding against other 
local electrical contractors. The responsibility for preparing the com­
pany’s bids rested with the company’s three salaried estimators. Typi-
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Exhibit 5
LARKIN ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC. 
Analysis of Administrative and General Overhead 
Year Ending March 31, 1964
Account Amount
Officers’ salary $ 9,999.91
Bonus — key employees 972.00
Office salaries 16,957.31
Office expense 4,441.41
Estimating salaries 23,933.42
Legal and accounting 3,055.00
Selling and advertising 8,015.92
Uncollectible accounts 599.20
Depreciation 3,095.94
Fringe benefits 14,586.61
Contributions and membership 4,687.52
Occupancy expense 6,459.17
Insurance 5,372.03
Maintenance 862.02
Taxes and licenses 1,971.07
Truck expense 14,852.20
Salaries — foreman-estimator 17,753.00
Salaries — storage and delivery 7,280.93
Cost rework jobs 1,162.64
Noncompetitive payments 800.00
Miscellaneous 1,066.74
$147,924.04
Applied to unfinished jobs (950.82)
Total administrative and general overhead $146,973.22
cally, these estimators prepared their bids by first estimating the 
amount of direct costs needed to complete the job based on the prime 
contractor’s plans. The final bid was then obtained by adding to these 
direct costs some percentage of the direct costs to cover overhead and 
provide a profit. This method for pricing jobs was also followed by 
the housewiring department, as discussed below.
During recent years Mr. Larkin believed it had become harder to 
obtain profitable electrical contracts in the construction industry. Mr. 
Larkin had two reasons for this conclusion. First, the number of 
electrical contractors in the Dallas area capable of handling large con­
struction jobs had increased. Second, the amount of available work 
had not increased proportionately, primarily because an increasing
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number of electrical appliances and fixtures, such as commercial air 
conditioners, required less time to install because of improvements in 
the equipment specifically designed by the manufacturer to cut installa­
tion costs. Consequently, Mr. Larkin reasoned, with a greater number 
of contractors bidding on smaller and less complex jobs, the con­
tractor’s mark-up on direct costs had to shrink. Furthermore, Mr. 
Larkin anticipated that this trend toward lower mark-ups would con­
tinue for a number of years until all the weaker electrical contractors 
were forced out of the construction business.
During 1964, despite Mr. Larkin’s expected trend toward lower mar­
gins, Larkin Electric’s construction department actually increased its 
mark-up as a per cent of sales by about seven percentage points over 
1963. Mr. Larkin attributed this improvement to the fact that on 
several large construction jobs the actual direct costs had been less 
than estimated by the estimator in preparing his bid. This favorable 
situation, however, was an exception to the company’s usual experience. 
Typically, actual cost had exceeded estimated costs on construction 
contracts. Frank Simmons had attempted to convince Larkin that some 
management services work in the area of controlling job costs would 
be useful. However, Larkin wasn’t interested at the time.
During 1964, the major contracts for the installation of electrical 
equipment completed by the construction department included:
Customer
Total
Contract
Description of Contract Price
U. S. Post Office 
S & W Phone Co. 
Williams Street Building 
Jason Metal Co.
First National Bank 
U. S. Post Office 
Arts & Science Building 
Shady Lane Country Club 
Route 21 Supermarket
Connecting equipment 
New building 
Connecting equipment 
Remodeling 
Remodeling 
Remodeling 
New building 
Building addition 
New building
$76,492
65,000
54,816
48,395
39,990
31,000
23,330
21,770
16,210
The housewiring department, as its name implies, installed com­
plete electrical wiring systems in new dwellings and replaced existing 
systems in older houses. These jobs were obtained through either 
competitive bids prepared by the construction department’s estima­
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tors or Mr. Larkin’s personal friendships with building contractors. 
During 1964, this department’s sales reached an all-time high of 
$56,000, and Mr. Larkin anticipated that in the future the department’s 
sales would continue to grow, principally because city officials had 
predicted that the number of new dwellings constructed in the Dallas 
area would increase by some 5 per cent each year during the next 
five years.
The Beech Division was created in late 1964 by Larkin Electric to 
carry on the business of the recently acquired Beech Electrical Service 
Company. This division was headed by a foreman-estimator who su­
pervised the operations of three “trouble trucks” which performed 
emergency and routine electrical repairs for private households and 
offices. The foreman-estimator was also responsible for determining the 
charge for each job. Charges typically were based on twice the cost 
of the serviceman’s time plus the cost at retail of any parts used.
Typically, new business was obtained by the Beech division through 
phone responses to classified advertisements placed by the company 
in both the yellow pages of the telephone book and several local daily 
newspapers. Mr. Larkin planned to expand his “trouble truck” busi­
ness within the next two years through the acquisition of several 
other small electrical repair companies. This expansion plan was 
prompted by the fact that the Beech Division’s mark-up on direct costs 
(hereafter referred to as “mark-up”) since its creation had been about 
49 per cent (33 per cent of sales), which was the highest mark-up 
achieved by any of Larkin Electric’s departments during 1964 (see 
Exhibit 4).
The maintenance and repair department’s 1964 sales amounted to 
approximately $128,000. In many respects this department was sim­
ilar to the Beech Division in that it also operated three “trouble trucks” 
under the direction of a foreman-estimator. In addition, however, the 
department also had contracts to perform routine maintenance work 
on a number of office buildings located within the city of Dallas. These 
contracts, which required the company to perform a number of main­
tenance services at specified times for a fixed fee, were obtained 
through competitive bidding. Mr. Larkin expected this department to 
continue its steady upward sales trend over the near future.
The retail department was not a distinct operating group in the 
same sense as were the company’s four other departments. As an 
incidental service to its customers, the operators of the company’s 
“trouble trucks” sometimes sold electrical parts at retail prices to the 
householders they serviced. For instance, if a trouble truck was called
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to fix a light switch, the serviceman might also sell a box of fuses 
to the customer. On the company’s books the revenues and costs 
related to the repairing of the light switch would be associated with, 
say, the Beech Division’s accounts, whereas the profit on the fuse box 
sale would be recorded in the accounts of the retail department. Mr. 
Larkin expected the retail department’s annual sales to remain at 
about $6,000 during the next few years.
Cost Structure
Following the question posed in the first paragraph of the case, the 
conversation recorded below took place between James Larkin, pres­
ident of Larkin Electric Service, Inc. and Frank Simmons, partner of 
Simmons & Fowler:
Simmons: Well, Frank, that’s an interesting possibility you’ve raised, 
but in order to answer it we’ll need to take a careful look 
at your company’s cost structure. First of all, let me ask 
a few questions about your direct costs. If you dropped 
the construction department, would all of the costs included 
in that department’s direct cost accounts be eliminated?
Larkin: Yes. Obviously, if I didn’t do any construction work the
direct material costs would be avoided. Also, all of the 
direct labor costs could be eliminated very easily. As you 
know, most of my direct labor is hired on a daily basis and 
nobody’s job is guaranteed by either the company or the 
union.
Simmons: OK, that’s what I thought. Now let’s turn to your ad­
ministrative and general overhead costs. As you look back 
over your 1964 administrative and general overhead costs 
see Exhibit 5), what costs do you think you could have 
reduced without impairing significantly the efficiency of 
your operations?
Larkin: Are you including the construction department?
Simmons: Yes.
Larkin: This shouldn’t be too difficult as I have been giving a lot
of thought to administrative and overhead costs since you 
showed me that chart relating my overhead costs to sales 
volume during the last 10 years ( see Exhibit 6). It is very
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LARKIN ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC. Exhibit 6
Historical Relationship of Administrative 
and General Overhead to Sales
For Years Ending March 31, 1955-1964 
Administrative and  
General Overhead
(thousands of dollars)
* See sales in thousands of dollars, Simmons’ explanation of the abnormal 
overhead.
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clear from the chart that based on past experience my 
administrative and general overhead cost last year should 
have been about $100,000, rather than $147,000.
Simmons: I’m glad you had a chance to look at the chart and found 
it interesting. Do you think you could have gotten by last 
year with lower overhead costs?
Larkin: Sure. For instance, the office salary could have been cut
by about $3,000 if I had taken your advice and replaced 
one of my clerks with an accounting machine, but as you 
know I didn’t want to let the particular employee go be­
cause she had been with the company so long.
The estimating salary expense could have been reduced 
$7,500 by firing one of my three estimators. Tom Allen, 
who has been with the company since 1961, seems to have 
lost his ability to accurately estimate the costs for large con­
struction jobs. In fact, as I think I told you, I have fired 
Tom as of the end of this month. I think I can get by with 
only two estimators this year.
The selling and advertising expense would have been 
lower by about $2,000 if I had not bought some extra spot 
radio time, which won’t be required in the future. Also, 
much of the entertainment expense which is included in 
this account could have been cut with a negligible effect 
on our sales effort.
The contributions and membership expense could also 
have been cut $1,500 by cancelling our membership in the 
National Electrical Contractors Association. The annual fee 
for belonging to this group is $1,500.
These items are the big potential savings that come to 
mind. No doubt there are many more places where I can 
reduce my overhead costs just by tightening the belt 
somewhat.
Simmons: Now, let me ask another question about your 1964 over­
head costs. If the construction department had closed 
down on, say, December 1, 1963, and assuming all other 
things being equal, what are some of the costs you could 
have eliminated from your 1964 administrative and general 
overhead costs?
Larkin: Off hand, I would say office salaries could have been cut
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by $9,000, first, by the elimination of the clerk I mentioned 
earlier and second, by the elimination of two more clerks 
whose functions related primarily to the construction de­
partment.
Obviously, if I didn’t have a construction department 
the salaried estimators would not be needed. I think my 
foreman-estimators could handle the estimating needs of 
the housewiring department.
Fringe benefits are variable with wages paid. So, if I 
eliminate the construction labor I automatically eliminate 
a large portion of my fringe benefit expense, perhaps, as 
much as $9,000.
With fewer employees on my staff I would need less 
office space, which means a lower rent. Under these con­
ditions I could reduce the occupancy expense by about 
$2,000. A lot of my insurance expense arises from insurance 
carried on my employees, particularly my direct labor 
employees. As you can imagine this insurance is expensive 
because my direct labor group engages in dangerous work. 
Therefore, if I eliminated the construction work, my in­
surance bill would be considerably lower.
Simmons: Do you have any idea of how much lower the insurance 
expense might be?
Larkin: Oh, I’d say about $2,500.
The truck expense and storage and delivery salaries 
would be lower by some $6,000 because I would be able to 
eliminate that part of the trucking and storage expense 
related to the construction department.
Again, I am sure there are many more overhead cost 
items I could reduce if I eliminated the construction de­
partment. The items I have mentioned are the large obvi­
ous savings.
Simmons: I know we discussed this topic last month, but what do 
you now think your construction sales will be for fiscal year 
1965?
Larkin: I expect they will be about the same as last year. Already,
we have several nice contracts. However, I do expect the 
direct costs related to construction sales to increase some­
what. Perhaps they will go up to 84 per cent of sales as 
compared to 81 per cent during 1964.
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As for the other departments, I expect the housewiring 
department, the repair and maintenance department, and 
the Beech Division all to increase their sales by about 10 
per cent each. The retail department’s sales should remain 
at about their 1964 level. Also, I think all of these depart­
ments’ 1965 direct costs should bear the same relationship 
to sales as during 1964, except for the housewiring depart­
ment. Margins will probably narrow a little there, and I 
would guess that direct costs might rise from 72 per cent in 
1964 to 76 per cent or so in 1965.
Simmons: Frank, I would like to spend a few hours thinking about 
the information you have just given to me. Also, I wanted 
to review your financial statements in greater detail. Per­
haps, we could meet for lunch next week and take up our 
conversation again.
Larkin: All right.
Questions
1. What analytical procedures would you follow in order to deter­
mine whether or not Mr. Larkin should discontinue his company’s 
construction department?
2. In particular, what cost and revenue items included in Exhibits 
1, 3, 4, and 5 are relevant to the decision to drop the construction 
business? Using the data available in the case, what recommendation 
would you make to Mr. Larkin?
3. What further information would you like to have in order to 
improve your analysis of the desirability of dropping the construction 
business? How would you go about getting this information?
4. How many man-hours do you estimate your complete analysis 
would take?
Case Commentary
The week following the conversation reported in the case, James 
Larkin and Frank Simmons met for lunch. Excerpts from their con­
versation are reproduced below:
Simmons: Jim, I think you ought to retain your construction depart­
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ment for at least one more year. I have three major reasons 
for this recommendation. First, if your sales and my budget 
predictions for this year—which I will discuss later—can be 
accomplished, your company will report a respectable profit 
figure for 1965. However, if you eliminate the construction 
department your nonconstruction activities will show a 
slight loss. Second, I think we ought to wait a year to see 
if we can get better control over your selling and admin­
istrative costs before we take such a drastic step as closing 
down the construction department. Third, in a years 
time we will have a better feel for the future trends in the 
electrical contracting business.
Larkin: Can I see your figures?
Simmons: Certainly. First, I made an analysis of your 1964 overhead 
costs to see what reductions you might have been able to 
make last year without seriously hurting your operations. 
Incidentally, this first set of figures includes 1964 operations 
of the construction department.
Here is a list of the overhead items and the amounts 
which, in retrospect, I think you could have eliminated last 
year if you had been more “hard-nosed” about your admin­
istrative and overhead costs:
Table I
Possible Reductions in 1964 Overhead Costs
Item Reduction
Bonus — key employees $ 972.00
Office — salaries 3,000.00
Office expense 600.00
Estimating salaries 7,500.00
Selling and advertising 2,600.00
Fringe benefits 500.00
Contributions and membership 1,500.00
Occupancy expense 200.00
Cost of rework jobs 500.00
Total $17,372.00
Larkin: Frank, as I figure it, you now think that I could have got­
ten by last year with administrative and overhead costs of 
about $130,000 rather than the $147,000 actually spent.
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Simmons: That’s right. Also, $25,000 of this $130,000 was incurred in 
1964 for the first time in anticipation of increased sales 
which unfortunately didn’t materialize. This consisted of 
$3,000 in office salaries, $15,000 in estimating salaries, 
$3,000 in fringe benefits, and $4,000 in salaries, storage, and 
delivery. Do you think you can operate this year with only 
$130,000 of overhead costs?
Larkin: I should think so.
Simmons: Fine, now let me give you a list of the overhead items I 
think you could have avoided last year if you had operated 
without the construction department (Table II). Where 
relevant, this list of reductions also includes the potential 
savings I just mentioned:
Table II
Possible Reductions in 1964 Overhead Costs Due to Elimination
of Construction Department
Item Reduction
Bonus—key employees $ 972.00
Office salaries 9,000.00
Office expense 1,000.00
Estimating salaries 23,933.42
Legal and accounting 1,000.00
Selling and advertising 2,600.00
Fringe benefits 10,000.00
Contributions and membership 2,000.00
Occupancy expense 2,000.00
Insurance 3.000.00
Maintenance 200.00
Taxes and licenses 200.00
Truck expense 4,000.00
Salaries, storage, and delivery 2,000.00
Cost of rework jobs 500.00
Miscellaneous 500.00
Total $62,905.42
Larkin: Let me see if I understand the significance of the figures
you just gave me. If I had only operated the Beech Division 
and the housewiring, maintenance and repair, and retail 
departments last year, my administrative and overhead
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costs would have been about $84,000, rather than the 
$147,000 I actually incurred.
Simmons: That’s right.
Larkin: I think I probably could operate my nonconstruction busi­
ness during 1965 and hold my overheads to about $84,000. 
What do you think?
Simmons: Well, I am not as confident that you could cut your over­
head cost back to $84,000 as I am that you could cut to 
$130,000. But, in any event, let me get on with my analysis.
Next, I calculated your projected 1965 sales, direct costs, 
and contribution for each department as follows:
Table III
Department
Projected 1965 Contribution by Departments
Contribution
(in thousands of dollars)
Estimated
Sales
Direct Costs 
Direct Costs as % of Sales
Construction $406 $341 84% $65
Housewiring 62 47 76% 15
Beech Division
(12 mos.) 79 53 67% 26
Maintenance
and repair 140 98 70% 42
Retail 6 5 83% 1
Total $693 $544 78% $149
Now, if your 1965 administrative and overhead costs turn 
out as predicted, that is, about $130,000, your company 
will have a record profit of about $19,000. As you can see, 
this is due primarily to having the full effect of the Beech 
Division, even though construction margins will be lower.
However, if you exclude the construction department 
from these projected results, your projected 1965 sales 
would be $287,000 and your projected 1965 direct costs 
would be $203,000. Thus, your 1965 contribution to ad­
ministrative and overhead costs would be $84,000. Of 
course, under these conditions, the projected administra­
tive and overhead costs are only $84,000, too. But, after
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eliminating the construction department, you would still 
only be able to break even for the year.
Putting it another way, the construction department 
will earn a 1965 contribution of $65,000. The overhead 
costs you could save by dropping the department are only 
$46,000, the difference between $130,000 with the depart­
ment and $84,000 without it. Thus, the construction de­
partment’s contribution in 1965 is $19,000 more than the 
overhead costs you could eliminate, and that $19,000 repre­
sents your entire profit for the year.
Larkin: Well, you can’t argue with figures. I guess it was wrong
to consider dropping our construction business.
Simmons: No, I don’t agree with you. These figures are only projec­
tions and they may not be realized. In particular, if you 
can’t reduce your administrative and overhead costs below 
their current level of $147,000, it is unlikely that your 
projected profit will be achieved.
Also, I am concerned that if you did drop your con­
struction business at this time, you may find you can’t cut 
your administrative and overhead costs to the projected 
$84,000.
Therefore, I recommend we look at the situation again 
next April when we have the operating results for the fiscal 
year ending March 31, 1965 available. In the meantime, 
I suggest you try to reduce your administrative and over­
head costs to the $130,000 level and, at the same time, seek 
to achieve your predicted sales volume.
Larkin: That makes sense. Let’s wait till next year to decide this
question.
The Situation in April 1965
In April 1965, one year after the events of the case, James Larkin 
received his company’s 1965 income statement from Simmons & Fowler 
(see Table IV ). Simmons had attempted to  have Larkin prepare 
interim financial statements, however Larkin had never gotten around 
to it.
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Table IV
LARKIN ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC.
Statement of Income 
For the Year Ended March 31, 1965
Sales
Direct cost of sales:
Materials
Labor
Total Direct Costs
Markup on sales
Administrative and general over­
head expense
Loss on operations
Other income less other deductions 
Net loss
$620,846.83
$286,149.41
237,780.33
$523,929.74
$ 96,917.09
144,534.08
$(47,616.99)
(425.48)
$(48,042.47)
In addition, he received a breakdown of his companys’ sales and direct 
costs by departments (see Table V) and a schedule of its administrative 
and general overhead expenses (see Table VI).
Table V
LARKIN ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC. 
Schedule of Direct Costs and Sales by Department
For the Year Ended March 31, 1965
Direct Costs Contribution
Department Sales Amount
% of 
Sales Amount
% of 
Sales
Construction $283,491.60 $283,653.28 100.1 $( 161.68) (0.1)
Housewiring 71,229.38 56,333.36 79.1 14,896.02 20.9
Beech Division 
Maintenance
73,637.76 49,434.16 67.1 24,203.60 32.9
and Repair 
Supple Division
142,523.35 99,895.51 70.1 42,627.84 29.9
(4 months)* 44,632.69 30,139.06 67.5 14,493.63 32.5
Retail 5,332.05 4,474.37 83.9 857.68 16.1
$620,846.83 $523,929.74 84.4 $96,917.09 15.6
* In December 1964, the Supple Electrical Service Company was acquired. 
This company’s operations were similar to those of the Beech Division.
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Table VI
LARKIN ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC.
Schedule of Administrative and General Overhead Expenses
For the Years Ending March 31, 1964-1965
Increase
Account 1964 1965 (Decrease)
Officers’ salaries $ 9,999.91 $ 10,000.00 $ .09
Bonus—key employees 972.00 - ( 972.00)
Office salaries 16,957.31 13,794.39 ( 3,162.92)
Office expense  4,441.41 5,374.10 932.69
Estimating salaries 23,933.42 8,482.80 (15,450.62)
Legal and accounting 3,055.00 6,743.84 3,688.84
Selling and advertising 8,015.92 5,490.61 ( 2,525.31)
Uncollectible Accounts 599.20 1,177.08 577.88
Depreciation 3,095.94 3,745.55 649.61
Fringe benefits 14,586.61 13,687.48 ( 899.13)
Contributions and membership 4,687.52 2,725.95 ( 1,961.57)
Occupancy expense 6,459.17 6,330.66 ( 128.51)
Insurance 5,372.03 7,536.75 2,164.72
Maintenance 862.02 1,513.73 651.71
Taxes and licenses 1,971.07 1,759.91 ( 211.16)
Truck expense
Salaries— foreman-
14,852.20 15,014.87 162.67
estimator
Salaries— storage and
17,753.00 25,809.94 8,056.94
delivery 7,280.93 9,669.09 2,388.16
Cost rework jobs 1,162.64 1,094.80 ( 67.84)
Noncompetitive payments 800.00 2,400.00 1,600.00
Miscellaneous 1,066.74 1,248.33 181.59
Applied to unfinished
$147,924.04 $143,599.88 $(4,324.16)
jobs
Total selling and
(950.82) 934.20 1,885.02
administrative $146,973.22 $144,534.08 $(2,439.14)
Soon after Mr. Larkin received his year-end statements and sched­
ules (Tables IV-VI), he met with Mr. Simmons to discuss whether 
or not he should close down his company’s construction department. 
Here are excerpts from their conversation:
Simmons: Jim, what is your appraisal of your company’s 1965 results?
Larkin: Well, after a good start our construction business unex­
pectedly went quickly downhill during the last part of the
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year. The only way we could get jobs was to submit bids 
that hardly covered our direct costs. Even then, however, 
we still couldn’t get as much business as last year. Per­
sonally, I can’t see any reason to stay in the construction 
business as I think the current unfavorable conditions are 
going to persist for a long time to come.
As for the other departments, they turned out about 
as I expected. I was particularly pleased to see that the 
Beech Division and our newly acquired Supple Division 
both performed well. Their success makes me all the more 
determined to get out of the construction business and con­
centrate on expanding the “trouble truck” service.
Simmons: How far back do you now think you could have cut your 
overhead costs during 1965, if you had decided to drop the 
construction department last April?
Larkin: Well, first of all let me say that I got my overhead under
better control last year than is perhaps indicated by the 
1965 schedule of administrative and general overhead ex­
penses (see Table VI). For instance, you will see that I 
came close to meeting my overhead target of $130,000, if 
you remove the increase in the legal and accounting de­
partments, which resulted from an unanticipated law suit 
and the increase in insurance, which resulted from a drastic 
increase in insurance rates, and the increases in the salaries 
of the foreman-estimators and the storage and delivery 
employees, both of which came about because of the in­
creased business resulting from the Supple purchase.
Now, to answer your question—if I had eliminated the 
cost of the construction department from my 1965 income 
statements, I believe that I could have reduced my over­
head to about $100,000 during 1965. Of course, I must 
admit that I now have a better grasp of the problems in­
volved in reducing costs than I did at this time last year. 
In fact, I doubt if I was strong enough last year to make 
some of those reductions I talked about. Even if some 
more unforeseen expenses materialize, I should be able to 
keep overhead at about this level in the future.
Simmons: Well, it’s very obvious now that your best course of action 
is to close down the construction department. Obviously, 
when you expect that a department will fail to cover its
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direct costs for a number of years, it’s not worthwhile keep­
ing that department, assuming the effects of the other bene­
fits associated with its continuance, such as the ability to 
react quickly to an increased volume of business in this 
field, reputation, related business, etc., are not significant. 
Also, if you can reduce your overhead costs by closing the 
department, you are that much better off. In addition, 
concentrating on the high margin “trouble truck” business 
makes a lot of sense. But you can’t stop here. The company 
is only in a breakeven position and will stay at this point 
unless overhead is further reduced or other profitable busi­
ness is obtained.
Subsequently, in June 1965, Electrical Contractors, Inc. finished its 
last construction job and closed down its construction department. 
At that time, Simmons prepared a projection for fiscal year 1966 that 
indicated sales of $400,000, a contribution to overhead of $125,000, 
overhead costs of $127,000, and a loss of $2,000. Mr. Larkin anticipated 
his company would report profits in 1967, which would be the first full 
year’s operation without the construction department.
Finally, in June 1965, Mr. Simmons estimated that during the period 
between April 1964 to June 1965, the total amount of billable time he 
had devoted to the question of whether or not Electrical Contractors 
should drop its construction department amounted to about 30 man­
hours.
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